Operation Barbarossa: Army Group Centre Early Moscow Drive?

Half_Life_Expert#4276

I've thought of another handful of What if/Could it? thread topics, and here's' the first. Ill put up the second on Friday,the day before I go on vacation for a week.

Operation Barbarossa, the largest invasion of any type in human history, over 3 million Axis troops storm into the USSR to wage a war of annihilation. The next 4 years resulted in tens of millions dead and many times that wounded or displaced. No doubt had Germany pulled off a victory it could have been much more bloody.

From a military perspective, one of the most important moments of this invasion was Hitler's decision to redirect Army Group Centre from it's drive on Moscow to encircle the Soviet forces in and around Kiev in support of Army Group South, which was facing tougher resistance.

Many consider this moment to be one of the key decisions that lost Germany the war, because has AGC gone on to Moscow as planned, many argue, the city could have fallen due to weaker Soviet defenses (relative to when the actual drive resumed) and likely not having to deal too much with the weather.

If, for whatever reason, AGC continued it's planned drive to Moscow and did not swing south to encircle Kiev, could Moscow have fallen? If so, could that have won Germany the War in the east, or would the USSR have fought on, and if the latter, how long could they have held, assuming they did not have the aid of the German advance becoming bogged down in the winter as badly as they did.

Hildor

Would Moscow not have turned into another Stalingrad?

Maeda_Toshiie

Half Life Expert wrote: »

I've thought of another handful of What if/Could it? thread topics, and here's' the first. Ill put up the second on Friday,the day before I go on vacation for a week.

Operation Barbarossa, the largest invasion of any type in human history, over 3 million Axis troops storm into the USSR to wage a war of annihilation. The next 4 years resulted in tens of millions dead and many times that wounded or displaced. No doubt had Germany pulled off a victory it could have been much more bloody.

From a military perspective, one of the most important moments of this invasion was Hitler's decision to redirect Army Group Centre from it's drive on Moscow to encircle the Soviet forces in and around Kiev in support of Army Group South, which was facing tougher resistance.

Many consider this moment to be one of the key decisions that lost Germany the war, because has AGC gone on to Moscow as planned, many argue, the city could have fallen due to weaker Soviet defenses (relative to when the actual drive resumed) and likely not having to deal too much with the weather.

If, for whatever reason, AGC continued it's planned drive to Moscow and did not swing south to encircle Kiev, could Moscow have fallen? If so, could that have won Germany the War in the east, or would the USSR have fought on, and if the latter, how long could they have held, assuming they did not have the aid of the German advance becoming bogged down in the winter as badly as they did.

Unlikely for Moscow to fall. Logistics hampered the drive IRL. It would have been the same even if AGC ignored Kiev. For the Battle of Moscow, Wehrmacht logistics virtually dictated the outcome.

In fact, atrocious Wehrmacht logistics and logistical planning killed the entire invasion. Hitler was just the icing on top of the piece of t**d.

Even if Moscow fell, no guarantee of Soviet surrender (or even negotiations). Typhoon showed that the Wehrmacht was at its last legs logistics wise in terms of how far they could extend.

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David Glantz doesn't think that the southward sojourn made the capture less likely.

Glantz, David, The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay,:
http://sti.clemson.edu/publications-mainmenu-38/commentaries-mainmenu-211/cat_view/33-strom-thurmond-institute/153-sti-publications-by-subject-area/158-history

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The Wermacht logistical tail primarily consisted of horses "appropriated" from farms across occupied Europe. Put these creatures to work in the steppe and you'll see how the survival rates go (clue: not good at all). The road and rail networks in the Soviet Union at that time were simply atrocious. Most roads were not paved (effectively mud tracks) and the railroads were sparse (and incompatible with German rolling stock). Mix both and you have a supply chain nightmare.

