Case Blue 1942: Could the German offensive have suceeded?

Half_Life_Expert#4276

I present to you the next what if/could it? thread.

I have not done this subject for a couple reasons: It seemed too obvious a topic to me at one time, then I just forgot about it. So I modified it to be a little more original, here it is.

Many of you may be wondering: "What is Case Blue?" "Was it a WWII Court battle?"

No, it is not a court battle, it was the codename for the German Strategic Summer Offensive of 1942 in Southern Russia.

If you have no idea what that means, does this ring a bell?

Stalingrad

Yes, the legendary Battle of Stalingrad became the focal point of this operation, but I did not want to call this thread "could Germany have won the Battle of Stalingrad?" because this thread really is not about Stalingrad.

FYI,if your wondering why you cant find the city on a map, it is not called Stalingrad today, today it is called Volgograd.

Before I go on, ill just briefly explain the "Case Blue" thing. Sounds weird for a military operation to have a name like that. In German, it translates as 'Fall Blau', and the thing is it appears to be a common name for major offensives in Germany at that point, I don't know why they used the word 'case', but to show you:

Fall Weiss or Case White= The Invasion of Poland in 1939

Fall Gelb or Case Yellow= The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and France in 1940.

Fall Rot or Case Red= The final assault on France following the evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940.

There are others, including ones that never happened, but I've already made my point.

Anyway, the purpose of Case Blue was for the Wehrmacht to regain the initiative against the Soviets after the defeat at Moscow in late 1941 and early 1942. Specifically, it called for the seizure of the Caucasus, particularly its many oil fields, both for the purpose of denying the oil to the Red Army, but also to provide Oil to the Wehrmacht.

Launched on June 28th 1942, the Wehrmacht advanced with two Army Groups, A and B, from their positions in the Ukraine and into Southern Russia.

The Plan was for Army Group A to move down into the Caucasus and advance to capture the Oil Fields, while Army Group B was to advance to the River Volga, near Stalingrad, to protect Army Group A's northern Flank.

I wont go into too much detail here, as im sure a number of you will go into great detail yourselves, but ill just summarize with this. I could be getting some things wrong, ill say that right now, so feel free to correct me.

Things went well for the Wehrmacht at first, Army Group A made good progress, but naturally was slowed down by Soviet opposition. Army Group B was also making good progress toward the Volga. It was somewhere around this point that Adolf Hitler, the Bohemian Corporal himself, ordered Army Group B to capture the City of Stalingrad, apparently because it was called Stalingrad. (Hitler hated Stalin and vice versa). The city really had no immediate significance and there was not a major threat there.

Hitler, in his legendary incompetence, became obsessed with capturing this city, and funneled more and more resources into to brutal urban battle that followed, all the way into the winter, the infamously brutal Russian Winter. With the German forces fighting in the city, troops from Germany's allies (Italy, Romania, and Hungary chiefly) were guarding the flanks of the Sixth Army fighting in the city. On November 19th 1942, the Red Army completed it's secret buildup of forces and launched Operation Uranus, which smashed through the non-German Axis troops and surrounded the Sixth army.

By the beginning of February 1943, the German sixth army surrendered and the Red Army was conducting massive offensive operations all over Southern Russia, completely destroying the German plans.

This campaign, particularly the Battle of Stalingrad, is often cited as the turning point of World War II in Europe. That can be debated, but there is no doubt that this defeat was absolutely devastating to the Axis war effort.


With this thread, I would like to discuss the possibilities if Hitler had not focused so much attention and resources on Stalingrad, and instead focused on the Caucasus, according to the actual plan.

Basically, consider the following:

"Could Army Group A, with proper support and cover, succeeded in taking the Caucasus Oil Fields?"

"Could a total success of Case Blue have succeeded in severely damaging the Soviet War effort?"

"If Case Blue completely succeeded, could Germany have been able to defeat the Soviets? Perhaps a second offensive toward Moscow in the Summer of 1943?"

I don't think it is worth discussing possibilities of Germany winning the Battle of Stalingrad, as it is my opinion that there was no reason for that battle to occur in the first place. But if you can come up with a good argument counter to that, then by all means present it.

So, it is time to discuss one of the largest and bloodiest campaigns in military history,

Discuss!

