Vietnam War: Could the United States have "won"?

Half_Life_Expert#4276

Its been about 10 days since I put up the last What if/Could it? thread, so ill put up this next one, but as always, previous threads remain open for new thoughts

The Second Indochina War, known to most Americans as the Vietnam War. I prefer the former as it was rather a phase of a much larger period of conflict, with the First being the war that culminated with the decisive French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

It is a dark stain in American History, and still is debated in many respects. But which ever way you look at it, it really is undeniable that the US effort failed. Many argue "the US military never lost a battle, therefore never 'lost' the war", if so, the North Vietnamese still won, as South Vietnam still fell.

This war is a critical one to study today and for future conflicts, as it is a textbook example of a successful asymmetric military campaign defeating a superpower.

We know that the general plan for the US military on the ground was never to Invade and topple the North Vietnamese government, the plan was always to support and protect the south.


I want to put forward this question:

"Could the United States Armed Forces, with total support of The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), have won the Vietnam War?"

Before you start typing your responses, I know there will undoubtedly be debate as to what would constitute a "Victory" for the US in this war. So, I am going to lay down a simple victory condition that must be met:

The Communist Forces, both regular NVA and Vietcong, cease all efforts to take over and/or destabilize South Vietnam. There could still be renegade communist bands or individuals attacking the south, but all official and major efforts cease for the foreseeable future.

I know some may argue against this, but I set this a the Victory Condition that we are examining. So you must work with this

You will have to come up with a convincing argument for me to be flexible on this.

Anyway, we will also assume that the larger strategic/political situation is the same faced at the start of major US military involvement in 1965. It would also be preferable that any of your hypothetical efforts took less time than the actual US large scale involvement (mid 1965 to 1973)


so, Discuss!!

Rath_Darkblade

The "Vietnam War" - as you say, HLE, this conflict was only the second to earn that title in that part of the world - is hardly my area of expertise. Therefore, if I try to enter into detail, I may be wrong. I can only speak in generalities.

The United States Army committed at least three tremendous blunders that were major contributions to losing the war for them:

1. First, defoliation with Agent Orange (and other chemical agents) was an act of ecological warfare on a vast scale. Its long-term detrimental health effects on the Vietnamese soldiers, as well as American and other soldiers, are not in question. The fact that it was used certainly did not help the Americans "win the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese. (I use the "hearts and minds" phrase with quote marks because it was widely used at the time, even though it has become a cliche now).

2. Secondly, the My Lai Massacre was another instance of failing to "win the hearts and minds" - not only in Vietnam but also in America. This incident and its outcome, seen in hindsight, are a major embarrassment for the US Army.

3. Finally - although this is not an error as such - the Vietnam War was the first to receive widespread "publicity", thanks to the increasing powers of television. This exponentially increased public awareness - and thus outrage - at the two incidents named here, thus (indirectly) damaging both Presidents Johnson and Nixon.

This is all background information that is, or should be, widely known about the war. It did not "lose" the war for the US Army, but it did make it much more difficult for them to "win".

Another point that should be made: it is tremendously difficult for a nation to win a propaganda campaign by the use of force, particularly when that nation invades another nation to spread said propaganda. I am merely conjecturing here, but it is possible that the South Vietnamese thought in terms of "the North might be communists, but at least they're our communists" (i.e. fellow Vietnamese). To put it another way, nationalism (i.e. Vietnamese vs. French/American) was - rightly or wrongly - thought to be more important than political ideology (i.e. democracy vs. communism). However, I must again stress that this is mere conjecture on my part.

Comments?

Maeda_Toshiie

@Rath

The failures were not so much on the US Army (or the Armed Services in general). The failures were political.

1. The first use of herbicides in COIN/Small Wars was not in the Vietnam war, and the decision was not made by any uniform wearing commander. The fact that the herbicides were impure with toxic contaminants didn't help matters, but this fault lies with the manufacturer, not the user.

2. With Project 100,000, you are asking for this kind of trouble. Again, Project 100,000 was a product of civilian "wiz kids".
In addition, soldiers going berserk and creating scandals happens in every army and every conflict.

3. It is somewhat the fault of the US Army for not handling media relations. To be fair, they never had to handle media relations to that extent before. WWII had the entire press on their side without asking for it. The Korean War saw far less coverage.

For the record, the Viet Cong was largely destroyed by the Tet Offensive that the regular North Vietnam units took over the fighting after that. Linebackers were not useless. They did force the North Vietnamese onto the negotiations table.

Ultimately, the failure of Vietnam is political. I'll hold off on it for now.

greycat

Maeda Toshiie wrote: »

@Rath

The failures were not so much on the US Army (or the Armed Services in general). The failures were political.