In addition, the overly optimistic attitude of the OKW (and/or OKH) meant that little care was given for the logistically draining sustained fight that occurred. It's a disaster right from the start.

daelin4#9896

I agree wit Maeda: i didn't really matter what the Germans did after they went into Russia or where they devoted their military resources to, the fact that long-term planning focused entirely on the presumption of victory before winter played a larger factor into success. The only chance of things turning out differently on a decisive scale (that is, the Germans won in Russia) would be a large combination of freak coincidences in the Wehrmacht's favour. Driving to Moscow would require, of immediate capitulation was not possible, a quite encirclement and then that's hoping the government had not already evacuated or otherwise set up contingencies to that effect. If THAT was somehow accomplished, then there's the waiting time for the Germans to magically sustain themselves, and who knows what counter-offensives could easily cut off the German force attempting this feat? Perhaps
in part this was the reason Hitler diverted towards Kiev: he knew it was impossible to take all objectives at once.

If army group centre remained on course I do not believe much would have changed, it would have left the forces going for Kiev under more resistance, army group centre itself would likely suffer the same results, and likely even less gains would have occurred then. Shifting insufficient resources around can only alleviate a situation that, frankly, demanded more resources entirely. One small decision like diverting one army group elsewhere isn't going to provide a big change to the grand scheme of things, especially when the wider grand strategy remained the same: a deadline of prior to Russian onset of winter where the Soviet Union capitulates. None of the German commanders really believed it was possible in the beginning.

Much of the preparation for success in Barbarossa was thus largely tactical and not strategic: a German economy not geared to sustain such a large scale, long-term war (again, the idea was that Russia fell before winter) plus the under-mechanized logistical system that supported its armed forces, even the lack of a long-range strategic bomber system that would have added a major benefit to the Germans' force projection, all meant that Barbarossa had few recipes for success and many for failure.

I compare the likelihood of success to having to roll six dice where they all give a six, for six straight turns...and all the dices are weighted towards rolling a one: increasing odds of success requires changing the dice, not changing the way you throw them, and certainly not merely being more optimistic.

Imperial Guard

By the time the decision to direct AGC towards Kiev was made, the Germans have realized that the Soviets were tougher opponent than expected.

The fact that AGC had deployed some of its panzer elements to support the operations in the north and Leningrad was not helping either. Also the Germans were already stretched to the limit and had troubles to keep up with the supplies and logistic so any attempt to further stretch their lines would enable the Soviets to pound them from the south with the troops that participated in the battle of Kiev. The advance on Moscow would have happened in the time frame of the battle of Kiev so the Soviets wouldn't have performed their offensives near Smolensk thus being more organized and prepared for the upcoming invasion. Moscow itself was relatively well defended and assisted by the troops from the south-western front would have defeated the Germans who would now be too stretched for the upcoming long battle. If by some miracle the Germans won, the time required to do that would have allowed the Russians to evacuate Moscow and Hitler would have met Napoleon's exact fate.
IMO the attempt to advance on Moscow, bypassing Kiev, would have resulted in WW2 ending sooner.

Istvan

I disagree with Maeda on a certain level. We speak as though an atrocious railway system is only a negative for the Germans and in no way pertinent to the Soviet situation. Considering how sparse the railway lines were in the Soviet Union, most of them were in one way or another connected to Moscow - you capture Moscow, you control the railroads. That doesn't mean the Soviets would have surrendered or that they would not have been able to build factories farther east of the Urals or the Germans supply problems would have been solved, but Soviet logistics would have been a mess as well. Cutting off the logistical head of the one-headed beast would have helped the Germans one way or another.

Another issue is that the offensive simply launched too late. The Italian invasion of Greece was a disaster and necessitated German intervention. While the Germans may have quickly conquered Greece it delayed their invasion of the Soviet Union by an entire month and that month proved to be a very crucial month, as it pushed the invasion start-date a month closer to the beginning of the cold weather, which brought the German advance to a halt and gave the Soviets time to reorganise themselves and prepare an effective defensive.

Maeda_Toshiie

Istvan wrote: »

I disagree with Maeda on a certain level. We speak as though an atrocious railway system is only a negative for the Germans and in no way pertinent to the Soviet situation. Considering how sparse the railway lines were in the Soviet Union, most of them were in one way or another connected to Moscow - you capture Moscow, you control the railroads. That doesn't mean the Soviets would have surrendered or that they would not have been able to build factories farther east of the Urals or the Germans supply problems would have been solved, but Soviet logistics would have been a mess as well. Cutting off the logistical head of the one-headed beast would have helped the Germans one way or another.