Half_Life_Expert#4276

Some Maps, from the Department of History on the West Point Website:

Initial offensives starting in June of 1942:



The Drive into the Caucasus and toward Stalingrad:



There are some others, here's the page where I got them from:

http://www.westpoint.edu/history/sitepages/wwii%20european%20theater.aspx

[Deleted User]

My view...by late '42 the Soviets would still have massed that huge force used to encircle 6th Army...if a major German force was deeper into the Caucasus, it would likely have meant a second major encirclement in the south. Keeping in mind that there was an encirclement at Velikye Luki, and at Rhezv, plus a few smaller ones in the north and centre.

The Germans were just spread too thin, there wasn't a continuous 'front line' north to south, only in specific zones, and they hadn't pacified the land behind them...they had barely penetrated into the Pripyat Marshes.

Case Blue successful or not, they were on borrowed time.

Maeda_Toshiie

http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=163993

1. No. The Italians, Hungarians, and Romanians were waiting to get knifed by the Soviets like a hot knife through butter.

2. Not enough.

3. Not likely. And no for the second part: not enough men, vehicles, and supplies.

daelin4#9896

Half Life Expert wrote: »

"Could Army Group A, with proper support and cover, succeeded in taking the Caucasus Oil Fields?"

"Could a total success of Case Blue have succeeded in severely damaging the Soviet War effort?"

"If Case Blue completely succeeded, could Germany have been able to defeat the Soviets? Perhaps a second offensive toward Moscow in the Summer of 1943?"

Maybe they would have succeeded, but it depends a lot on what the Soviets would have done (or actually fail to do) while also depending a lot on the Germans' plans actually working out as intended.
If Army Group A managed to succeed in its objectives, the only thing that it really does is deprive the Soviets of oil form that region- the Germans don't necessarily reap the benefits, especially if the Soviets either sabotage the fields to prevent Germans from utilizing the oil, and regardless battle damage prevents you from immediately taking advantage of economic resources- one can easily refer to Japan or more obviously to the Eastern territories conquered by Germany up to that point- you can't just start farming captured Ukrainian wheat field if there are partisans running around blowing stuff up.
The most obvious candidate towards success for the operation was to simply avoid Stalingrad altogether; as it was neither an immediate threat to the actual German operation nor a significant source of benefit for the Germans, besieging it would have been far more practical as it minimized German casualties and losses to materiel, while also applying pressure for the Soviets from utilizing the wide front to attack the Germans' flank. The biggest threat wasn't Soviet opposition, but rather the Soviets counter-attacking. As you say, taking Stalingrad was not necessary to win the war, and yet the decision to attempt to conquer it resulted in that subsequent battle becoming a decisive turning point. Lesson to learn is: if you want a pivotal moment, try to keep it in the more important places.
I don't think it would have "severely damaged" the Soviet war effort, it would at best deny the Soviets a source of oil while potentially becoming one for the Germans. And yet that's still speculative- the Soviets already benefit from Lend-Lease, which included raw materials as well as vehicles, and the Caucasus oil fields weren't the only source of oil for the Soviet Union, even though data points to it providing a significant majority. Case Blue was effectively just another stepping stone towards the vision of a beaten Russia, it certainly would not have been the last few steps. Operationally speaking, denying the Soviets the oil they need would work better and not require the sort of operational and logistical risks that Hitler ultimately forced the Germans to undertake- it would not require as much of an operational thrust, splits up pockets of potential resistance and alarming and keeping the Soviets out of step.
Which answers the third question: no, denial of enemy resources and strategic capability is sometimes more important than trying to take said resource and initiative for yourself: the Germans were pretty much always on the ropes, they didn't amass over a million men for Barbarossa just to get a generous margin of error, they knew that for success they needed much more than that.

For perspective, Stalingrad for its part was a major urban, road and industrial hub, and in a practical sense was an obvious point in the next step of conquest, and for Hitler's part, the sooner the Russians are deprived of the city the better. But that's thinking too far ahead. Focusing on preventing the Russians from creating multiple footholds on the western side of the Volga would be more strategically beneficial, since it denies operations like Uranus from ever taking place. Getting bogged down over one particular city when the possibility of encirclement is very hazardous planning. Hell I think Stalin knew that Hitler was going to go all in for the city so he deliberately let the place become a focal warzone while also amassing forces for an encircling action. Besieging the city would deprive it of contributing to the Soviet War effort, and force the Soviets to maintain yet another line of supply to a stranded location, and frees up German forces to do other things like, say, securing actually vital regions. Both Hitler and Stalin saw the city as a manpower sinkhole, but unlike Hitler, Stalin saw it as means to an end.

