The Western Desert Campaign: Could Rommel have driven to the Suez Canal?

Half_Life_Expert#4276

I was thinking this thread could be on Operation Zitadelle aka The Battle of Kursk, but since the last one was Barbarossa, I decided not to have two successive threads on the same theatre of war. So Kursk will be next after this one unless you want me to move away from WWII, I have a few ideas but I welcome yours as well, just PM me.

The Western Desert Campaign. Over two years of back and forth drives between the Allies (Primarily British/Commonwealth Forces, along with some Free European Forces: French, Greek, Polish, Czech)

and the Axis (First the Italian army from Libya, then Rommel and His Afrika Korps from early 1941).

This theatre of World War II is well known for many reasons, but largely due to the legend of Erwin Rommel as well as it being the only major theatre where the Western Allies fought Germany between the Fall of France and the entry of the United States into the war.

The Decisive battles of this campaign, as we all know, were the two battles of El Alamein, first in July 1942, then the second in late October and Early November. By the time the second battle occurred, Rommel had run out of offensive power, both in supplies and practicality as well as momentum. Rommel being driven back in the second battle permanently removed the threat to the Canal.

It is well known that his ultimate plan during the campaign was to drive all the way to the Suez Canal and cut Britain off from large parts of her empire, if not totally cut off then severely hamper the links.

For reference, here's a map of what is considered "The Western Desert":


its from this Wiki page, you can see a larger version there:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Desert_Campaign

So for the this "What If/Could it?" thread, I pose this question:

Could Rommel and His Afrika Korps have succeeded in taking the Suez Canal? And if so, could he have gone any farther?
I do not mean just looking at the situation from right before the first Alamein battle, I mean looking at the Entire campaign from 1940 to 1942.

For instance, consider these possible alternative factors that did not occur but could have:

-British 8th Army not fortifying the Alam Halfa Ridge, the position that stopped Rommel's attack at 1st El Alamien

-The Island of Malta being ether captured or sufficiently damaged to the point where it could no longer hamper Axis supply convoys

- The Italian Navy not being severely damaged or even not being attacked at all in the Raid on Taranto

- Berlin taking more of an interest in the Africa Theatre and sending Rommel more supplies.

-Tobruk never being under siege at all, and therefore never absorbed any of Rommel's resources.


and any other alternative factors you can think of

and in terms of the second part of my question, could Rommel have gone beyond the Suez Canal, if not right away then after halting to let his forces rest and resupply.

Could they have driven on to take the Arabian Oil Fields?

or the ultimate worse case scenario from the Allied perspective: A drive north to link up with German forces in southern Russia?

Again, with the above possibilities, I do not see an immediate blitzkrieg drive right after the Fall of Egypt, rather a somewhat slower advance, factoring the likelihood of British forces being relatively small in the Middle East, I doubt they could afford to redeploy much forces from India as they had to hold against Japanese advances in SE Asia.

So there it is, discuss.

NOTE: it may be a while before I can add my own input, as i am going on vacation tomorrow for about a week, I will have my laptop with me and will likely have internet access, but it may take me a while to catch up on your thoughts.

daelin4#9896

Two important things to consider: One is taking the Suez is different than holding it; therefore one is to consider the difficulty in maintaining control of the canal on top of actually taking it. Rommel's supply situation in Africa was already, and always was, very tenuous, and taking over the Suez would simply have extended this problem, hardly solving it.
Second is based on the first: supply and support from Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine are required for taking and holding the Suez. Even if we're to assume the entire German war effort was thrown into this objective, we still have British and eventually American naval and air power to contend with. Seizing and holding the Suez would rather be the first in a series of steps in severely hampering the Allied presence in Africa and their access to Asia from the Mediterranean, not the last.
As with the rest of Europe that was conquered by the Germans during the war, there is a big difference between taking territory and utilizing it for their own use. For the Germans, the whole war was waged from an entirely reactionary standpoint: Hitler and the Nazis had planned on already taking over Eastern Europe and, in their theory, developed their empire at a sufficient level that by the time the showdown with the West occurred, it would not only be ready, but ready by around 1946. Germany didn't even ratchet up it's war effort to a serious level until after Barbarossa had failed. Of course as we know, the British called Hitler's bluff after Poland and the plans had to change to knocking out the West first, before any consolidation of envisioned land and materials can be realized: the entirety of Plan Z, the program to build up the Kreigsmarine, was scrapped entirely, forcing the Germans to rely on U-boats and merchant raiders to fight what was effectively a holding action against a much superior Royal Navy. Efforts to develop a longer range strategic bomber for the Luftwaffe was eventually put onto the back burner as economic and wartime expediences called for short-range bombers, which were already available, well-tested, and in immediate demand. Because of all these change of plans the Germans would always be fighting one step behind the Allies.


