Operation Market-Garden: Could it have been sucessful?

Half_Life_Expert#4276

This will be the first in a series of historical discussion threads I have in mind, to examine possible "What ifs?" in military history. Not so much about what would have happened if the operation had succeeded/failed, but rather if it could have succeeded or if it was possible for disaster to occur.

Operation Market-Garden in 1944 is one of my favorite military operations to study. For one thing, in a part of the war in Europe that is in my country dominated by discussions of US operations, it was primarily a British offensive, with support of US Airborne and Polish forces. It is also one of those spectacular failures that pop up every now and then in history. This one even coined one of my favorite phrases: "A Bridge too Far", which is indeed the title of the novel and film about Market-Garden.

If you have no idea what I am talking about or would like to refresh your memory on this operation, here is the Wiki page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden

Also if you have never heard of "Market-Garden" before, perhaps the Battle of Arnhem rings a bell, that was one of the central clashes of this battle: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Arnhem

to get things going, my general stance is that Market-Garden was an inherently flawed plan that had very few chances of success as it depended too heavily on too many things going right.

Message to the Mods: As this thread does involve discussing something that failed and how it could have gone better, there is a chance someone could spoil it with Rome II bashing, so I request removal of any posts on this thread related to Rome II or total war at all

Astalano

Market Garden was an operation that happened far too soon without enough planning. It was assumed the Germans would be unprepared for it and that the Allies could adequately defend their vast supply lines. They were wrong in both assumptions and suffered massively for it.

They also did improve on the operation in the subsequent operations that recognised that a slow and steady advance to Germany, meticulously demolishing German forces and freeing occupied cities, was the best way of ensuring the fastest possible victory.

This operation stresses the need for patience and intelligence in warfare, as well as not overstretching your supply lines.

Moreover, I don't really like the Allied war strategy in the Second World War. It was incredibly inhumane in that it provided troops with far less effective equipment than their adversaries and resulted in many unnecessary casualties from a lack of foresight. The German strategy was far more efficient, but the industry in Germany was what let it down, as a protracted war caused it to buckle under pressure.

Nisemono

Astalano wrote: »

Market Garden was an operation that happened far too soon without enough planning. It was assumed the Germans would be unprepared for it and that the Allies could adequately defend their vast supply lines. They were wrong in both assumptions and suffered massively for it.

They also did improve on the operation in the subsequent operations that recognised that a slow and steady advance to Germany, meticulously demolishing German forces and freeing occupied cities, was the best way of ensuring the fastest possible victory.

This operation stresses the need for patience and intelligence in warfare, as well as not overstretching your supply lines.

Moreover, I don't really like the Allied war strategy in the Second World War. It was incredibly inhumane in that it provided troops with far less effective equipment than their adversaries and resulted in many unnecessary casualties from a lack of foresight. The German strategy was far more efficient, but the industry in Germany was what let it down, as a protracted war caused it to buckle under pressure.

The German strategy was more efficient? By using Panzer I and II against heavier tanks? By sending untested tanks to the field that half get abandoned due to technical faults? The Wehrmacht's (especially the Heer's) logistics was an insane nightmare that any logistician from the US or the Soviet would laugh themselves silly over. There was nothing that Fritz did in WW2 was efficient. Once the Soviet Stavka got their s*** together, they showed Fritz how to whip the c*** out of others using an inferior industry and population base.

Before anyone claims that the Soviets used human wave tactics, they didn't, and people who think so need to get a military history education before attempting to enter the discussion.

Astalano

Nisemono wrote: »

The German strategy was more efficient? By using Panzer I and II against heavier tanks? By sending untested tanks to the field that half get abandoned due to technical faults? The Wehrmacht's (especially the Heer's) logistics was an insane nightmare that any logistician from the US or the Soviet would laugh themselves silly over.

I did say their industry had problems. The army itself was modern and efficient, at least until the mid-late part of the war. This doesn't include Hitler's politics and pointless division of various institutions into smaller competing branches.

Also, they used their lighter tanks in combination with other army elements to overcome heavier tanks. The Allies and Soviets just sent more tanks.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

Nisemono wrote: »

The German strategy was more efficient? By using Panzer I and II against heavier tanks? By sending untested tanks to the field that half get abandoned due to technical faults? The Wehrmacht's (especially the Heer's) logistics was an insane nightmare that any logistician from the US or the Soviet would laugh themselves silly over. There was nothing that Fritz did in WW2 was efficient. Once the Soviet Stavka got their s*** together, they showed Fritz how to whip the c*** out of others using an inferior industry and population base.

