Fall Weiss: Could the Poles have held out?

Half_Life_Expert#4276

Its been a while, but I now present the next What if/Could it? thread.

My Pre-WWII aggression thread kind of touched on this, but that thread really looked at a pre-emptive allied attack on Germany.

For one of my classes this semester that just ended, I wrote a paper about Poland's war effort in WWII, and I wanted to discuss the 1939 campaign.

Germany's Invasion of Poland, codenamed Fall Weiss (Case White), was the event that started World War II in Europe. Poland was overrun after a month and a half of fighting both Germany and the USSR which invaded two weeks after Germany.

I want to look at Fall Weiss from the perspective of the Polish military, which contrary to popular beliefs, performed rather well considering the situation they faced.

Fall Weiss cost the Luftwaffe 25% of the aircraft committed to the invasion, and the Wehrmacht lost a division's worth of Panzers and over 45,000 casualties.

And no, the Poles never used cavalry with sabers and lances to attack Panzers, this is a fact, so don't even think about bringing that up.

I want to examine how the Poles could have held out long enough for the Western Allies to have come to their aid.

Most of you, upon reading this, will probably instantly say: "No Chance."

Believe me, I agree, so I set forth two hypothetical assumptions for us to work with.

1) The Western Allies, Britain and France, decide to launch a serious effort to help Poland, which they really did not do in reality. I do not mean that half-hearted Saar Offensive, I mean a determined effort to help Poland. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saar_Offensive

With this, we will also assume that the Western Allies, seeing the imminence of war, do more preparations that they actually did.

2) The USSR does not invade Poland from the east on September 17th.

Some of you may not agree with my choice here, but hear me out. I believe that Poland's fate was sealed with the Soviet invasion. There was zero chance of the Polish military holding out against Germany and the USSR.

We will assume that Stalin, recognizing the massive damage he did to his army with the purges, and wanting to focus more resources against Finland and the Baltics, does not take his opportunity to invade eastern Poland, despite the terms agreed to in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.



As to whether Stalin could have actually done this, I don't know, but we are not debating that here, it is simply being used as a hypothetical situation where Poland only has to fight Germany.


So, with the set conditions given:

"Without the USSR to deal with, and the Western Allies determined to support, could Poland have held out against Germany's Fall Weiss?"


I have a couple more thread ideas in mind, the next one will deal with a major Cold War crisis.......:)

Bmnoble981#3908

They did have a plan, which might have worked with your scenario:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanian_Bridgehead

The Romanian Bridgehead (Polish: Przedmoście rumuńskie) was an area in southeastern Poland, now located in Ukraine. During the Invasion of Poland of 1939 (at the start of World War II), on 14 September the Polish commander-in-chief Marshal of Poland Edward Rydz-Śmigły ordered all Polish troops fighting east of the Vistula (approximately 20 divisions still retaining cohesion) to withdraw towards Lwów, and then to the hills along the borders with Romania and the Soviet Union.

The plan was a fall back plan in case it was impossible to defend the Polish borders, and assumed that the Polish forces would be able to retreat to the area, organise a successful defence until the winter, and hold out until the promised French offensive on the Western Front started. Rydz-Śmigły predicted that the rough terrain, the Stryj and Dniestr rivers, valleys, hills and swamps would provide natural lines of defence against the German advance. The area was also home to many ammunition dumps that were prepared for the third wave of Polish troops, and was linked to the Romanian port of Constanța, which could be used to resupply the Polish troops.
This plan is one of the reasons the Polish-Romanian Alliance was not activated by Poland. Poland and Romania had been allied since 1921 and the defensive pact was still valid in 1939. However, the Polish government decided that it would be much more helpful to have a safe haven in Romania and a safe port of Constanța that could accept as many Allied merchant ships as required to keep Poland fighting. The Polish Navy and merchant marine were mostly evacuated prior to 1 September (see Peking Plan); they were to operate from French and British ports and deliver the supplies through Romania.