At Alam Halfa, Montgomery was made aware of German intentions via intelligence gathering; the fortification of the ridge was therefore premeditated and designed to lure Rommel into a pitched engagement. In other words fortifying the ridge was entirely intentional, and part of a larger plan to lure Rommel into a disadvantageous position to be destroyed by entrenched forces ready to meet his advance. Not fortifying the position when it was meant to engage Rommel makes zero sense. It would be like Hannibal planning to envelop the Romans ad Cannae and he decides not to have any troops at the flanks to make it happen.

Part of the reason why Malta was not kept up under pressure is similar to the reason the Germans lost Britain: Hitler was shuffling assets elsewhere, in this case in Greece and in anticipation for Barbarossa. Had the Germans remained over Malta the Allies there would have been significantly strained and vulnerable to an airborne invasion, but that would also prove potentially costly as Crete, and the Germans can't just sink manpower like that. The ideal situation, I think, was that Malta is neutralized from taking further part in the war effort simply by the continuing pressure of a few Luftwaffe squadrons, but that in itself is not a victory, let alone conquest. And it's not like the Germans had a fleet to use Malta for much effect anyways. Preventing the island from being used y the Allies is one thing, taking it over and using it for themselves is another matter, and would demand more resources to considerate, something the Germans don't have. Like in the Atlantic, the best thing to do is to simply bleed the Allies dry so that they cannot fight the Axis where it hurts. Malta, then, was always another holding action.

From what I have read on Taranto, the effect of the attack did not seem to have had permanent long term consequences: the Italians remained aggressive with the remainder of their fleet, continuing to attack convoys in the Mediterranean fleet well until they switched sides in 1943. Within a year two of the three damaged battleships were repaired and returned to service. IMO if the effects of the attack were rather miniscule, one can only assume the same result had the attack never took place. And since Cunningham had these assets in place for such a strike, the debate would and indeed was always a matter of when and where, not if.

An interest in Africa would only increase if Hitler was interested in consolidating control of the Mediterranean. Ideologically he prioritized conquering Eastern Europe over all other objectives, and in any case the pressures of war over a looming Soviet Union, a persistent Britain and a United States that is sympathetic to both would have brought up serious questions over such a commitment. Taking over Africa doesn't accomplish Lebensraum or even knock out the French or the British.

Advancing to Egypt and taking over the Suez inevitably demanded the capture of a strategically significant position such as Tobruk, to bypass it entirely would be disastrous, as the defenders can easily attack Rommel's forces as they attempt to move on into Egypt, and worse the Allies can land forces and deploy air assets for devastating effect. Not putting Tobruk under siege would in face be a huge mistake, in the same way a medieval army tries to take over a town without first securing control of the walls or gates. Regardless of the commitment of German forces toward Tobruk, it would have had a significant effect on the Germans' ability to achieve success in the campaign. To not attempt to take Tobruk would be like the Allies not bothering to take Caen during Normandy, despite strategic importance and significant presence of German forces stationed there.

The only way Rommel could exploit taking over, consolidating control of, and then advancing past the Suez would be if the Allies literally did nothing about it the entire time. Ultiamtely, such successes would only serve to hamper the Allies, which I should mention is not the same as bolstering Germany's geographical position. Even if you take over oil fields you still got to organize a way to exploit the resources, something the Germans largely failed to do in Poland and the conquered parts of Russia. The Allies would surely have done something along the lines of scorched earth if they knew they could not stop a German advance. If Rommel reached the German forces in Russia what does that accomplish? A giant supply line from Egypt through Palestine and through the Caucasus regions that had no strategic importance and only be a huge logistical burden for the Germans, that could be gobbled up by opportunistic Allied forces. Rommel would then have made a very costly road trip and not really achieved any strategic objectives at all!

Rommel's successes in Africa were primarily in the realm of manoeuvre warfare, and not a slow and steady pace either. Every time he faltered was when the supply system finally failed him while he was on his last legs. Whatever gains Rommel could get for Hitler (and they were plenty), there was no logistical system or supporting arms to provide for his ability to make his accomplishments matter in the long-term. In my view, Rommel's failure in Africa in reality had nothing to do with Rommel. He made every success in the Africakorps possible, but Germany had nothing behind him to make any good out of it.

Seleucos of Olympia

I have a few comments to make on your, otherwise very well informed points, Daelin. First, the Germans may not have had much of a fleet in the Mediterranean which would use Malta as a base, but the Italians did. There wasn't much need for it as an Axis base (what with Sicily just north of it), but taking it away from the Allies would have deprived the latter of their only base in the central Mediterranean. That would make Axis naval operations safer there and, if Suez and Gibraltar could be secured (an interesting 'what if' would be if Franco had agreed to help Hitler attack Gibraltar) then Italy would be in no danger of an Allied attack.