Before anyone claims that the Soviets used human wave tactics, they didn't, and people who think so need to get a military history education before attempting to enter the discussion.

when you refer to Panzers I and II, you mean the earlier war campaigns. Both of those tanks were very much out of service long before D-Day (and Market-Garden was 3 months after D-Day). Plus, the allied tanks in 1940 (British Matilda and French Char B1) were heavier, but the German tanks ran circles around them, and that is what won them the ground battle. and the Allied tanks were used piecemeal to support infantry, the Germans concentrated their tanks. By 1943-44, it was the Germans that wielded a lot of heavy tanks (Panther and Tiger Series) along with some older models, chiefly the excellent Panzer IV, while the primary tanks of the Allies were generally lighter (Sherman and T-34 series among others).

I wouldn't blame the Wehrmacht's late war logistical problems on the logistics system itself, rather on the air supremacy of the Allies by summer 1944 and the poor leadership (as old Adolf himself was more or less running the show himself on the strategic and operational levels).

Even all the way until the end in 1945, the German troops were very capable soldiers, capable of adapting to any situation they were thrown against, at least on the tactical and operational level. THis was shown with Market-Garden, as the panzer units in the Arnhem area quickly reacted to the airborne landings and send armored units south to intercept XXX Corps. There were a number of times late in the battle when the supply route, known as "Hell's Highway", was in danger of being cut by determined Panzer attacks.

Although this is off topic (remember this is about a battle on the Western Front, not the East), the Soviets had a significant numbers advantage. Im sure on at least a handful of occasions, some small tactical units might have used human waves, but im sure you are right as well. It was really a combonation of numbers, supply problems that are inherent with invading Russia, and a very incompetent supreme commander that was micromanaging like crazy.

but to be clear, lets remain with Market-Garden and fighting techniques on the Western Front, this battle we are talking about had nothing to do with the Red Army

mcoffm

Market Garden was a brilliant plan. It really was. The problem was Monty and his ego. If I remember right Ike wanted to change the plan somehow I cant remember now what he wanted to do but Monty was against it {of course} To much of WW2 was spent keeping the Brits happy instead of winning the war. No offense is meant.

Maeda_Toshiie

Astalano wrote: »

I did say their industry had problems. The army itself was modern and efficient, at least until the mid-late part of the war. This doesn't include Hitler's politics and pointless division of various institutions into smaller competing branches.

Also, they used their lighter tanks in combination with other army elements to overcome heavier tanks. The Allies and Soviets just sent more tanks.

Erm, it is a big misconception that the Heer was modern and efficient. It was never. The generals told Hitler that it would take them till 45/46 before they were ready for war. Meanwhile horses was the biggest number of prime movers in the Heer from 39 to 45. There were never enough half tracks for the panzer divisions, let alone the panzergrenadiers who had to make do with trucks. I guess the panzergrenadiers were lucky not to have to use bicycles. There were never enough tanks throughout the war, and so panzergrenadier units made do with assault guns in their panzer regiment. Meanwhile, the German factories were so insufficient in providing tanks for the Heer that Rommel commanded a division driving Czech tanks made in Czech factories.

In contrast, the US Army was so heavily motorized that the Germans were shocked. The US had access to such a plentiful supply of lead acid batteries that they could create the best artillery force (in terms of speed and accuracy) in WW2. The Soviets had to use numbers to counteract the lack of accuracy, and use them in direct fire support role to compensate (to deadly effect on the defenders).

The Germans were never efficient when it comes to weapons design, and they forgot the cardinal principle of war logistics in the quest for the "perfect" weapon. They wanted a heavy, long range bomber that was capable of dive bombing (go figure), an automatic rifle that does not lose propulsion gas to preserve (which required complicated sealing systems that never worked), while the Stg 44 came into existence due to the unusual common sense rarely displayed by Wehrmacht officers in the procurement office.

Thankfully, the Heer didn't forget the battle of annihilation concept, or the Allies would might been badly screwed...

---

As for tank vs tank combat: In France '40, panzers used tactics to flank heavy French and British tanks, thanks to superior training and tactical doctrine. In France '44, US Army did the same against inexperienced German tank crews. Both sides are equal on this score, except that the Panthers were sitting ducks when they didn't have a clear range of fire.

And no, the Soviets didn't send just send more tanks. They sent more tanks with bigger guns (T34-85). Of course, German local superiority in terms of heavy tanks didn't matter in the face of a Soviet army who had mastered combined arms in a way the Germans never did.

Rath_Darkblade

Maeda Toshiie wrote: »

The Germans were never efficient when it comes to weapons design, and they forgot the cardinal principle of war logistics in the quest for the "perfect" weapon. They wanted a heavy, long range bomber that was capable of dive bombing (go figure)...

