Operation Zitadelle: Could it have Suceeded, and what could have been gained?

Half_Life_Expert#4276

Here is the next What if/Could it? thread, I have a few more ready to go after this, but most, but not all involve WWII, so I am fully open to suggestions for topics, as long as they don't involve WWII, as I would like to move beyond that war soon. However, the next two I have I think are fresh and could be very enjoyable

Operation Zitadelle (Citadel), was the German plan for the Summer Offensive in 1943 against the Kursk Salient in the Soviet Union, which would become the legendary Battle Of Kursk: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk

The plan, to put it simply, involved a massive German armored pincer involving forces from Army Group Center in the North and Army Group South in the South with the purpose of capturing the City of Kursk, and thereby cutting off and destroying all Soviet forces west of the City. Here is a map to illustrate this:



The hope, in theory, was that the destruction of these large soviet formations would shatter the momentum the Red Army had after the Stalingrad Counter Offensives, and give the strategic initiative in the East back to Germany.

We all know that this plan failed with the pincers not getting anywhere near Kursk, and resulting in the largest clash of Armored Vehicles in the history of warfare, and the Wehrmacht losing its offensive power in the East permanently.

I will not go into details of the reasons for failure now, as no doubt the first few responders will detail them


My question this time is:

"Could Operation Zitadelle have succeeded in taking the City of Kursk? If so, what could Germany have realistically gained by destroying Soviet formations of that size?"

As customary, I will not share my opinion now, but I will say that im pretty sure we can all agree that by this point in the war, there was no way Germany could have genuinely defeated the Soviet Union, so we will not consider that possibility.

Unless, of course, popular demand convinces me otherwise

Nisemono

"Could Operation Zitadelle have succeeded in taking the City of Kursk?"

No because the Soviets were waiting. This is evident in the amount of defensive works prepared.

"If so, what could Germany have realistically gained by destroying Soviet formations of that size?"

Nothing. It won't change the outcome of the war due to the losses incurred by the Germans. The Germans would be scrapping the bottom of the manpower barrel before the Soviets do, unless Stalin's behavior followed Hitler's instead of the opposite as in history.

daelin4#9896

The details put forth in the subject's Wikipedia article suggest that Zitadelle was basically an unnecessary offensive. I agree on that argument: it was simply attempting to re-live the success of Barbarossa, and worse with the preparations and resources of a prepare army that was well aware of such an attack.
The goal of Zitadelle, like Barbarossa, was an attack to envelop and smash the opposing force, and this has already proven to be less than decisive as Hitler expected. Nobody even expected that to be achieved, so the entire point of Zitadelle was really just a waste of time and an ego stroke for Hitler. Generals such as Walter Model suggested a defensive approach to defeating the Soviet forces: in reality a "reverse Zitadelle", similar to what happened at the second battle of Kharkov, where the Germans absorbed Soviet offensives and counter-attacks encircled and destroyed their advances. This wold not only have prevented the Germans from trying to trike at positions that were prepared against them, but the same can be utilized to their own benefit. Such mobile defense, or "fire brigade" manouvres as some have called it, were however unthinkable to Hitler. An iron will does not make up for silly ideologies cooked up by a corporal whose education never reached university-taught architect.

In reality it was the Soviets that learned and applied this lesson- they received intelligence pointing towards an attack on Kursk, and while Stalin also wanted to mount an offensive to prevent this attack, Zhukov advised exactly what the Germans wanted out of Hitler: let the enemy come first, smash them up with prepared forces, then go on the offensive after they have been pushed back. Unlike Hitler, Stalin agreed to this idea. As a result, Stalin did not even conceded much ground to the Germans once Kursk occurred. Hitler wasted a valuable opportunity to regain the offensive by going on the defense.