If the Germans and Italians reached Suez, then they'd be able to proceed further east counting on pro-Axis uprisings in Iraq and even Iran, if they could reach it. Turkey, seeing the Axis victorious all around it, might have been more inclined to ally with Germany, and that would create a much more direct and dangerous logistical route to the Soviet Caucasus than through Iraq. Also, the Italian navy would be able to operate in the Black Sea.

German high command was no doubt aware of such options, but Hitler had his mind set on Russia. German paratroopers payed a steep price in blood to conquer Crete, yet the island was not used for offensive operations against Cyprus or Suez. With the shift in focus on Russia, that whole front was neglected. But so much could have been accomplished there; after all, it wasn't so much about Africa, it was about securing the Mediterranean and threatening the Middle East.

dge1

Seleucos of Olympia wrote: »

I have a few comments to make on your, otherwise very well informed points, Daelin. First, the Germans may not have had much of a fleet in the Mediterranean which would use Malta as a base, but the Italians did. There wasn't much need for it as an Axis base (what with Sicily just north of it), but taking it away from the Allies would have deprived the latter of their only base in the central Mediterranean. That would make Axis naval operations safer there and, if Suez and Gibraltar could be secured (an interesting 'what if' would be if Franco had agreed to help Hitler attack Gibraltar) then Italy would be in no danger of an Allied attack.

If the Germans and Italians reached Suez, then they'd be able to proceed further east counting on pro-Axis uprisings in Iraq and even Iran, if they could reach it. Turkey, seeing the Axis victorious all around it, might have been more inclined to ally with Germany, and that would create a much more direct and dangerous logistical route to the Soviet Caucasus than through Iraq. Also, the Italian navy would be able to operate in the Black Sea.

German high command was no doubt aware of such options, but Hitler had his mind set on Russia. German paratroopers payed a steep price in blood to conquer Crete, yet the island was not used for offensive operations against Cyprus or Suez. With the shift in focus on Russia, that whole front was neglected. But so much could have been accomplished there; after all, it wasn't so much about Africa, it was about securing the Mediterranean and threatening the Middle East.

Both Daelin and Sel's make excellent points. All kinds of "what if" scenarios can come from even a minimal review and analysis of the situation at the time.

• First - if Spain under Franco had assisted and isolated Gibraltar then the western end of the Med is blocked from supply and support from Britain and the US.
• Second - the Germans had isolated or taken Malta. Denies the middle part of the Med to attack by Britain and allies, and allies free supply and support to North Africa. Frees the Italian fleet to operate.
• Third - the focus in Berlin had not been to attack Russia when it actually did. The least likely "what if"!
• Fourth - the Africa Corps had been properly supplied, the German's biggest asset in North Africa (Rommel) would have been able to have taken Egypt then moved into the Middle East. All they needed was about a year's delay into Russia. With more men and equipment, and no resistance for the air, they would have been attacking a British army that could only really be supplied from the Far East.

Problem is, Hitler would never admit he was ever wrong, the German High Command knew better than to challenge him and the Brits (navy and army), with their few friends, weren't about to give the Germans a free hand.

daelin4#9896

Seleucos of Olympia wrote: »

First, the Germans may not have had much of a fleet in the Mediterranean which would use Malta as a base, but the Italians did. There wasn't much need for it as an Axis base (what with Sicily just north of it), but taking it away from the Allies would have deprived the latter of their only base in the central Mediterranean. That would make Axis naval operations safer there and, if Suez and Gibraltar could be secured (an interesting 'what if' would be if Franco had agreed to help Hitler attack Gibraltar) then Italy would be in no danger of an Allied attack.

As mention before, beating back the enemy is not the same as consolidating those gains to press home the advantage. In Normandy the Allies didn't just kick the Germans out of France, they built up bases of operations so that they can continue the job into Germany and the Netherlands and beyond. This required a tremendous logistical operation, and even the Allies didn't do things right from the start, both Market Garden and the Bulge are proven examples of the need to keep the pace of offensive tempo. Otherwise, like Africa, you will just be running into enemy territory only to retreat back to the original lines of defense because supply could not sustain your advance.
I recall one documentary that referred to the Japanese during WW2 (specifically their naval assets) as a small bed sheet: effective wherever it is, but once you pull it one direction, it exposes another to the elements. I think the same can be applied to the Axis: wherever they go they were effective, but they could not cover much and since they were eager to expand and fight s many people o rapidly at a time, they were invariably stretched thin in so many places. The German presence, wherever focused, was very effective in the Axis' favour, but once Rommel advanced towards Egypt and the Germans had to concentrate on Barbarossa, Africa faltered and the raids over Malta rapidly declined. Same as over Britain where the diversion towards bombing cities instead of maintaining the bombing over RAF positions. A bigger factor to the what if's of this scenario have more to do with the hypothetical persistence of the Axis' war efforts.
Consolidation of islands like Crete and Malta were required to assure either their use towards the Axis or at the least their denial from being used by the Allies. Both require substantial efforts even fi you're not going to use them as bases of operations (which seems foolhardy given the impact they had for the Allies and the potential to do the same for the Axis).