Not to take away from your post, Maeda (which is excellent), but what do you mean by "The Germans"? Do you mean Goering (for the Luftwaffe), or Hitler, or Messerschmitt? I read that Hitler interfered so much in the research and development of fighters and bombers that it was a wonder anything was actually done (though Prof. Messerschmitt himself had his bad days too, as with the Me-210). One example of Hitler's interference was with the Me-323 (popularly known as the Gigant). In 1940, Hitler decided he wanted a plane to carry tanks and other heavy equipment across the Channel, in preparation for Operation Sealion). The Gigant had a huge freight capacity, but prototypes couldn't even get off the ground. By the time Messerschmitt worked out how to tow the monster, Sealion was cancelled.

But Messerschmitt wasn't going to give up. The problem was that when he was finished, his giant bomber was pitifully slow, less than half the speed of the British and American fighters, and thus a sitting duck. It was transferred to the Eastern Front, but as the Soviet fighters gained the ascendancy in the East, there was nowhere for the German monster bombers to hide. They cost a large part of Germany's aerial production capacity to no useful purpose.

Can you please clarify which Germans you mean?

daelin4#9896

A lot of factors brought Market Garden to a predictable failure. Had these factors been addressed then the issue would have likely been solved. But of course they did not.

Now whether it would have succeeded despite these factors is a challenge, because it would sort of depend on how the German side reacted. Had they reacted rather poorly then even a flawed plan would have worked. But that's why you plan and organize, in the event the opposition does the same.

@Rath I believe he meant those Germans in charge. There were the guys that made things happen, and there were the guys that decided if those guys could make those things.

[Deleted User]

The Market-Garden plan wasn't flawed, per se, but there were a number of issues in both planning and execution.

The 'rush' mentality that permeated all headquarters over-rode the majority of available intelligence (not so much in relation to 2SS Pzr Korps, but more so to the fact that the defence was coalescing and the great advance was over). Although the fallschirmjager korps was a complete shock to them.

Planning

Lack of co-ordination between the ground force staffs, air force staffs, and airborne staff...contributed to by Montgomery not accepting the role of overall commander, and essentially stepping back and letting everyone do their own thing, even though it was his plan, he was the one to convince Eisenhower to adopt is 'one thrust strategy', and the entire operation was in his area of responsibility. This basically meant that the airforce had control over where and when drops were made, and the there was no co-ordination between the ground force and landed airborne forces (although comms problems did come into play).

Insufficient use was made of allied airpower, which had all the tactical and strategic resources of the USAAF and RAF available.

Execution

Montgomery failed to oversight the operation...nothing further needs saying, it was the most complete failure of leadership and generalship in known history. He didn't even attempt to do his job.

Co-ordination of tactical air was poor.

No use was made of the strategic assets, nor of the vast majority of tactical assets available. A ring of airpower could have been put around Arnhem and Oosterbeek, which would have essentially been a cordone sanitaire. Plus, german movement anywhere in the vicinity of the ground operation could have virtually been closed down.

Insufficient ground forces were available for the objective of the operation - crossing the Rhine and ending the war. Montgomery's plan called for 30 Corps to do this...one armoued and two motorised infantry divisions and support elements.

No plan was drawn up for what was to happen when 30 Corps crossed the Rhine...the plan was all about 'getting there', and in the concept that wasn't to involve the ground forces fighting any serious opposition, so there in fact was no plan for actual battle.

The last two points highlight the major flaw in Montgomery - shortsightedness and lack of attention to detail. He failed in the pursuit following the victory at El Alemein, for these two reasons, although circumstances and the pressing need for good news (in Churchill's eyes) blinded everyone but the troops and allies to Montgomery's failings. He repeated the errors at Normandy, and cost a lot of Canadians and Brits their lives, and he repeated it again with Market-Garden.

dge1

I agree that the primary failure with the plan was the leadership. I also believe that the genesis of the idea came out of the competition between two men, Bernard Montgomery and George Patton. Neither was happy with the Allied strategy being used on the Western Front, moving along a broad battle front. Each was constantly looking for ways to gain influence and the competition for resources between them was almost as fierce as the actual fighting.

Market-Garden is the kind of thing someone can come up with from looking at a map too long. Once the thought takes hold the objections and problems can be easily "solved" by a staff instructed to find a way to "make it happen".

I also believe, and agree with the statements already, the politics played a large part in the decision by Eisenhower and the Allied staff to allowed it to go forward. While the same thought and planning could not have been done like that of D-Day for example, someone should have asked a couple of what-if questions and worked out possible solutions to the various potential failure points. That was not done and it sealed the stamp of failure on a wild scheme that might have possibly have worked.