The question of whether success at Kursk was possible needs to first look at what made Kursk a failure:
First, the reason why the operation was cancelled was due to the Allies landing at Sicily prompting a German withdrawal from all gains to divert forces to Italy. Had this not happened and Hitler continued to press the attack- some divisions were more successful than others in penetrating Soviet defenses- that's already a possibility for the Germans to succeed.
Second, even if Hitler remained committed to finishing Kursk, there is still the open-ended tactical question of whether the Germans may have been able to continue. The Luftwaffe were nearly matched by the Red Army Air Force, and depending on how the Luftwaffe performed if they achieved air superiority, German advances would been greatly appreciated their ability to soften up Soviet ground forces. As Kursk was cancelled from stalling rather than a defeat for ether side, the potential outcome of an alternative is difficult to ascertain. I think, like Barbarossa, that if tactically the Germans were successful the strategic outcome, as already stated, would not have been any different.
Third, the Soviets had superior strategic reserves that would have enabled them to salvage whatever disasters that would befall on them after Kursk. No one can really admit that if the Germans took the city, or even destroyed the forces stationed there, he Soviet Union would have been pushed on the defensive, or even collapsed or surrendered. Had Kursk been achieved, Hitler would still have to have withdrawn forces to Italy, negating whatever initiative the Germans would have gained.
Of course the question of success would first require that Hitler continued the offensive (which was never practical in starting or finishing), that if he decided to keep things going that things went well, and if things went well, which was unlikely, the Germans would somehow have been relieved of tremendous pressure on not one but two of their defensive fronts, which of course did not occur in really life and unlikely to have occurred somehow in an alternate history. I mean the only thing going for Hitler was if the Allies did nothing and he had all of eternity to build up and smash the Soviets.

The third point already explained what Germany would have gained if they succeeded at Kursk- nothing much. If anything it would have bought time for Hitler to ensure that the East was propped up to specs and some forces can be put towards elsewhere if and when the Allies started making their moves. The successes gained at Kursk would in reality be less than what the Germans were already succeeded in doing prior to that battle- a strategy of defensive counter-attacks to destroy Soviet advances as they came, the exact opposite of Zitadelle. If you think about it, the same disaster fell onto the Romans at Cannae for the same reasons: Hitler did not like how this successful strategy was going, and wanted to fight the enemy in different terms. Like Fabius, genrals such as von Manstein, Model and especially Guderian must have shaken their heads in facepalm and disappointment.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

I agree that the odds were pretty bad for Zitadelle's success on it's launch date: July 5th

But there are a couple things worth looking at imo.

The fact that the Soviets got solid intel on the date of the offensive meant that they were fully prepared for it. That was most certainly the key factor that ensured failure. Heck, right before the time of day the attack was to begin, the Red army hit the German jumping off points with a massive preemptive artillery barrage.

What if, for whatever reason, Zitadelle was launched as a total or semi surprise?


Also, what has often been mentioned in the works and documentaries I have seen and read on Kursk, is that Hitler delayed the Offensive by many weeks to allow more of his "super tanks" like Tiger I, Panther, and Elefant Tank Destroyer to be deployed for the offensive. This no doubt gave the Red Army much more time to dig in and construct their many fortified belts of trenches, minefields and Anti-Tank emplacements.

What if the offensive did not wait for the extra "super-tanks"?


Is it possible, in your opinion, for odds of operational success to go up if one or both of the above became reality? By this I mean taking the city of Kursk and encircling Soviet formations east of the city.


In terms of actual gains from encircling the Soviet formations east of Kursk, well I agree that not much would have been realistically gained, except for maybe a morale boost back in Germany. But perhaps destruction of such large numbers of Soviet troops and tanks could have been the perfect delaying action to buy Germany enough

Half_Life_Expert#4276

im sorry, but for some reason, the forum wont let me add the rest of that last paragraph, so ill post it here, maybe the mods can try to add it themselves"

(from last sentence in previous post): time to improve it's situation in the East, defensively and whatnot. But of course that is not factoring in old Adolf himself, who would have probably ordered an insane drive to Smolensk or something crazy like that. In the end, the reasons for failure really all point back to Hitler. Daelin sums it up well:

"An iron will does not make up for silly ideologies cooked up by a corporal whose education never reached university-taught architect"

daelin4#9896

Half Life Expert wrote: »

The fact that the Soviets got solid intel on the date of the offensive meant that they were fully prepared for it. That was most certainly the key factor that ensured failure. Heck, right before the time of day the attack was to begin, the Red army hit the German jumping off points with a massive preemptive artillery barrage.

What if, for whatever reason, Zitadelle was launched as a total or semi surprise?