Seleucos of Olympia wrote: »

If the Germans and Italians reached Suez, then they'd be able to proceed further east counting on pro-Axis uprisings in Iraq and even Iran, if they could reach it. Turkey, seeing the Axis victorious all around it, might have been more inclined to ally with Germany, and that would create a much more direct and dangerous logistical route to the Soviet Caucasus than through Iraq. Also, the Italian navy would be able to operate in the Black Sea.

This obviously not only counts on pro-Axis sympathy by territories under the influence and control of the Allies, but also counts on the inactivity of the Allies themselves. The bigger you carve out an empire the more places the enemy can strike, and if you don't consolidate or build up your own forces to match this expansion, which inevitably brings up the issue of focusing forces in a particular area (Barbarossa for the offensive, Calaise for defensive), then you have your gains seriously vulnerable for a counter-offensive (as the Soviet offensives like Saturn shows, tremendous gains mean tremendous areas to defend). The example already discuss is Tobruk, you cannot just ignore the presence of the enemy there and move on towards strategic objectives which, if linking up with the Germans in Russia is one of them, may be seriously lacking in strategic value.
Like with Barbarossa, you cannot expect to advance so far into enemy territory and hope the enemy has nothing to do about it; in fact you are supplying the enemy with many more opportunities to hit you where it hurts, simply because you are creating more places to feel that hurt. In Barbarossa supply was the not only problem, it was the tremendous surface area that had to be guarded and watched in the event the Soviets tried to attack you, which they did numerous times and in a few cases failed. The same can be said in Africa, though the limited terrain may seem to aid the Axis advance, the lack of forces and supply to have a greater presence makes the situation just as frustrating.
As for Turkey I cannot say what would happen if they joined with the Axis. On one hand it would provide the Axis additional means and strategic locations, on the other hand it at the same time requires the Axis to mind those locations from attacks and occupation by the Allies for the exact same reason. More places to go does not equal more forces to go around.

Seleucos of Olympia wrote: »

German high command was no doubt aware of such options, but Hitler had his mind set on Russia. German paratroopers payed a steep price in blood to conquer Crete, yet the island was not used for offensive operations against Cyprus or Suez. With the shift in focus on Russia, that whole front was neglected. But so much could have been accomplished there; after all, it wasn't so much about Africa, it was about securing the Mediterranean and threatening the Middle East.

I think the lesson after Crete for the Germans was that they re-eventuated the effectiveness of their tactics and realized that things needed to change. Fallschirmjaeger regiments after Crete took on the role of elite light infantry rather than airborne paratroops afterwards, and this must have affected the strategic considerations on other targets like Britain and Malta. As with the other armed elements of military forces, airborne troops relied heavily on surprise and aggressive manoeuvre to seize strategic locations in order to allow supporting elements to arrive and assist: the Germans were making no gains in Crete until they secured an airfield to fly in heavy reinforcements. The campaign over Malta was also not a blockade, so Allied shipping were able to continuously resupply the island.

If anything, a preferable strategy for the Axis powers was not to conquer so much territory from the Allies, but instead make the Allies' hold on these possessions a costly burden. The more places you lose the less places you must defend. The same problem applies to whatever losses the British suffered in Asia and the Russians in the East, and the exact opposite problem was the case for the German defense of France during Normandy and after Barbarossa. Just like in a game of Risk or any Total War campaign, the more places you take the more places you must defend, and it will take time to expand yourself in numbers and logistics to remain in a superior position, otherwise you are constantly stretching yourself out to take more, which means more places to be attacked.