SmokeScreen

Finally, I've been waiting for a proper (war) history thread. Unfortunately I don't have time right now to give a proper response.

nigesybar

[QUOTE= To much of WW2 was spent keeping the Brits happy instead of winning the war. No offense is meant.[/QUOTE]
Lol from a UK citizen. None taken.

nigesybar

Monty is an interesting character and rather encapsulates Britsh WW2 thinking. I think he was imbued with the British horror of the hideous losses in WW1 and an acute awareness of limited manpower but clung to the already outdated British view of Empire. Despite this his tactics up to Market Garden were somewhat blunt in terms of concentrating overwhelming frontal force and defeating the enemy head on (Alamein and Caen). In these terms MG seems like a deviation from the norm but I believe the western front was stagnating at the time, the Russians were winning the race for Berlin and the British were running out of men and influence. In hindsight it looks like a last roll of the dice.
As for if it could have worked? I'd say yes if the intelligence had been better/heeded but it was certainly risky. Very unMonty.
Fortunately Hitler threw his dice in the Ardennes 2 months later and kinda solved the problem.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

I think another factor might also be a case of "Victory Disease". After the breakout from Normandy and the fall of the Falasie Pocket, the German forces opposing the Allies were for the most part retreating all along the front. Even though they were aware of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area, they just assumed that it wasn't serviceable and unable of participating in major combat.

In this way Market-Garden, because of its failure, might have been a little good for the Allies in that it was a "slap in the face" so to speak in that it reminded the Allies that Germany wasn't finished yet, and was still capable of putting up a tough fight.

Atkins

yes it could have been successful if XXX corps had advanced along a wider front. German resistance was concentrated into such a small area that the British spearhead had no chance to break through.

Maeda_Toshiie

Rath Darkblade wrote: »

Not to take away from your post, Maeda (which is excellent), but what do you mean by "The Germans"? Do you mean Goering (for the Luftwaffe), or Hitler, or Messerschmitt? I read that Hitler interfered so much in the research and development of fighters and bombers that it was a wonder anything was actually done (though Prof. Messerschmitt himself had his bad days too, as with the Me-210). One example of Hitler's interference was with the Me-323 (popularly known as the Gigant). In 1940, Hitler decided he wanted a plane to carry tanks and other heavy equipment across the Channel, in preparation for Operation Sealion). The Gigant had a huge freight capacity, but prototypes couldn't even get off the ground. By the time Messerschmitt worked out how to tow the monster, Sealion was cancelled.

But Messerschmitt wasn't going to give up. The problem was that when he was finished, his giant bomber was pitifully slow, less than half the speed of the British and American fighters, and thus a sitting duck. It was transferred to the Eastern Front, but as the Soviet fighters gained the ascendancy in the East, there was nowhere for the German monster bombers to hide. They cost a large part of Germany's aerial production capacity to no useful purpose.

Can you please clarify which Germans you mean?

I'd say in general (not any particular German person), though I agree Hitler made things worse. For example, after the T-34 shock, they had two possible solutions, a) a T34 like vehicle, and b) what became the Panther. The chosen design performed better on paper (and on the never fulfilled assumption that the final drive was redesigned and manufactured to work), but significantly more complex (the road wheel and suspension design is a maintenance PITA). Another is the FG 42, which was unnecessarily complex. For whatever reason, the Heer couldn't accept an intermediate round, until the Soviets forced them to, and the intermediate round issue was something the Germans had been looking into way before the war started.

==================================

On the topic of Market Garden, I believe the mission was pushed ahead due to thoughts that the 1st Allied Airborne Army was sitting around doing nothing (after Normandy), and given that there were prior missions cancelled, the feeling what that they ought to be doing something. So the mission was rammed through and 1st Airborne (UK) got decimated along the way.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

I have a copy of Montgomery's Memoirs that I used for a school project 4 years ago. There is a chapter on Market Garden, although it is emphasized around the Battle of Arnhem. I don't particularly agree with his view, but I thought I would put it up here.

He makes only a few points on why Market-Garden failed, and I paraphrase them here:

#1. "the operation was not thought of by Supreme Headquarters as part of major effort in the North to isolate and capture the Ruhr Valley". Basically saying that it wasn't given enough priority.

#2. "The Airborne forces dropped at Arnhem were dropped too far from the Bridge. I take blame for this mistake". pretty self explanatory here.

#3. the weather, mainly how fog in England delayed the reinforcements, chiefly General Sosabowski's Polish Parachute Brigade, from being sent into the battle area.