1. The first use of herbicides in COIN/Small Wars was not in the Vietnam war, and the decision was not made by any uniform wearing commander. The fact that the herbicides were impure with toxic contaminants didn't help matters, but this fault lies with the manufacturer, not the user.

But... 2,4D (one of the ingredients in Agent Orange) was developed as part of a clandestine wartime effort to create chemical warfare agents for use in World War II; 2,4-D was not used this way in WWII.

So I am pretty sure they alone had the data of how it could be used as a weapon.

daelin4#9896

The only way to force the North Vietnamese from further efforts to taking over the rest of the country is to completely destroy it's ability to do so. This requires tactical as well as strategic military offiense. THis worked, somewhat, in the Korean war because UN forces invaded North Korea and almost destroyed it, retreating only when the Chinese joined into the fight, a move the West did not expect and were forced to retreat to pre-war lines. Militarily the North Koreans were in no position to continue any offensive operations: the West therefore had achieve their objective of preventing the South from being overrun.

This was not the case in Vietnam, there were no plans nor true efforts to an invasion of North Vietnam, and in any case, the political establishment in the North was successful compared to the Korean situation, and was part of the reason why the US shied away from a formal, conventional military intervention by way of stomping the North entirely (and that's not mentioning China and the Soviet Union being more than peeved at that). War was inevitable the minute that the "temporary" partitioning of the country became permanent, and neither side could agree on a resolution to reunify the country. The US containment strategy (that is, indirect action to prevent spread of communism) was the reason for American participation, and unlike Korea, it did not provide for a forced regime change b overthrowing the North Vietnamese. A comparable analogy, I think, would be American involvement in WW2 without land or even air participation: yeah the war's not going to end for quite a while. But by the time they could contemplate this sort of campaign, the US had neither the public support or even military means, and North Vietnam had not only significant political support from the Soviet Union and China but also sizable military aid in the form of weapons and vehicles: special forces operations and intensive air bombings can only do so much to weaken the North. The bombings were also not with impunity: several B-52s were shot down over the course of the campaign as the North anticipated their repetitious patterns. Several bombers might not sound so bad statistically compared to the other losses incurred in Vietnam in general, but as they are B-52s and the mindset had fostered a sense of superiority, that is shattered when they are lost to enemy action. However, Linebacker II was relatively successful in that it destroyed most of its strategic objectives and the North was significantly hampered to the point of returning to negotiations: it's goals however was not so much about hampering the Norths ability to fight, but rather force them to peace talks again using threat of force.
Now a GOOD question in extension is whether the US continued strictly on air campaigns and whether the long-term effects might have provided for a favourable military position (ie an easier time for an invasion force to land and topple the North). But I'll leave that to our resident What-If questioner hint hint!

There is also the fact that the US fought on behalf of the South and was often at odds with the democratic government, you can find all the general details in wikipedia. Suffice to say it's hard to carry the team so to speak when the teammate isn't very good or even willing to cooperate at times. Ironically, the US's efforts of instituting regime change occurred only in the south. I can only imagine the changed strategy of regime change on the North as hardly any different when it comes to US-South Vietnam cooperations- the Southern government wasn't exactly an ideal model for neither the local population nor the idea of what the US had in mind.

Overall I'd say the answer is no: the goals were set in stone a bit too late to change (can you imagine the outrage if the US suddenly decided to formally go to war and muster a large conquering force? The Draft was despised enough), and in any event would have required the changes occur well before 1965. To be fair that would still be nigh-impossible as that courts war with not only hte North but with the rest of the communist world. The policy of containment refrained from direct military conflict.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

Considering that the US military operations were inherently flawed with the lack of orders to directly defeat the NVA and Vietcong, the real chance for success within that flawed framework relies, in my opinion, on the permanent destruction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail as well as all available routes for supplies and fighters to get into South Vietnam.

Yes, this was a major effort of the US, especially with air power, but it was ridiculously stupid to think that they could have seriously damaged the Ho Chi Minh Trail (HCMT from now on for convenience) with airpower. Hitting the existing bridges was just about all they could have effectively done. Most of the HCMT was outside the territory of South Vietnam, as with the official ban on US ground operations outside South Vietnam until 1970, the US military could not destroy the trail.

So, the nessicary requirement is for the US forces to have full freedom to attack Vietcong logistics and supplies.