I also think that the focus for the Axis powers in waging war ought to have been the destruction of enemy forces as much as securing control of vital locations. Yamamoto's principle for Pearl Harbour and Midway were based entirely on this concept: destruction of the US naval presence in the Pacific was very vital to the survival of Japanese interests because if the US doesn't have any ships there, the Japanese can literally do anything. Taranto was also based on the same principle: a night attack on a concentrated assortment of ships with, ideally, results in many ships sunk would have meant the Italians cannot wage war. It is completely different than trying to take over the place to make sure the enemy cannot use it any further, because the quetsion of what they are going to do about it remains. Barbarossa counted on the decisive destruction of Russian armies as part of its strategic objective, but of course the inability to complete this goal and the underestimation of Russian fighting and manpower capabilities also ensured this objective was never reached.
What the Germans needed to do was to inflict decisive losses upon the Allies, not simply take places from their control. Pearl Harbour was a brilliant tactical and short-term strategic victory for Japan because it seriously impacted the US navy's ability to prevent the subsequent (and rapid) takeover of the East Indies. Leyte Gulf and Midway were significant not only because strategically valuable locations were secured, but also that the Japanese forces suffered heavy casualties. Likewise, the loss of the 6h army at Stalingrad was a terrible blow, more than losing control of the city itself. Conversely, Dunkirk was a strategic victory for the British because while weapons and vehicles can be rebuild, manpower cannot.

Seleucos of Olympia

A difference between Eastern Europe and the Middle East is that the former was considered a region that was to be colonized by Germans while the latter was simply a region that would have to be deprived from the UK. This means that the Germans would have been happy to support local nationalist governments there, freeing up resources that would otherwise be needed for anti-partisan duty. Iraq already had a pro-Axis coup in 1941, which was put down by British forces, and Iran was invaded by the UK and the Soviet Union to prevent it from aligning with Germany. The Middle East was not a core region of the British Empire, in the sense that they could not easily muster troops there, much less manufacture equipment. The British logistical lines would have been even longer than the German ones.

As for Turkey, if the Mediterranean were to become an Axis lake (by controlling Suez and Gibraltar), it wouldn't have to worry about any other front except the Caucasus, and Italy wouldn't have to worry at all. That's a lot of forces freed up to be used elsewhere. A UK up against an Axis at peace (and secretly allied, for all the British could guess) with the USSR, without access to the Mediterranean and at risk of losing the Middle East and India might have been willing to sue for peace. But Franco's refusal to help take Gibraltar (along with several smaller reasons) rendered that a weak prospect. That's why I think Franco joining the Axis is the most interesting 'what if'.

daelin4#9896

Seleucos of Olympia wrote: »

A difference between Eastern Europe and the Middle East is that the former was considered a region that was to be colonized by Germans while the latter was simply a region that would have to be deprived from the UK. This means that the Germans would have been happy to support local nationalist governments there, freeing up resources that would otherwise be needed for anti-partisan duty. Iraq already had a pro-Axis coup in 1941, which was put down by British forces, and Iran was invaded by the UK and the Soviet Union to prevent it from aligning with Germany. The Middle East was not a core region of the British Empire, in the sense that they could not easily muster troops there, much less manufacture equipment. The British logistical lines would have been even longer than the German ones.

The British however have one advantage: they own a lot more things than the Germans. Even more importantly, their Allies were significant contributions of material and manpower. So the British did have much longer logistical lines, but they also had the means to protect them. Numbers aren't also the only factor as well, the Germans lagged behind in a few critical technologies such as RADAR and ASDIC, to which they used to very great effect. The Germans also had some technological advantages, but they also suffered from critical or persistent economic issues: as said before, their economic and administrative situation was set up to be very problematic. For the Germans, technological advantages was limited due to logistics: jet fighters are powerful, but they are not cheap, and they needed a lot of them. And in order to use a lot of them you needed fuel and parts, which had to be taken from somewhere and protected while it travelled to be processed and consumed. Then you needed the pilots, who needed to be trained and kept alive.

Seleucos of Olympia wrote: »

As for Turkey, if the Mediterranean were to become an Axis lake (by controlling Suez and Gibraltar), it wouldn't have to worry about any other front except the Caucasus, and Italy wouldn't have to worry at all. That's a lot of forces freed up to be used elsewhere. A UK up against an Axis at peace (and secretly allied, for all the British could guess) with the USSR, without access to the Mediterranean and at risk of losing the Middle East and India might have been willing to sue for peace. But Franco's refusal to help take Gibraltar (along with several smaller reasons) rendered that a weak prospect. That's why I think Franco joining the Axis is the most interesting 'what if'.