#4. The presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area, and the poor assessment as to their operational capability.

and another that is not directly related to Arnhem: his poor judgment in how difficult it was to capture the Scheldt Estuary leading to Antwerp. Basically the port was useless until that Estuary was secured.

This is the final paragraph on his view of Market-Garden:

In my-prejudiced-view, if the operation had been properly backed from it's inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces and administrative resources nessicary for the job-it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market-Garden's unrepentant advocate

I think much more was wrong than that. The reliance on all the bridges being taken intact (it only took a single 88mm gun to destroy the Son bridge that held up XXX Corps for 36 hours). The dependence on a single road, a road that should not be used for a mechanized/armored offensive, as significant parts of it left the vehicles very vulnerable to Anti-tank fire. Plus there were numerous other delays because of the road, some parts of which were only just wide enough for a single Sherman Tank or Transport truck. The poor communications in the Arnhem area, chiefly caused by the mostly broken radios.

and as I said in my previous post, over confidence AKA "Victory Disease". all of the paratroops and glider borne troops were told to expect little resistance, and any hostiles they might encounter would be Hitler youth battalions and old men reserves. and aw man were the British 1st Airborne boys in for a shock when they had Tiger Tanks and SS Troops breathing down their necks.

Bottom line, the plan just had too much dependence on too many things to go right, and most of them went wrong in one way or another.

and I agree with HG when he said that not enough air support was used. Since the presence of the SS Panzers was known, what they should have done is sent ground attack aircraft (Chiefly the P-47 Thunderbolt and the Hawker Typhoon) that had great success against the Wehrmacht in Normandy to hit those Panzers, whether they were serviceable or not, as even only a few tigers could spell disaster to isolated Airborne troops.

on a similar note, why on earth did that piece of junk PIAT ever see combat in WWII?!?! A Spring Loaded anti tank launcher?!?!?! The UK/Commonwealth forces made such great use out of other American weapons, why didn't they just adopt the Bazooka? Sure it had it's issues against the heavier German tanks, but at least you could hit something with it.

[Deleted User]

The PIAT had the same range as the panzerfaust (later models), had roughly the same penetrating power, roughly the same arc, and could be fired from cover with no back blast danger area - you can't fire a bazooka from inside a room, unless you want to damage yourself.

Interesting read though on Montgomery's memoirs...all those issues could and should have been resolved by him...failure to ask is not a failure of higher headquarters, I'm afraid. The fact was that the Tac and Strategic airforces were all available for operational ground support work up until January '45, as part of the invasion plan. They weren't used.

Using the excuse of 2SS Pzr Korps is a bit of a smokescreen. It was only deployed in the vicinity of Arnhem and Nijmegen, and after the bridge area at Arnhem fell (after what, five days? Three more than the plan called for it to be held), on the Betuwe between Arnhem and Nijmegen. If the ground forces had been operating according to plan, 30 Corps would have been over the Betuwe and in Arnhem city while the Germans were still trying to establish lines to hold back 4 Para Brigade at Oosterbeek, and trying to contain/reduce 1 Para Battalion at the bridge. However, better planning may have meant that the railway bridge at Oosterbeek was secured and held, and 30 Corps would have linked up with 1st Airborne, secured Deelen airfield, pushed back the scratch forces on the west, and ploughed through 2SS Pzr Korps....the fact was that the defenders of the railway bridge, before it was blown, was a section of ten odd men from 2SS Pzr who had walked all the way from Normandy for the last five weeks, and arrived at the bridge as the 1st airborne was in the process of landing...that in itself is probably one of the most decisive decisions made by an nco in the war - to hold the railway bridge without orders, and then to blow it.

The issue of 30 Corps advancing on a broad flank is problematic...the road network throughout the area (at the time of the operation) is a bit of a jigsaw puzzle, with only that main road being capable of carrying armour for any length of time, and heading in the right direction. The area was intersected with streams, canals, rivers, and the bridges weren't able to hold up to the weight nor the traffic. The two flanking divisions were still trying to gain ground at the end of the battle, and they hadn't advanced very far at all.

The Betuwe was another issue, as it primarily required infantry...and as shown at Nijmegen, infantry was in short supply due to having to rush armour and support up that one road - a combined assault with US paras and brit armour being required to take the Nijmegen bridge.

Trouble was, the Brits couldn't afford to take major losses...they were sc****** the bottom of the barrel manpower wise, and Normandy had even chewed up their armour replacements (the three day battle of Operation Goodwood alone had eaten up between 450 and 550 tanks), so they were fairly cautious.