It is also clear that the Germans were logistically ill-prepared for the operation, within about two weeks they had run out of fuel and starting to peter out. You can't really succeed in an operation if you never have the fuel to do it in the first place. If the idea for Hitler was to start siphoning oil from Baku for his own ends and alleviate his economic situation, he's living in a dream world where the oil infrastructure is just left intact by the enemy as they flee for their lives in the wake of Aryan ubermensch; if you know Barbarossa, you'd also know resources don't just sit there waiting for you to take it you need the men and the infrastructure set in place to extract, refine, transport and distribute fuel; the Soviets would never let that happen and if they couldn't old Baku there's a high probability they will simply make the Germans pay dearly for it, especially in time to rebuild. And with the way the Nazis were handling conquered territories, efficiency in the political and economic sector will be horribly underperforming. It was only after 1942 that Albert Speer took over as armaments minister and starting ramping up the German war effort.
Logistics is a major prerequisite for success, without it is like planning to live for another few months while budgeting for less than a day's worth of food- you must either love gambling your health and life against ridiculous odds or just plain stupid.

If there was to be a major factor in the Germans winning with any strategic benefit, it would require the Soviets draining themselves dry of men and materiel, not the loss of a small portions of land. And the Soviets had plenty of all three. If you really want a Stalingrad outcome where the Germans won, then it would involve the Germans knowing about Uranus and planning ahead to trick the Russians into diverting huge amount of men and weapons to encircle what ends up being a small force, and using the 6th army to besiege the besiegers and in turn cause the Russians to put themselves into the city.

Ultimately Case Blue was simply over-ambitious and had too many objectives at once. What the Germans succeeded in doing was force the Soviets into defending multiple fronts because Stalin remained convinced that Moscow was the primary target, and devoted troops towards that city and all immediate access points to it like Voronezh- once he became convinced that the Germans were simply going to spread themselves everywhere, all he needed to do was find the strongest army and build up an enveloping force to destroy it. The rest became history.

Rath_Darkblade

daelin4 wrote: »

The most obvious candidate towards success for the operation was to simply avoid Stalingrad altogether; as it was neither an immediate threat to the actual German operation nor a significant source of benefit for the Germans, besieging it would have been far more practical as it minimized German casualties and losses to materiel, while also applying pressure for the Soviets from utilizing the wide front to attack the Germans' flank...

As you say, taking Stalingrad was not necessary to win the war, and yet the decision to attempt to conquer it resulted in that subsequent battle becoming a decisive turning point. Lesson to learn is: if you want a pivotal moment, try to keep it in the more important places.

For perspective, Stalingrad for its part was a major urban, road and industrial hub, and in a practical sense was an obvious point in the next step of conquest, and for Hitler's part, the sooner the Russians are deprived of the city the better. But that's thinking too far ahead... I think Stalin knew that Hitler was going to go all in for the city...

I believe that the discussion so far has ignored three important factors:

1. Hitler's personality - particularly his fanatical hatred for Stalin and the Soviet ideology;
2. The almost complete inability for Hitler's underlings to use their own initiatives and having to wait for word from up high; and
3. Hitler's friendship with, and reliance on, the word of Herman Goering.

It is obvious to us that taking Stalingrad was not necessary to win the war. However, the first factor means that Hitler was never going to simply ignore a city that was named after his mortal enemy.

The second factor contributed hugely to the final catastrophe in Stalingrad, since it meant that Paulus was not allowed to break out or to link up with von Manstein's relief effort.

The third and final factor, however, is vital. It meant that Goering's report to Hitler - that he could supply the Sixth Army by air - was considered sacrosanct and could not be overturned. Zeitzler, in this fascinating report, describes in detail the two meetings he had with Hitler and fellow officers about this issue. Perhaps Goering made the promise to Hitler based purely on political considerations, or perhaps one of Goering's underlings made an error in his calculations and Goering forbade him to correct it; but the result was the same. The blunder became a crime which would doom tens of thousands of Germans to death or captivity.