The issue of logistics still apply if Turkey and other countries like Iraq decided to side with the Axis. But considering the participation of Axis satellite forces alongside the Germans in, say, Barbarossa, the question of whether they would be ad decisive factor is still up for debate. This is of course not to imply that satellite forces such as Romanina, Hungarian and Bulgarian troops were inherently second-rate despite common media portrayals, but it does raise the question of whether or not their participation may be a boon or a burden to the Axis (or Allied) war effort. Italy switched sides mid-way but was effectively out of the main theatre of war. Turkey would have opened up opportunities yes, but also opportunities for the Allies to make their own strikes. To take full advantage of such opportunities require a further contribution of men and resources; if the Axis were not up to the task then that task was left up to the puppet regimes in the form of local contributions, which were either not up to technological or tactical standard, lacked inter-service coordination (itself a problem for the major Axis powers), or contributed too few numbers. After all the British had Canadians, Australians, etc. to augment their strength, something neither Japan nor Germany can put out in great numbers.

Overall, although the Allies were at times in a strategic crisis, they were never truly in any economic or logistical disadvantage. The Axis forces, particularly Germany and Japan, were striking precisely because of these problems: they attacked because they needed resources. Until they can start churning out tanks and plans and ships at a comparable rate (they either did so but with dated vehicles or simply did so too late), they were doomed to constantly fight with one hand behind their back. It would take more than some genius tactical and strategic manouvres like seizing the Suez and linking up with Russia, and the joining of Turkey, to change the course of events.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

OK, I got back from my vacation yesterday and have just gotten around to reading your responses. Im not done yet, but having just read Daelin's first response, I want to clarify some things that I don't think he understood what I meant by them. Then, after reading all of these long responses (I printed them out to read after typing this), I will place my own opinion on this matter.

so, the clarifications for Daelin4:

-with Alam Halfa possibility, its really a hypothetical, meaning that despite the fact that fortifying that ridge was the plan, we assume for the sake of argument that it is not fortified and a different plan was adopted by 8th Army

-with regard to the possibility of Berlin taking more of an interest, your argument is mostly reasonable, but I disagree somewhat. I think capturing the middle east oil fields would have been of great benefit to the Axis, as the opposition guarding them would have been significantly less than that in the Caucasus, with the legendarily disastrous results we all are too aware of.

also, if not making use of the Suez Canal themselves, perhaps simply denying Britain access to it may have been worth it.

-regarding the Tobruk possibility, I did not mean ignoring it, by 'never having been under siege' I meant the Axis forces capturing it on their offensive, rather than cutting off and besieging the Australians there. Basically, they capture Tobruk quickly without any siege effort. And again, it really is a hypothetical and a 'for the sake of argument' thing


anyway, as I said, I just wanted to clarify those misunderstandings and post my one opinion of potential motives for Berlin, I will read the rest of your responses and get back to all of you

Istvan

Well, Rommel would have had a difficult time driving to the Suez Canal. Cars did not have such great fuel efficiency in these days and gas stations would have been few and far in between in north eastern Africa, I imagine. Also they didn't have GPS yet, so Rommel probably would have gotten lost a few times and needed to take out a map and try to figure out where he is and which road he'd need to take. But all in all, I think Rommel probably could have driven to the Canal.

In all seriousness, though, I don't think cutting Britain off its colonies would have been the German high command's top priority, so I don't think he would have been given the resources necessary to actually reach it and block it. The main theatre of war was elsewhere.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

OK, I have read the rest of the responses and have my response to them:

I am largely leaning to agree with Daelin on this one, I very much agree with him that the real chances of success depended on situations that were gigantic long-shots. I suppose that if, for whatever reason, Barbarossa was delayed a couple years, perhaps a successful conquest of North Africa and critical parts of the middle east would have been possible.

But I am a strong advocate for potential motives, to capture the Middle East Oil (MEO for short as I will put it) would have been of great benefit to the Axis, as prior to that they only had one dependable natural source of it: Romania. Capturing the MEO would not just have given the Axis more oil, it would have denied it to Britain and the USSR. With the Dutch East Indies under Japanese control, I don't think there were huge oil reserves outside of North America that were in firm Allied control.

I also think that taking Suez away from Britain would have hampered her war effort, at least her lines of communications, particularly with India. Consider this scenario:

Egypt falls, and 8th Army is largely destroyed or captured, with the surviving units escaping into British Palestine and the Sudan, Britain would have been in a precarious situation.

Perhaps Italy could have advanced north into Sudan from Abyssinia. If it was clear that a push beyond Suez was likely to the British, maybe they would have deployed more forces from India to hold them off, this would have meant that the Japanese in Indochina would have had less opposition to face, and perhaps they could have advanced into India. I also think the possibility of Pro-Axis uprisings in the Middle East like the one in Iraq in 1941 were certainly a real hazard if there were more of them. Perhaps the uprisings could have targeted the Oil Fields along side the local British governments.