Another issue is that the offensive simply launched too late. The Italian invasion of Greece was a disaster and necessitated German intervention. While the Germans may have quickly conquered Greece it delayed their invasion of the Soviet Union by an entire month and that month proved to be a very crucial month, as it pushed the invasion start-date a month closer to the beginning of the cold weather, which brought the German advance to a halt and gave the Soviets time to reorganise themselves and prepare an effective defensive.

The point is that it is unlikely that the Wehrmacht could have captured Moscow in 1941, diversion to Kiev or not. IRL, the Wehrmacht didn't even reach the city. Assuming that the AGC continued its drive to Moscow and AGS kept the rest of the Soviets sufficiently busy, AGC still has the job of fighting and capturing a well defended major city within a small time frame before winter sets in. Meanwhile, the AGC's logistics tail is stretched to the limit.

Time may have been a factor for the Wehrmacht, but logistics would remain, no matter what. Even if Greece had delayed Barbarossa (there is apparently some debate on this), the extra time only meant that the Germans would have been bogged down trying to capture Moscow, not trying to reach it. The mud and winter would have happen regardless, which still means that the Germans would have to fight to get their supplies forward.

Marshal Suchet

Napoleon captured Moscow and lost.

Main problem was that Russia is so vast and that many of industrial resources were far beyond the reach of the Germans. The Germans were also stuck in a two front war with 50% or more of their manpower tied up in other theatres.

I think realistically to invade Russia you need to have a lot of allies on the European continent who you can trust not to mess with you while your forces are away. You also need to be able to commit to a slower incremental invasion over a 5-10 year period rather than one that leaves you with your forces scattered over Russia and you probably also need to look at some way of gaining the support of the local population.

I think the biggest issue was not so much supply as it was the ability of the Russians to concentrate their new combat units far more effectively than the Germans could once they were deep inside Russia - they also did not have to waste their manpower fighting a two front war like the Germans did. This allowed them to build up far more powerful strategic reserves than their Axis opponents at several key points. It was not much different during the war in North Africa - the side closest to its supply base often tended to win because it had the least amount of territory to secure and because they could quickly replenish their losses.

Supply issues were certainly a pain for the Germans, but I think that people ignore some of the problems that the Russians had during the campaign in this regard. They had effectively lost almost all of their heavy equipment on what was their Western Front in the first few months of the war. They needed to pull their reserve divisions from the other side of Russia to fill the gaps, they had to train new recruits and resupply their army almost from scratch. The Germans had lost some equipment, but they were still a combat effective force with high morale and the fact that they managed to launch further offensives after the drive on moscow failed proved that they were able to recover from the first winter. The issue was however that after the first 12 months they were decisively outnumbered by the Russian forces who had retained and rebuilt their cohesion. It was just a matter of time before they lost the campaign and several decisions made by the German high command did not help their situation (most notably the decision to leave the 6th army at Stalingrad).

I think politically Hitler and Napoleon made a big mistake by not promising to emancipate the local population. In both instances, the invaders immediately put the local population offside very early in the conflict and were not interested in granting any political rights or priveleges to the local communities. This left these groups with noone to turn to other than the government of the day, whether this was tsarist or communist.

Imperial Guard

Marshal Suchet wrote: »

Main problem was that Russia is so vast and that many of industrial resources were far beyond the reach of the Germans. The Germans were also stuck in a two front war with 50% or more of their manpower tied up in other theatres.

From 1941 the Germans had 80% of the troops on the eastern front and all of the troops of their eastern European allies.

wrote:

I think politically Hitler and Napoleon made a big mistake by not promising to emancipate the local population. In both instances, the invaders immediately put the local population offside very early in the conflict and were not interested in granting any political rights or priveleges to the local communities. This left these groups with noone to turn to other than the government of the day, whether this was tsarist or communist.

As you said, they should have opted for slower pace of the invasion trying to work with the population which in reality wasn't possible and was defying with the German ideology. They were trying to get to the much needed resources asap.

Even if the Germans opted for protracted invasion the outcome would been the same although the war would have lasted longer. The whole displacement of Soviet industry eastwards was a step of increasing the production that Germany could never have reached.