SmokeScreen

Maeda Toshiie wrote: »

Erm, it is a big misconception that the Heer was modern and efficient. It was never. The generals told Hitler that it would take them till 45/46 before they were ready for war. Meanwhile horses was the biggest number of prime movers in the Heer from 39 to 45. There were never enough half tracks for the panzer divisions, let alone the panzergrenadiers who had to make do with trucks. I guess the panzergrenadiers were lucky not to have to use bicycles. There were never enough tanks throughout the war, and so panzergrenadier units made do with assault guns in their panzer regiment. Meanwhile, the German factories were so insufficient in providing tanks for the Heer that Rommel commanded a division driving Czech tanks made in Czech factories.

In contrast, the US Army was so heavily motorized that the Germans were shocked. The US had access to such a plentiful supply of lead acid batteries that they could create the best artillery force (in terms of speed and accuracy) in WW2. The Soviets had to use numbers to counteract the lack of accuracy, and use them in direct fire support role to compensate (to deadly effect on the defenders).

The Germans were never efficient when it comes to weapons design, and they forgot the cardinal principle of war logistics in the quest for the "perfect" weapon. They wanted a heavy, long range bomber that was capable of dive bombing (go figure), an automatic rifle that does not lose propulsion gas to preserve (which required complicated sealing systems that never worked), while the Stg 44 came into existence due to the unusual common sense rarely displayed by Wehrmacht officers in the procurement office.

Between 1939 and 1942, what the Germans had going for them was infantry tactics on a micro level. They didn't have nearly enough submachine guns nor semi-automatic rifles, but what they did have in sufficient numbers was MG-34's. Their mg reliant infantry tactics were quite genius, and worked well against armies that still relied heavily on fixed position MMG's and riflemen. If the German riflemen weren't storming a positions they were carrying ammo belts and drums as well as barrels, which meant the gunners could just keep firing without running out of ammo or risking overheating the mg. It was practically impossible to fight infantry vs infantry against the Germans up til 1942.

But don't get me wrong, I very much agree with you. From a macro viewpoint the German army wasn't very modern, although media often portrays it as such.

Backo

I never got to Arnhem in Close Combat: A Bridge too Far. I stopped the Allies plenty of times though.

I think the plan was flawed. From my admittedly light reading it seems they made no allowances for anything to go wrong. They assumed they would stroll up that highway and no-one would try to stop them.

Point of interest, my wife's grandfather was dropped into and then captured in Arnhe. He spent the rest of the war in a POW camp. Apparently he never again took a piece of chocolate for granted.

SmokeScreen

Backo wrote: »

I never got to Arnhem in Close Combat: A Bridge too Far. I stopped the Allies plenty of times though.

That was an awesome game, the close combat series is by far the best WW2 strategy games ever made.

About OP though...

Now I know military operations are never just a numbers game but to me it seems that in the Market Garden operation the odds were stacked against the Allied. What I mean is that the Allied had between 70-90 000 men, comprised of 40 000 was paratroopers, 1 armored division, 2 infantry division and one armored brigade (according to wikipedia). Couldn't the operation been a success if the Allied would just kept at it, and sent more men in? Considering how many the Brits lost at Caen, the casualties in the Market Garden operation weren't that staggering.

Am I wrong here? I have to admit I'm not too well read in this particular area of WW2.

[Deleted User]

The problems for the Brits, strategically, were a bit complex...

They (Churchill) wanted political leverage post war, and as all the allies were jockeying for that from 1943 onwards, anything was up for grabs short of separate peace deals. The casualty situation was becoming critical, and with the end of the war in sight, it wouldn't have been politically tasteful to do the WW1 and draft up youths (under 19's) and train them up to send them off with the expectation of putting them into battle the day they turned 19.

I actually think that overall the Brits 'professionalised' or got a bit more serious about things after Market-Garden. The poor planning fiascos lessened, Montgomery was reined in, and they realised that they had to work with the US forces (well, most of them did...Montgomery was still in his own world).

Edit:

More men wouldn't have been the solution. There was only one road north for the ground forces, and 'up' traffic had to be stopped for 'priority down traffic', such as ambulances and empty supply trucks.

Most of 30 Corps wasn't engaged, in all reality.

Putting more troops into arnhem wasn't really an option, unless a radically different plan was used. The only real forces available were the Polish paras, and 52nd Lowland Division (Airtransportable)...it was planned to be flown into Deelen airfield when it was secured, and it was assumed, the air transport groups were freed up from airsupply and reinforcement to the Airborne corps. 52nd did offer to have a brigade to be either glider delivered or jumped into 1st Airborne, but they weren't trained for that....and with the shortages of transport aircraft due to losses in the operation, it probably wasn't viable. Keep in mind that for nearly all the battle, the germans had air superiority over Arnhem and Nijmegen...the only time in 1944/45 that they ever did achieve that on any front.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

SmokeScreen wrote: »

That was an awesome game, the close combat series is by far the best WW2 strategy games ever made.