Maybe with the British forces based out of India becoming overstretched, those organizations and groups in India that wanted Purna Swaraj (Complete Home Rule) could have commenced intense uprisings and revolts against the British, both violent ones and the non-violent ones done famously by Mahatma Gandhi.

A Joint German-Spanish assault on Gibraltar was certainly not impossible, there was even plans for it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Felix) and the loss of Gibraltar along with Suez would have certainly made the Mediterranean and Axis Lake, if Malta was still standing it would have been totally isolated with the remaining elements of the Royal Navy that was left in the Med. But the willingness of Franco to risk bringing the already war weary Spain into the larger conflict is the real question mark.

If all of these factors came into play, it is entirely possibly that Britain could have abandoned India, and all the implications that could have meant. Communication lines with Australian and New Zealand could have been hampered, and the only way to get there would be ether around Africa, or around South America, certainly doable, but a much tougher situation than if they had the Canal.

If all of this had occurred or was about to occur prior to Pearl Harbor and the Entry of the US into the war, Britain would have been in bad shape in terms of her empire, at the very least it would have prolonged the war in the West by 1-2 years, maybe more. By that point, the Soviets could have already been ether advancing into Poland or fighting a second battle of Moscow before the Western Allies even attempted Operation Overlord. I don't think it's an unreasonable possibility that if, hypothetically, Stalin had defeated Germany before Overlord, the Soviets could have continued on to the North Sea and the English Channel........


but despite all that I have just said, Daelin is very much correct when he says that all of these possibilities would have required unlikely events to occur. It is very correct that Germany didn't go into a full war economy that they should have been in until well after Barbarossa. In the end I think it was the following key factors that prevented and real German-Italian Success outside Europe:

-Lack of War Economy in Germany earlier, as well as signifantly inferior Navy (other than sub fleets) and supply lines than that of the British.

-poor war fighting ability of Italy (both in terms of actual operations as well as general logistics), I think we can all agree on this, the Italians could probably have only made real gains if the British were already severely damaged in the MTO (Mediterranean theatre of Operations)

-The War in Russia

-And as always, the poor long term planning of the German High Command, chiefly old Adolf himself


NOTE: it is clear that we have spread our arguments into parts of the Second World War far from Africa, im fine with it, as long as you can clearly tie it back to strategic possibilities in the MTO and Middle East

daelin4#9896

Half Life Expert wrote: »

-with Alam Halfa possibility, its really a hypothetical, meaning that despite the fact that fortifying that ridge was the plan, we assume for the sake of argument that it is not fortified and a different plan was adopted by 8th Army

lol that's rather vague and ambiguous sort of hypothetical though, since it can include anything from less machine guns at the ridge to just packing up and leaving for Iraq for whatever reasons, leaving the Suez entirely free.

Half Life Expert wrote: »

-with regard to the possibility of Berlin taking more of an interest, your argument is mostly reasonable, but I disagree somewhat. I think capturing the middle east oil fields would have been of great benefit to the Axis, as the opposition guarding them would have been significantly less than that in the Caucasus, with the legendarily disastrous results we all are too aware of.

It might have been, but where would the men and machines come from? Barbarossa couldn't be put off forever, even if Hitler magically decided that the Jewish-Bolshevist scum that was the Soviet Union was no longer worth eradicating. And unlike the Allies, leaving the Soviet Union's oil assets in the Caucasus would mean the Soviet Union gets the oil to themselves...oil that Germany needs and got prior to Barbarossa.
Furthermore, I don't think Hitler really thought that far ahead in terms of logistics; he was first and foremost obsessed with Lebensraum and more political matters, something that inevitably required things like fuel for ships planes and tanks to take a back seat. He was chancellor, not a general.
In any case, seizing the oil fields might have been successful for numerous alternative results, but I do not think the Suez canal would have been a factor. I mean if the drive down to the Caucasus was in fact successful, there's not much point in Rommel prioritizing his drive towards the Middle East. His original mandate was simply to support the Italians and drive the Allies back from the Mediterranean theatre.

Half Life Expert wrote: »

also, if not making use of the Suez Canal themselves, perhaps simply denying Britain access to it may have been worth it.

But how could you really do that if you don't have enough planes and ships and tanks for everyone's needs? Denial of resources to the enemy is simply one step towards victory- Yamamoto realized this, that's why his primary strategies involved destroying the US Navy in the Pacific; if the Japanese did not do that, they'll come back sooner or later. The only way to make sure they don't cause trouble is to simply destroy as many of them at once. The Allies had other places to get resources, but you can only replace so many lost vehicles and manpower. And remember, Hitler wanted to cow the Allies into peace so he can do his own thing in Eastern Europe; it was the Soviet Union he wanted to destroy.