After all, capturing Moscow wouldn't have brought the desired economic effects that were possible with the occupation of the southern areas of the USSR. In the plan for operation Barbarosa, capturing Moscow wasn't considered as a strategic objective but rather as a symbol of might and boosting. For some reason when the Germans reached 'in sight' of Moscow some of the generals were anxious to reach it even that it wasn't considered a major objective. They must have been obsessed with Moscow as Napoleon was.

HowFarWouldYouGo

As for labor and military manpower I agree with you all, the Soviet Union was far superior. German Army was never so motorized and well equipped as we are shown to believe by pictures and tales of the past. I would say the biggest reason for failing is the lack of preparation against the biggest enemy “winter” and not the movement of AGC.
But if for some reason Stalingrad and Moscow would have fallen, from a Moral point of view (it was getting lower and lower after each defeat) the Russians could have lost faith and rebelled against their communist leaders. Plus Leningrad nearly starved and surrounded.
I find Russian propaganda was the biggest and most important tool for winning the war. A non-communist Russia would have surrendered soon, it was the ability to motivate and dazzle their population which made these two dictatorial regimes so strong during WW2. This made the immense loss of human life on both side possible.
To get back on topic I agree there was no possible (chance was too small) victory for Germany in the Soviet Union or the rest of WW2.

Imperial Guard

HowFarWouldYouGo wrote: »

German Army was never so motorized

If the German army wasn't 'so motorized' then I don't know who was.

wrote:

But if for some reason Stalingrad and Moscow would have fallen, from a Moral point of view (it was getting lower and lower after each defeat) the Russians could have lost faith and rebelled against their communist leaders. Plus Leningrad nearly starved and surrounded.

During Napoleon's invasion Moscow fell but the Russians were nowhere near surrendering.

wrote:

I find Russian propaganda was the biggest and most important tool for winning the war. A non-communist Russia would have surrendered soon, it was the ability to motivate and dazzle their population which made these two dictatorial regimes so strong during WW2. This made the immense loss of human life on both side possible.

Just like imperialistic Russia surrendered to Napoleon. No matter who was in power in the USSR back then the outcome would've been the same. The massive lose of live on Soviet side was possible by the German ideology and strategy. They considered the Soviets lower then humans and were going to exterminate them anyway. The Germans themselves would have never agreed to some peace treaty with them. The situation was total war and pushing to the end until one side is completely annihilated.
As Marshal Suchet said, had they, in some other circumstances, tried to work with the people etc. then some hope for the Germans might have existed.

Amilcar Barca

I think the discussion is largely pointlees, as I am almost sure that the fall of Moscow, even if a moral damaging issue, would have not make the SU surrender.

First of all, War in the East was, above all, a war of ideologies. And, as such, it was going to be fought to the bitter end. Stalin and his "lieutenents" knew they were fighting for the survival of the SU and for their own, personal, survival. So, unless some sort of internal coup had happened, I dont see any possibility of Stalin surrendering. And, after purges, I dont see possibility of an internal coup.

Second, the SU and its people had a perfect historical example in what happened during the Napoleonic War. Moscow fell, but the enemy was finally beaten when winter came. History would be telling them that Moscows fall, even if morale damaging, meant nothing.

So, could Moscow have fallen? Yes. Would have the SU surrendered? I really doubt it. And that would have been the end of the german advance. They simply and plainly couldnt continue much further East.

Amilcar Barca

Maeda Toshiie wrote: »

The point is that it is unlikely that the Wehrmacht could have captured Moscow in 1941, diversion to Kiev or not. IRL, the Wehrmacht didn't even reach the city.

Not that it is relevant for the discussion, but the Wehrmacht almost reached the city. In fact vanguard elements of 258 Infantry division reached Khimki (in Moscows outskirts) but retreated after receiving no support, just a few kms. from the Kremlin.

HowFarWouldYouGo

I do agree the Germans wouldn’t go further east than Moscow, but do they have too? Holding every major city in the west of the SU like Kiev, St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Stalingrad would have been enough ground for the Germans. Reaching the oil in the south of the SU was the prime objective for Hitler and his Generals.