In short, it becomes clear that the Battle of Stalingrad was always going to be fought and that the Germans would never win it.

daelin4#9896

Rath Darkblade wrote: »

I believe that the discussion so far has ignored three important factors:
1. Hitler's personality - particularly his fanatical hatred for Stalin and the Soviet ideology;

I think with the subject Hitler's personality has more to do with changes to operational plans; the objectives for Case Blue were adjusted and expanded once the Germans commenced the offensive, and while ultimately the decisions were faulty if not foolhardy, many of them made practical sense. For Stalingrad, a large city that commanded access of the Don and Volga rivers, industrial hub for manufacture of vehicles and weapons, it was a major strategic centre for access by the Soviets, in order to pose a threat to Germans' position in Southern Russia. Avoiding the city altogether is in reality just as impractical as grinding yourself dead trying to take it over, because with such a large settlement with military capabilities in a salient (and heavily defensible) would have proven just as dangerous as the Uranus counter-offensive. I believe that the initial idea of taking Stalingrad was indeed made in sensible grounds, but over time cognitive dissonance lead Hitler to emphasize the political, propaganda and symbolic value of taking over that city. The lack of detailed planning in that endeavour however, would doom the Germans sent there since an overambitious, if not overly vague objectives, tends to become a sinkhole for resources you might need elsewhere; it was entirely possible to perform area denial activities to the city without having to take it over, for example. Hitler's personality therefore really comes into play in regards to the planning (or lack thereof.)
Hitler's subordinates unwilling to act on their own is closely related to Hitler's personality- he was commander in chief and as such really liked to flaunt his role. He had the aura of infallibility about him and surrounded himself with yes-men. But there were times when he yearned for approval of his actions to seek acknowledgement that he still had a grip on reality.
On the other hand, the manouvres in the Caucasus made perfect sense, but the real problem was logistics behind them- not enough men or vehicles, fuel or munitions. Hitler's goals were unrealistic because they failed to factor in these limitations.

Seeing as HLE wanted the subject to be broader than Stalingrad, these factors therefore tend to become less important when you look at the bigger picture. Whatever Hitler or even Stalin's view of the city, it was ultimately a location on a map that needs to be factored into your plan of attack. You couldn't secure the Caucasus region without neutralizing Stalingrad. How Hitler decided that was to happen was the pivotal point of contention; he couldn't understand the concept that if you can't have it, you can always just make sure the enemy doesn't either; a lesson the Soviets learned after their initial setbacks.

If Hitler really wanted Case Blue to succeed he would have had to appreciate the fact that Stalin was dead-set on Moscow being the primary target of the Wehrmacht, and played along with the ruse. However once Stalin realized the real intentions of the German plans, he could simply divert resources from other fronts to focus on responding to Hitler's agenda. The more men and materiel he diverted into the city (which BTW came from other fronts, so the remainder of German forces were weakened) the more clearer it was made that he was all focused at the city, as well as the general outline of Case Blue was revealed to the Soviets, who simply recalled forces from other fronts (as well as the East) and prepared for a counteroffensive. Hitler set himself up for the trap, he even marched the 6th army into place and practically declared his intentions to Stavka.

Thesaboteur

I believe it would, if the Germans didn't focus on saving all the infrastructure and cities. Stalingrad in my opinion was a German failure because of lack of air power. Soviets in urban combat tended to stick to close combat instead of fortifying positions inside the city. Assault teams traded long range rifles for SMGs for street fighting. Zhukov capitalized on how dangerous the German air force was. It wasn't until 1943 that the Soviets developed bombers capable of destroying German armor efficiently. The Luftwaffe could not provide support for the front lines in the city of Stalingrad so the infantry could not do their job.

If either faction wanted to succeed, they would have destroyed any city in their way. Germans in my opinion were mostly fighting to deny the Allies any hope of winning the global war. Nazi Germany was highly anti-Bolshevik and with the war forced on them by Poland, they had to find a way to survive. Europe could only be secure by securing their natural borders (France, Poland, USSR, Scandinavia).

The Germans could have easily destroyed Stalingrad or any city they wanted to. It's my thought that if they had decided to bomb the city into submission, then they wouldn't have gotten bogged down in the urban fighting and losing months on a pointless operation. German main plan was to seize the oil fields in southern USSR. Stalingrad was a major Soviet city, having several large industries capable of supplying the Soviet army. I can see why the Germans would want to seize it, but it would have been far safer to just destroy it.