Istvan wrote: »

In all seriousness, though, I don't think cutting Britain off its colonies would have been the German high command's top priority, so I don't think he would have been given the resources necessary to actually reach it and block it. The main theatre of war was elsewhere.

Rommel's mission was really just support and to tie down the Allies in Africa. Ever since 1939 the Axis were moving in reaction to all the Allies' movements, because they can't just go anywhere themselves. If the Suez is taken, it would have to be held...and everything around it. The Germans won't have enough men and materiel for that.

So take the Suez? Sure, maybe. Hold it? Heck no.

Half Life Expert wrote: »

But I am a strong advocate for potential motives, to capture the Middle East Oil (MEO for short as I will put it) would have been of great benefit to the Axis, as prior to that they only had one dependable natural source of it: Romania. Capturing the MEO would not just have given the Axis more oil, it would have denied it to Britain and the USSR. With the Dutch East Indies under Japanese control, I don't think there were huge oil reserves outside of North America that were in firm Allied control.

That's sort of why the Allies invaded the Middle East countries: there were alleged pro-Axis sympathies, so they took them over.
As for oil, I was never under the impression that the Middle East was considered an economic prize for Germany. They were more interested in autarky as well as the oil found in Eastern Europe. If Hitler eyed elsewhere, it would certainly have been after hegemony in Europe was well established, ie the 1950s, where Germany's armed forces were planned to have been developed to the point to confidently take on the Allies, namely Britain and France. IMO there simply wasn't much thought put into the future for the Nazis.

Half Life Expert wrote: »

Egypt falls, and 8th Army is largely destroyed or captured, with the surviving units escaping into British Palestine and the Sudan, Britain would have been in a precarious situation.

But how would Rommel plan to do this? His logistical situation was precarious, it was actually easier to let Rommel overstretch himself and simply attack his rear supply line. His retreat was in large part due to this: lose too many troops at the front while your own rear is exposed demanded a withdrawal to consolidate.

Half Life Expert wrote: »

Perhaps Italy could have advanced north into Sudan from Abyssinia. If it was clear that a push beyond Suez was likely to the British, maybe they would have deployed more forces from India to hold them off, this would have meant that the Japanese in Indochina would have had less opposition to face, and perhaps they could have advanced into India. I also think the possibility of Pro-Axis uprisings in the Middle East like the one in Iraq in 1941 were certainly a real hazard if there were more of them. Perhaps the uprisings could have targeted the Oil Fields along side the local British governments.

Again this all depended on the Suez being taken and held firmly from any attempts by the British. You can't do that with just tanks and men or even some planes. The Wehrmacht had serious problems with coordination between its services; there was virtually no naval air arm because of political bickering. The Luftwaffe would need to have a presence in the African theatre beyond tactical support for Rommel's forces, not to mention more resources diverted to more aircraft- aircraft that may need development to adapt.
As for the Japanese, their primary mission was securing of Pacific resources, not advanced westwards into Eurasia. That does not allow them to consolidate their Pacific holdings against a future American reprisal after Pearl Harbour, but rather contradicts their political goals. Any Japanese advance into the Middle East would first demand three things: economic progress, territorial consolidation, and most importantly, the decisive destruction of US presence in the Pacific. That last part demands Midway to have been so successful that the Japanese could have years before they can worry about any serious American attack.

Half Life Expert wrote: »

Maybe with the British forces based out of India becoming overstretched, those organizations and groups in India that wanted Purna Swaraj (Complete Home Rule) could have commenced intense uprisings and revolts against the British, both violent ones and the non-violent ones done famously by Mahatma Gandhi.

That would have required siding with the Japanese, and I do not think that the Indians are so keen in simply letting some imperial power come "help take over" for them, especially considering how the East Indies turned out. If people weren't fighting the European colonials, they're fighting the Japanese, because they're the same foreign occupiers. If they went neutral, then the British would simply invade again with no fear of Japanese presence. If the Japanese were smart they'd keep some troops around to make sure that wouldn't happen, but then forces would be tied down.

Half Life Expert wrote: »

A Joint German-Spanish assault on Gibraltar was certainly not impossible, there was even plans for it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Felix) and the loss of Gibraltar along with Suez would have certainly made the Mediterranean and Axis Lake, if Malta was still standing it would have been totally isolated with the remaining elements of the Royal Navy that was left in the Med. But the willingness of Franco to risk bringing the already war weary Spain into the larger conflict is the real question mark.

That is a question mark for everyone that was either neutral or pro-Axis. The Allies can always threaten these small countries with invasion and installing sympathetic rulers to support them, because they have the means to project power in that manner. Ironically, the British's most pressing manpower need was in Britain, but then again they needed planes more than troops there.