About OP though...

Now I know military operations are never just a numbers game but to me it seems that Market Garden had odds were stacked against the Allied. What I mean is that the Allied had between 70-90 000 men, comprised of 40 000 was paratroopers, 1 armored division, 2 infantry division and one armored brigade (according to wikipedia). Couldn't the operation been a success if the Allied would just kept at it, and sent more men in? Considering how many the Brits lost at Caen, the casualties in the Market Garden operation weren't that staggering.

Am I wrong here? I have to admit I'm not too well read in this particular area of WW2.

in theory it could have been, but here were the problems:

as others have said before me, the British at this point in the war did have a numbers problem, as they were getting to the point where there were not a whole lot of reserves left after 5 years of war. The US had a similar problem, athough not as huge IMO, but they were fighting a massive 2 front war on opposite sides of the world. the US Army raised I think 89 divisions for the war, and 61 of them were in Western Europe by 1944. the rest were in Italy and the pacific, and the ones in the latter were backed up by practically the entire USMC.

The point is the UK/commonwealth forces couldn't afford to take large numbers of casualties. Neither could the US, but I think the US would have been able to recover more easily.

also, even if more numbers were available for Market Garden, as HG said, it wouldn't have helped a whole lot. The single road could barely keep XXX Corps going at a fast enough pace due to a combination of traffic jams and enemy attacks, and other delays like the costly delay with the destruction of the Son bridge on the first day.

Even if a whole other Corps were committed or more (say if the Canadians had been able to secure the Scheldt estuary much more quickly and thus deploy them at the outset), the terrain of the Netherlands is largely below sea level and rather wet, so vehicles, especially tanks, had to mostly rely on the roads. and the area between major roads in that part of Holland was pretty large.

and as far as airborne reinforcements, well, there was no real problem with getting help to the US Paratroops in the areas of Eindhoven and Nijmegen, XXX Corps reached them without a huge number of problems. The problem was getting help to the British 1st Airborne at Arnhem. The airborne assault required practically ALL of the air transports and gliders available to the Allied forces in Western Europe. The plan couldn't even get all of the Arnhem airborne in at once, the first half of British Airborne on the first day, the rest on the second day, and the Polish Parachute Brigade on the third. The latter was delayed by 2 days due to weather in England. As some transports were lost, and every one lost meant a delay in getting a squad or 2 in. Many of the supply drop zones in the Arnhem area were overrun, but the pilots did not know that as almost all communications with Arnhem (and within the forces at Arnhem other than runners) were broken down for a number of reasons.

in spite of all the issues, I think the odds of success would have gone up if somewhat, hypothetically, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps wasn't in the Arnhem-Nijmegen area. Without that heavy armor to deal with I think the British Paras could have held on.

Backo

With reference to HLE's final paragraph, assuming the link up had occurred, does anyone have any opinions on whether the road could have been held long enough for the operation to be a 'success'? What would that success have looked like?

SmokeScreen

What about equipment...

Didn't gliders quite often have a Jeep on board that was meant for the Lt's and other officers? What if the Airborne force instead of Jeeps had AT guns like QF 6-pounders on board the gliders, which weigh roughly the same as a Willys MB. The QF 6-pounders didn't have as much stopping power as the bigger QF 17-pounders but at least they'd have something with a little more range than a PIAT against German armor.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

First in response to Backo:

I think it could have been, as the most amount of Close Air Support would have been diverted to the most critical point in the operation: keeping the road open. In the real battle, that was the primary contribution of the 101st Airborne after XXX Corps had reached the bridges under its area of responsibility.

But even had Arnhem been taken and the 1st Airborne saved from disaster, the operation had already lost its critical momentum and would have not been able to go much beyond Arnhem. So overall, Monty's goal of outflanking the Siegfried Line and Cutting off the Ruhr would still have not been achieved. If it was possible to regain the momentum once Arnhem was secured, the Fuhrer would have certainly sent what reserves he had left in Northwest Germany to counter the Allied Thrust that was running out of steam. I don't think even old Adolf himself would have been dumb enough to not counter the advance of XXX Corps had it entered Germany north of the Siegfried Line.

So in the end the best that could have happened were really the rescuing of the Entire 1st Airborne/Polish Parachute Brigade as the taking of a crossing over the Rhine, but a rather irrelevant crossing IMO. The only real success there would be that it wasn't a defeat.