Ah forgot to add that bit about intel; I suppose in terms of tactical circumstances a surprise attack, like Barbarossa, would have caught the Soviets unguarded and perhaps would have resulted in the destruction of a large portion of its defenders. But on the other hand, the only reason why they would concentrate so many forces in such an area was because earlier a Soviet setback at Kharkov occurred- if anything the Soviets were aware of such an attack precisely because they had made the exact same mistake Hitler was about to make.
The effect of the attack also came from elsewhere: even if we're to assume the Soviets were completely routed due to complete surprise and tactical superiority, the Allies soon landed in Sicily shortly after and Hitler would still be pressed to cancel the operation and divert forces. Zitadelle was not an operation designed to take down the Soviet Union once and for all. To Heinz Guderian, Zitadelle was a solution looking for a problem, and its commitment was an unnecessary risk. Going on the strategic defensive would have instead allow the Germans to continue to rebuild their strength rather than sapped from committing to battle on the Soviets' terms, especially with the backdrop of their recent smashing of the Soviets' attempt in taking Kharkov being a QED. In that regard, most of the preparations the Soviets made in anticipation of Kursk would have effectively been a waste of time.
There is also the next problem of whether Hitler would have insisted on pressing towards other offensive operations if Zitadelle was a success; he had a tendency of having an arrogant "I told you so" attitude towards his generals ever since Poland and France. Victor's disease can easily lure one to advance towards levels that were not prepared for.

Half Life Expert wrote: »

Also, what has often been mentioned in the works and documentaries I have seen and read on Kursk, is that Hitler delayed the Offensive by many weeks to allow more of his "super tanks" like Tiger I, Panther, and Elefant Tank Destroyer to be deployed for the offensive. This no doubt gave the Red Army much more time to dig in and construct their many fortified belts of trenches, minefields and Anti-Tank emplacements.

What if the offensive did not wait for the extra "super-tanks"?

The thing about the delay was that it was in direct response to the considerable Soviet defenses already being arrayed against them- a telltale sign of not only intelligence compromise but should have been an obvious warning to Hitler that it was just better to stay put and let the Soviets try to have at them instead. The delays were attempts to bolster the forces earmarked on the offensive, which of course only grew over time as the Soviets fortified themselves.
If you think about it, the relative mechanical problems these new tanks suffered would likely have been minimized if the Germans were on the defensive. Or to put it another way, these tanks would actually have been better served in a defensive role, which only all the more proved how foolish, and unnecessarily so, to attempt an offensive operation for what would effectively been a temporary tactical success.

Half Life Expert wrote: »

Is it possible, in your opinion, for odds of operational success to go up if one or both of the above became reality? By this I mean taking the city of Kursk and encircling Soviet formations east of the city.

In terms of actual gains from encircling the Soviet formations east of Kursk, well I agree that not much would have been realistically gained, except for maybe a morale boost back in Germany. But perhaps destruction of such large numbers of Soviet troops and tanks could have been the perfect delaying action to buy Germany enough

Ah see there's the third problem to Zitadelle: the goal wasn't about shoving the Soviets back a bit, but to commit to what could be weeks worth of encirclement of Soviet formations. This obviously only works if the operational tempo was held steady or increased over time, but the Allies at Sicily would have prevented this from occurring- to me, Hitler would still have had to cancel Zitadelle even if it was going smashingly well. The entrenchment Soviet position, moreover, would have made such an encirclement easy to accomplish but very difficult for Hitler to exploit.
In order for any true success, a lot of factors like Allies bumming out of Sicily and a massive political catastrophe befalling the Soviet Union in the wake of German success at Kursk would have had any meaningful results.
And then there's still the hypotheticals: if Hitler had instead time to slowly defeat the Soviet forces at Kursk, there is still the overall strategic situation that would have remained relatively unchanged: Stalin would have had lost at the most generous two million men, along with the hardware and logistical resources, but it's not like the Germans could go on the offensive again, they'd at best use these captured resources to bolster their defenses, but shortage of manpower was becoming an issue; in fact the reason why Kursk is known as the largest tank battle was due to the panzer arm taking the most of the work: that was in itself due to an increasing shortage of manpower in other parts of the Wehrmacht, namely infantry and artillery. Barbarossa itself was devastating enough, not to mention tremendous territorial gains, but even that hardly proved fatal to the Soviet Union- that was precisely what Hitler needed in order to gain any strategic advantage in the war. That or some other countries in the world decided to pitch in for the allies and extend their manpower and economic resources, in the same way the United States did so after Pearl Harbour.