Maybe the SU would never surrender, but it would have lost the important part of its land and cities. Germans are very good at defending with very little equipment and the supply lines are much more evolved since Napoleonic times. Advancing against such a gigantic enemy like SU is the hard part. When being on the defensive it’s much easier to supply and holdout in winter, especially in cities.

I do agree Germans could never have won in the end, but SU could have lost its war when losing all its major supply lines and cities. Maybe a real surrender wouldn't have been needed, rather new borders to fortify.

About the exterminating part, Germans where told if the soviets come they will be exterminated and all killed (soviets thought the same about the Germans), but did it really happen? There is still a country called Germany and it has the biggest population in Europe. Same would have happened to SU, sure it would have been cleansed from communism and many would have been killed. That’s just the Nazis racist way of doing things. Stalin did no better the following years. So the important thing is letting people think with propaganda that it's win or die more than it really is. It's more a win or die for the current leaders.

I am no history expert or academic, it’s just how I see things.

Istvan

HowFarWouldYouGo, that sounds like sound reasoning but in this particular circumstance the other posters are actually correct when they say Germany wanted to exterminate the Russians.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalplan_Ost#Phases_of_the_plan_and_its_implementation

In Western classrooms all we ever hear about is how the Germans sought to exterminate Jews, but no mention is given to other ethnic groups, such as Slavs and Rroma. The German leadership actually had every intention of causing annihilating much of Eastern Europe's population and repopulating the region with Germans.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

ok, I think this thread should end here as we are getting into some dangerous territory

ill put the next What if/Could it? thread shortly

EDIT: next thread is up, time for the Western Desert Campaign!

daelin4#9896

Hitler's dream was that German's empire reached as far as the Urals, where a defeated Russia would be a shadow of its former self controlling the desolate land east of those mountains. It was envisioned that this region would consist of "eternal war" so that all future Germans would groom themselves by fighting them there; sort of like a place where young ones are baptized by fire, usually separating men from boys where the latter die off. The Nazis' vision of racial ideology was essentially an extreme for of social Darwinism, and was exemplified by the Nazis' own bureaucracy, which ironically was also a key factor in their downfall.

As for extermination, that's all fear-mongering. Even today misconceptions about Nazi racial theory abound, namely the whole "If Germany won we'd all be speaking German!" nonsense. If we threw all logic out the window and envisioned an alternate universe where Germany somehow won, all we'd get is a Germany that would tear itself apart. It was heading to that direction from the start, and as said before, the Nazis' idea of how the world works demanded that end. Dog-eat-dog didn't end with race: the best of the Aryans deserved the top positions, and there were plenty of "inferior" Aryans according to the Nazi worldview. As the war progressed reality pushed all these concepts aside, because frankly you need everyone fighting or part of the war effort, not merely the best of the best: most of the best were being killed off due to poorly conceived strategy.
The latest Wolfenstein game pictures a world that was ruled by the Nazis due to an impossible combination of limitless resources, perfected technologies and ruthlessness towards enemies; if you knew anything about Nazism you'd know that this is all just convenient videogame fiction. Their racial ideology was in reality self-suicidal: it constantly demanded "trimming" of their Aryan race at a much greater rate than reproduction by those left over can possible outpace, and not all of those being born will be considered suitable either. Nazi ideology also fails to take into account human actions as well: A Jewish doctor is less valuable than a German serial murderer- a lot of Europe's talent pool was depleted when they all fled Germany in the wake of the Nazis coming to power.
Ancient Sparta is a typical example of what happens when you persist in such conservative methods of social Darwinism: you may actually be powerful and even respected by outsiders, but you will always remain small. Sparta never really became an empire; Rome, Macedon and Carthage became powers, not because they made sure their own kind were running things, but instead the total opposite: outsiders played a very key role in their development, and not merely as subordinates either.