Also, just launching raids or major offensives on the trail alone may not have been enough, so the most effective strategy probably would have been a limited offensive into North Vietnam, with the goal of cutting off the beginning sources of the HCMT. Perhaps the total collapse of the HCMT network with it's source being cut off would have been enough, combined with the guaranteed major losses to the NVA in any major offensive.

daelin4#9896

I suppose using only ai power was a "safe" way to commit to their strategic and political goals with relatively minimum risk of life and materiel, public opinion, and in the event of failure, would not only somewhat absolve for it but also justify escalating into more conventional methods. The same conclusion of the ineffectiveness of air power was more or less shown in WW2 and, less prominently, in the Korean War, though in that conflict it wasn't so much tried-but-failed but already-on-the-ground.
Of course, there's also the fact that the best way to neutralize the Ho Chi Minh Trail would be to put troops there, South Vietnamese, US or otherwise. If you want to be incredibly brutal, you can also consider area denial weapons like mines, chemical agents or even nuclear warheads. Like you said, parts of the trail exist outside of Vietnam, so attempting to operate outside those borders risk conflict with otherwise neutral countries. That's not only walking out of the ballpark, but straight through that mall on the other side. No one's going to accept that, and would drive those countries into the arms of the commies, which was supposed to be the main goal.
I suppose public opinion stymied the ability for the US military to exercise "full freedom" in their methods. Indiscriminately bombing cities and villages is one thing, but losing troops in the process can be seen as needlessly throwing lives for a needlessly ineffective strategy.
As my local regiment Captain once said, troops are trained to go in and kill the enemy. Bombing them at a distance and hoping they just give up isn't a very effective option, not unless you're counting on another party (in this case, the South Vietnamese military) doing their part.
And to that I think a good What-If question to consider is how things might have turned out if the Vietnamese played a more active part as the result of an aggressive training programme provided by the Americans.

Amilcar Barca

Vietnam war was never my cup of tea, but i will leave here the knowledge i think i have gathered about it. The US problems were two:

1. The us armed force fought with an arm tied to his back. With this i mean that they, for political reasons, could never use their full force to destroy the north vietnam armed forces.

2. On top of the above the war quickly became unpopular in the us, so that political leaders shied away from it quite soon, getting into a vicious circle: lets make just limited military actions with limited means so that home opposition doesnt shout too much.

Basically, number two problem feeded number one, and the contrary (limited means and actions kept the war going, making home opposition against the war grew).

So, could the us have won the war? I think so, if they had commited their full forces and means as long as needed. They certainly had the means to destroy the north forces, so they could have won the war.

daelin4#9896

Amilcar Barca wrote: »

Vietnam war was never my cup of tea, but i will leave here the knowledge i think i have gathered about it. The US problems were two:

1. The us armed force fought with an arm tied to his back. With this i mean that they, for political reasons, could never use their full force to destroy the north vietnam armed forces.

Mmm wouldn't say so much arm tied back, but rather the entire intention of the full force they brought was never for defeating the enemy, only to just make sure they don't win. A big difference when it comes to an insurgency buttressed by a hostile neighbour with ever-increasingly large and sophisticated conventional force. I mean did the US ever intend to defend the south for an eternity? South Vietnam wasn't exactly trying to get a grip on itself: the president was actually juggling the rivalries of its own generals and even the US in order to sustain its unpopular regime. Diem even ordered special forces to raid Buddhist sites wearing army units, deliberately to foment the army's reputation. In casual common parlance, the US was carrying the team, and the teammate was doing the worst things possible to advance a mutual cause. Whatever the US was doing to undermine communist advance, the South Vietnamese regime was constantly oppressing the populace.

Ancient_Ruffian#5651

If anyone has read Tim O'Brien's book "The Things they Carried", and especially the first chapter thereof, you'll get some understanding of why the US lost that war. There's one part of it that sticks in my mind, which is the part when the US soldiers come across a dead VC teen soldier. Much of the chapter catalogues the enormous amount of gear the Americans carried - and wasted - when they were in the field. The young VC was carrying a spare clip of ammo and a packet of rice. He was of the land, was not far away from home and refuge, surrounded by people he knew and could rely on. The American soldiers, for all the huge logistical support they had, were fish out of water, strangers in a strange land. Many were draftees who had no motive at all for being there or behaving professionally. The stress of their situation drove many over the edge, where some of them remain to this day.

I think if the US had had massive international support for being there - which it didn't have - and had the kind of reason for wanting to win which they had in WW2 - which they didn't have - then they would have overwhelmed the North. They say you need a six to one majority when you are the attacker and the defending enemy is determined to hold their ground. The US could have mustered that level of firepower and manpower, all things else being equal. But all things else seldom are.

It was not just internal politics that stopped the Americans: the international community was lukewarm at best and downright hostile at worst. And all over the world opposition to the war was a rallying cry for the disaffected, and that included many thousands of young people. I was young then. I marched in the protests, chanted the slogans, helping to fill the streets of down town Wellington with sound and fury. When Vietnam "fell" in 1975 I considered it a victory. That rose-tinted view of the world is no longer all there, but I shudder to think what might have happened if the US had decided to go for broke. And Vietnam now is a quiet, peaceful, independent nation. It's not "free", but it's no North Korea. Would anyone want that not to be the case?

BillyRuffian#6250

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