Now in response to Smokescreen:

Some gliders just had a Jeep (and some of those were specially modified with heavy machine guns) but a good number of them were lost in early combat. Some of the gliders did carry light artillery, mainly AT guns. In fact I remember reading a story of a Victorian Cross recipient at Arnhem whom single handedly operated a 6pdr gun and took out at least 3 German tanks.

but the problem was the British 1st Airborne (and really all airborne units up until perhaps today) are not properly equipped to take on heavy armor, or really most armor. they are intended to take key positions in enemy controlled areas and hold them for a relatively short period of time until they are relieved by ground forces. It was expected that 1st Airborne would only need to hold for 2, maybe 3 days, they were under siege and collapsing 9 days later.

In theory they had some good equipment, but they didn't have enough of it, and their supply drops often fell into German hands.



also, a new thought of mine. Many battles of the War in Europe (both East and West) showed how capable the German Army was in reacting to localized threats and concentrating forces to defeat them. For one to really defeat Germany in WW2, one had to strain Germany's land forces so that they could not concentrate. This is where Monty was wrong and Eisenhower was right.

Had Monty gotten his way (his whole Post-Normandy idea was for a concentrated British thrust in the North to cut off and capture the Ruhr and press on to Berlin). That would have been a total disaster because:

the supply problems meant almost every spare piece of ammo, parts, fuel and food would be sent to support the narrow thrust, therefore leaving all other Allied forces in the Western Front theater unable to do little more than hold ground.

The lack of offensive capability by forces other than those participating in Monty's narrow thrust would allow the Wehrmacht to concentrate pretty much everything that was not fighting in the East or in Italy to counter and destroy this clear and obvious threat. That means all of the elite panzers and panzer grenadiers as well as every available plane in the Luftwaffe that was not busy fighting the strategic raids by US 8th Air Force and RAF Bomber Command, and despite the Allied Air Supremacy, I think the counter offensive to destroy Monty's thrust would have succeeded as it would have been a concentrated effort as opposed to having to spread already thin forces to counter the massive front of Eisenhower's creation.

also, in my personal opinion, Montgomery was not a very good general. His one great victory, El Alamien was up against a very good enemy, but one that was low on fuel, reserves and food and was not being properly supported by Germany or Italy. at the end of the battle, Rommel had only 8 tanks left operational out of I think 300 or so at the start of the battle, Monty had over 1000 tanks. I think any competent commander could have defeated Rommel at the Alamien line provided they made use of Rommel's fuel weakness to trick him into concentrating his panzers in the wrong area.
Monty's operations throughout the rest of the war were not that impressive IMO, and his one chance to really show his offensive capabilities: Market-Garden, was a complete disaster, and can be considered Germany's last Victory. His biggest accomplishment IMO was whipping the 8th Army in Egypt back into shape after endless defeat. In that way he can be compared to McClellan in the American Civil War: a good trainer and driller, but not very good in actual combat.

[Deleted User]

HLE, at Alemein, the Germans were forced to commit their armour away from the point of breakthrough. Australian 9th Division wheeled in place while in contact, and went from a west facing aspect to north facing, and launched a reinforced brigade towards the coast, cutting off what was in effect a division sized force of Italians and Germans. The axis were forced to counter-attack, and it cost 9 Div massively, but that opened the way for the brit armour to pull finger (with a lot of pushing from Montgomery) and effect the breakthrough...the line basically wilted at that time and axis withdrew. It cost 9 Div though, they weren't useful for anything after that and came back to Australia to fatten up for the 1943 new guinea campaign.

daelin4#9896

From a logistical standpoint on the issue of air support, the availability of air power was there, but not the means to communicate and coordinate them. Along with planning, there was just too few contingencies for the operation, and given the short time for Market Garden's preparation (Sicily, Normandy took months in comparison), the affair just had zero room for error.

SmokeScreen

Wikipedia doesn't have any numbers on the German troop strength. I was just wondering how combat effective they were after losing 10 000+ men, 30 tanks and a whole bunch of planes?

Oh and after operational failure of Market Garden, what was the next move the Allied did in the West?

daelin4#9896

They did a lot of stuff between then and the Bulge, but in particular they focused on taking the Scheldt estuary from which the Germans held made the port of Antwerp relatively useless: you can't really use a port if the only waterway in was held by enemy forces. That they instead focused on Market Garden made it seem ridiculous, especially given that doing so would have alleviated supply issues for everyone.

I also read that part of the pressure to go with Market Garden was the use of the areas in the Netherlands for V-2 launch sites on bombing London.

In the end it kinda felt like the typical politically motivated operation where they had to do something just to make it look like they weren't doing nothing. Quite ridiculous given that the majority of waging war is done in less-than-notable actions like hauling ammunition or flying reconnaissance sorties.