Back to Russia, the conquest of Eastern Europe also exemplifies the reality of the Nazi ideology's implementation: chaotic and self-destructive. The Reichkommissariats established in Poland proved to be self-serving fiefdoms carved up by various Nazi bureaucrats: prisoners including those that would end up in concentration camps and killed were shuffled between the administrations because no one wanted to deal with that kind of paper-pushing trouble. This was in fact one of the reasons why the Final Solution came about: Nazi ideology did not have an answer to the reality of a subordinate race under their administration, it was all assumed that they would work the land and provide Germany with resources such as food and raw materials, and yet the conquest of Poland and Russia resulted in a great deal of devastation to land and industry, and the Germans weren't finished with war either. Whatever land and resources the Germans actually managed to take for themselves, they failed to organize it effectively to contribute to their war effort- their own home front was hardly up to speed until the later years of the war when it was clear they were not going to be fighting off a resurgent Red Army and Western Allies. Unless you go back furher in time and re-organize circumstances in great favour towards the Germans' strategic position, it didn't matter when and where Army Group Centre went.

If Operation Barbarossa was a thesis paper, you won't get a passing grade if you just edited a few lines or paragraphs here and there, you need to redo the whole thing, or settle for an F.

Istvan

As for extermination, that's all fear-mongering. Even today misconceptions about Nazi racial theory abound, namely the whole "If Germany won we'd all be speaking German!" nonsense.

That depends on who is doing the speaking. Typical Western teenagers who view Hitler as brilliant will often subscribe to the notion that the Germans just wanted to eliminate everyone and make everyone speak German, since they're confused by the incomplete picture they're provided in their educational system. They're provided an image of the war that centres on the Western front and they're given the image of Nazi Germany as a state that was involved in racial extermination, and without being given the proper context or the full picture, some individuals quickly assume that Nazi Germany's master plan revolved around invading France, Britain and America making them speak German or something along those lines. Of course that's rubbish, as Hitler had hoped for a Germanic ally in Britain and never viewed the French or other Western Europeans inferior in the sense of deserving elimination.

Central and Eastern Europe, however, is a different matter. The Nazi German state genuinely desired an empire in that area. The Final Solution may have been an afterthought, but Lebensraum was not.

daelin4#9896

The idea of Lebensraum imitated the British colonial establishment in places like Africa and Asia: the Germans were to be a socially elite minority ruling over races of peoples that, presumably, would serve them diligently and without question. Of course Nazi racial ideology was never really developed beyond the simply justifications for the beliefs they hold, and as history shows having such a large empire in that manner isn't easy, especially if you're going to be ideologically rigid. Hitler's vision of Eastern Europe under German influence had no room for cooperation and co-existence, it assumed dominance over people that in his mind should only be subservient to the Germans, and he used rhetoric of Jewish Bolshevism and the sort to justify the feelings that his march into German would be welcomed as liberators, since apparently all the Slavs and other groups living in these areas prefer slaving away under noble Germans than Jewish communists. Even the Waffen-SS, the envisioned future army of Germany made up entirely of idealized Aryans, had to be filled with foreigners later on to fill the need for manpower; they had to compete with the army navy and air force for recruits. The Luftwaffe was a political rival, and the army and navy were conservative, pre-Nazi institutions that were composed of an officer class that opposed the more radical ideas of Nazism, though for reasons of personal ambition more so than morals.

I forgot to mention that extermination was totally counter to the original Nazi idea of racial superiority. Like the other European colonial powers, the social order consists of Germans at the top and everyone else at the bottom, not Germans at the top and ll the others are burning ashes below them. Inferior races exist to serve the Germans in their existence, and the Nazis took history as precedence. If you want a realistic vision of Nazi Europe, imagine the stereotyped social situation of the American South prior to their Civil War (which was also in various places exaggerated).
Russia in other words was envisioned to be a colonial backyard that provides numerous things for Germany and her people, including war to strengthen men and resources to be milked.

Metaphorically speaking, if you want eggs you got to make sure your chickens are healthy, and you're obviously not getting any eggs if you keep killing all of your chickens.

SmokeScreen

daelin4 wrote: »

...if you want eggs you got to make sure your chickens are healthy, and obviously you're not getting any eggs if you keep killing all of your chickens.

But you can't make an omelet without breaking a few eggs.

daelin4#9896

You do not break a few eggs by killing all your chickens.

SmokeScreen

daelin4 wrote: »

You do not break a few eggs by killing all your chickens.

Touche, daelin, touche.