The Soviet Union invaded from the east in early hours of 17 September, breaking the non-aggression pact with Poland, while the French, despite their promises, had taken no significant offensive against Germany, making it impossible for the Polish army to hold out at least in eastern parts of the country. In the late hours of that day, the Polish government and members of the military high command crossed the Polish-Romanian border with the intention of moving to France where the Polish forces in the west were being formed.[1][2][3] Polish units were ordered to evacuate Poland and reorganize in France.
Up to 120,000 Polish troops withdrew through the Romanian Bridgehead area to neutral Romania and Hungary. The majority of those troops joined the newly formed Polish Armed Forces in the West in France and the United Kingdom in 1939 and 1940. Until the United States entered the war and Germany attacked the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), the Polish army was one of the largest forces of the Allies.[4]

The Romanian government also received the treasury of the National Bank of Poland in 1939. One part of it, consisting of 1,261 crates containing 82,403 kg of gold, was loaded aboard a commercial ship in the port of Constanța, and transported to Western Europe. The transport was escorted by ships from the Romanian Navy, in order to prevent an interception by Soviet submarines in the Black Sea. The second part of the treasury was deposited in the Romanian National Bank. It was returned to Poland on 17 September 1947. A fictional portrayal of the gold's evacuation from Warsaw forms part of the novel The Polish Officer, by Alan Furst.

daelin4#9896

These hypothetical situations make for only one possible answer... ;/

Anyways there is one important thing about Fall Weiss: the Allies should have prepared for the inevitable German hostile action against Poland: the Germans made plenty of red flags to Britain and France given their aggressive diplomacy towards Poland and sudden pact with the Soviet Union.

Istvan

1) If Britain and France invaded Germany in a serious move, Germany would have essentially had to immediately request peace or collapse.

Britain and France didn't capitalise on this for three reasons: 1) They assumed WW2 would be a repeat of WW1, and so fronts would be more static and stable; essentially they did not anticipate the rapid collapse of Poland. 2) They believed - wrongly - that Poland's collapse was inevitable and attempting to save it would just be a waste of manpower, resources and political capital. 3) They overestimated Germany's military prowess and underestimated their own, which led them to wrongly believe that they needed the time more than Germany to prepare for a potential encounter. As for Germany: it didn't expect this, because Germany was convinced that Britain and France were led by cowards who would pull in their tails and let Poland fall without a declaration of war.

At any rate, Germany was in no shape to fight a war against Britain and France, much less fight a war against Britain and France with their forces becoming rapidly exhausted in Poland.

2) If Poland only had to fight Germany and received supplies through Romania, I like to assume that Poland would have humiliated Germany in the sense that Germany would never have managed to engulf in the entire country in a reasonable amount of time. In reality, as you pointed out, generally German losses were heavy and Germany exhausted a huge amount of its petroleum reserves in the span of a few weeks, making continued combat involving heavy vehicles a whimsical fantasy. Without Soviet backup Germany would have had to settle for a slice of Western Poland after a brief few months that would exhaust it, or continue a war that would turn out to be incredibly costly and slow. Some may scoff at this when they consider the rapid collapse of the armies of British, French and the Low Countries, but unlike the British and French who anticipated that World War 2 would simply be a repeat of World War 1 with more aircraft and tanks, the Polish were more prone to standing fast and holding the line, which made them less susceptible to the swift, aggressive tactics that the Germans displayed at the onset of the war. Furthermore, Poland was the main proving ground for German tactics, strategies and overall national leadership. It was here tactics and strategies could be experimented with that propelled Germany towards its early victories, not to mention it establish support for the Nazi leadership in conservative circles who otherwise opposed the regime, as they were drawn in by the allure of victory and territorial revisions that made them turn a blind eye to all the sins and shortcomings of the Nazi regime. A defeat or lengthy and costly war in Poland would have on the other hand significantly shaken the foundations of passive acceptance of the regime by the traditional elite in Germany, which could have led to domestic turmoil and possible coup d'etats.

Imperial Guard

Actually the German loses were quite light. For example during the invasion of France, which lasted roughly the same, the Germans lost almost 4 times more men.

For some reason there's quite big emphasis on the Soviet invasion of Poland in western histories. By the time the Soviets joined the war the Polish army was defeated as an effective fighting force and was retreating. The units opposing that invasion were the ones that were supposed to cover the retreat and put up a final resistance in southeastern Poland.

So even without Soviet 'help' Germany would have occupied everything that's worth occupying in Poland ending up to fight the remains of the Polish army near the Romanian border. The Germans could have decided not to press on that mountainous area and leave it be and then what? The Poles would wait for all sorts of supplies (and I mean all sorts because their industrial and military capacities would be producing goods for the German army at that time) to be delivered from across the continent and hope that they can effectively counter-attack the Germans and liberate the conquered parts? That's some overly optimistic thinking there.

The thing is nobody expected the Germans to advance so quickly and maybe that's the key why the French and the British didn't provide any meaningful help. Also the communication and coordination between the Polish units was on pretty low level especially during their retreats.

TheSuebiBerserker

Polska hold out, Polska best country

Amilcar Barca

TheSuebiBerserker wrote: »

Polska hold out, Polska best country

POLSKA STRONK¡

Anyway, i think the only way Poland could have hold is if:

1. They had abandoned the Poznan salient and fought behind rivers. That would have been politically and economically bad but good strategically, as it would reduce the front a lot and they would fight behind rivers.

2. France mobilization and readiness to attack had been quicker than it was. And if France had had a real willingness to attack in the first place. A strong attack in the first days against the Sigfired line could have spooked the germans enough (especially if it had broken through the line, something not dificult considering the german disadventage in the West) so that they pulled out units from Poland to stop the french. This, coupled with a shorter polish front and defending behind rivers, could have given Poland a chance to at leats held for longer. And, seeing the quick french attack and that Poland holds, the soviets perhaps would have given a secind thought to invading Poland.

Amilcar Barca

By the way, Half Life Expert, this "what if" makes me think about another good one: "what if the allies had declared war on the soviets when they invaded Poland?". I think that might have provoked very important divergences in WW II.

Buttons the Kitten

Amilcar Barca wrote: »

By the way, Half Life Expert, this "what if" makes me think about another good one: "what if the allies had declared war on the soviets when they invaded Poland?". I think that might have provoked very important divergences in WW II.

I was just thinking the very same thing, France and the UK were basically forced into declaring war on Germany purely because they had publicly guaranteed Polish independence before Germany declared war so why didn't they declare war on Russia when Russia did exactly the same thing just weeks later, especially as Russia had a pact with Germany at the time -surely as the two countries had a pact they were both allied Axis powers working together from the Allies point of view?

Amilcar Barca

Buttons the Kitten wrote: »

I was just thinking the very same thing, France and the UK were basically forced into declaring war on Germany purely because they had publicly guaranteed Polish independence before Germany declared war so why didn't they declare war on Russia when Russia did exactly the same thing just weeks later, especially as Russia had a pact with Germany at the time -surely as the two countries had a pact they were both allied Axis powers working together from the Allies point of view?

I am sure they thought about it but discarded it for practical reasons. After all, Poland was already beaten to the ground when the soviets invaded (an the soviet excuse was not taking a part of Poland, but protecting the ukranian and bielorussian population living in East Poland). And I guess they could see Germany and the SU were natural enemies. Declaring war on the SU could only tighten their relationship instead of letting "nature" do its work.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

The next thread is up, but I will give some input.

I cannot think of any reason why Britain and France would have declared war on the USSR, there is no way they could have taken on both Germany and the USSR. After all, at least some in the western governments must have foreseen the USSR as being a likely future ally against Germany, as Stalin has already proposed that in the late 30s.

But IF they did, I think it may be possible of some German-Soviet military cooperation against the Western Allies, which does put forth interesting scenarios.

daelin4#9896

Half Life Expert wrote: »

I cannot think of any reason why Britain and France would have declared war on the USSR, there is no way they could have taken on both Germany and the USSR. After all, at least some in the western governments must have foreseen the USSR as being a likely future ally against Germany, as Stalin has already proposed that in the late 30s.

I see it in the way that they saw the USSR as potential allies after September 1939 and thus not worth declaring war on. Not so much that they couldn't take them on (at least not without riling the Americans).

Half Life Expert wrote: »

But IF they did, I think it may be possible of some German-Soviet military cooperation against the Western Allies, which does put forth interesting scenarios.

I dunno, the pact was non-aggression, not an alliance per se. Both sides were practically hiding swords behind their smiles when they signed it: they were counting on killing eachother at the next convenient moment.

Amilcar Barca

daelin4 wrote: »

I dunno, the pact was non-aggression, not an alliance per se. Both sides were practically hiding swords behind their smiles when they signed it: they were counting on killing eachother at the next convenient moment.

A DoW on the SU could have make Germany and the Soviet Union (even if just for a while) become allies (after all, they would be fighting the same war against the same enemies). The Middle East would have been a new theater of operations, as the SU borders Persia (which was pro Axis until the joint SU-UK invasion) and Turkey (perhaps the turks would have been conveinced to join Germany and the SU in their war). The Axis could have given the UK far more attention that it gave it (which was few after Barbarossa was decided late in 1940). Barbarossa could have been delayed until later, giving Hitler time to struck a peace deal with the UK. This is all pure speculation, but a lot of things could have been different if the Allies had DoWed the SU in 1939.