My other thought is that they could have secured the natural rivers of the USSR and held the line. Defensive warfare is always the better option of Offensive, especially in modern warfare. Soviets had poor military technology compared to the Germans early in the war. They should have: Made Poland a supply base, occupied Belarus, Lithuania, Ukraine, Estonia, and Livonia. This would have provided them with a big area of occupied land that had no real impact on German industry that could be ravaged by warfare. Rivers would have provided excellent natural barriers by which the Germans could fortify. if I were in their shoes, I would have used the gains used in Operation Barbarossa and held on to them, bleeding the Soviets dry. It would have had the benefit of not inspiring the Russian heartland of the USSR to fight a patriotic war. Ukraine in particular had many people who wanted to be independent, and did join the Germans (Especially Cossacks).

Switch to actual warfare:

Germans took the bulk of their casualties on the Eastern front, 80% of the total. The main problem I see with the German war effort was the destruction of their industry in Silesia and the Rhine, along with their manpower in terms of conscription. If we can assume that the men used in the 1942 offensive, the Kursk offensive, the reserves used in the Seelow defense, then the Germans have more than 1.5 million men to reinforce their lines. As all movies in the cold war ever said, Soviets threw waves on waves of their own men at German lines. Which isn't true. But still, Soviets definitely have the superiority with a population of 280 million at the war's dawn (Probably less due to the annexation of their western front, maybe 200m minimum)

For the most part, Germany had the technological superiority for most of the war. German Panzer IV, Panthers, Tigers, etc. Were vastly better than the old models the Soviets had at the start of the war. But by 1942 and 1943, they had managed to balance the armor playfield by introducing the T-34/35 and the KV series from Leningrad. I believe that the T-34 could penetrate German armor at 200 meters, which isn't a lot on paper. The Soviets countered this by building tank bunkers, arming them with camoflauge, and using ambushes on German armor columns. If we take the fact into account that the effective range of the T-34 is so small, and if Germans fortified their own armor, then we can assume that the Germans hold the advantage in this area.

Infantry technique: As stated before, Soviets were mostly equipped for close quarter combat. Their doctrine emphasized this, to create breaches in the enemy lines and to maximize their numerical advantage. And as a vet, entrenched positions are hard as heck to break. Especially if you are ill equipped as the soviet infantry were. They might have had great leaps in other areas, but this is the field in which they were the least best at. Infantry effectiveness mostly comes from equipment, support, and experience. Germans have all three, while the Soviets only have support. I give it to Germany.

Navy. No decisive factor, except if you count the battle of Leningrad and the Crimean offensive. Britain on the other hand....

Airpower: German had the advantage no question. Soviets caught up, but if played offensively the Germans could have easily dominated this field. Especially since most of the Soviet airfields and fleet was destroyed/captured early on in the war. German advantage.

I can't really think of any else. We can really go into detail about the war, but that's kind of... off topic. My main idea is that the Eastern front had to be secure in order for other defensive operations to work. Such as Normany, Sicily, Vichy France, etc. Though all of this is assuming German leadership has some foresight.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

Having read this great and long responses, im inclined to think that in the end Case Blue was not going to be a war winner for Germany, even if it totally succeeded. It seems to me that the only real hope Germany had was the long shot of a total victory (conquering Moscow being a key part) in 1941.

In principle, the original idea was sound: Seizing the vital oil whilst at the same time denying it to the Soviets. But the sheer size of Russia, combined with the massive losses suffered in the Operation Barbarossa, the Battle of Moscow and the subsequent January offensive, meant that the Wehrmacht had to make a lot of use out of Germany's allied armies: Italy, Romania and Hungary being the largest, with others. Those armies proved their general inability to stand up to the red army, partially from their poor leadership and partially from being poorly supplied. I don't see the failure being with soldiers themselves, but with their leadership and their support system totally failing them, and a probable lack of motivation for fighting compared to the German troops. Operation Uranus proved this, with the counter attacks by the Red Army completely shattering the non-German Axis forces on the flanks of the Sixth army. I remember reading once that on the northern flank of the Sixth Army, where the line was guarded mostly by Romanian forces, the Artillery and AT guns available to them (limited at that) only had about 12 shells per gun. That is simply unacceptable.

But I also believe that the catastrophic failure of Case Blue was due primarily to the terrible leadership of Hitler himself. He was micromanaging too much, and made irrational and emotional decisions. He alone is responsible for their being a major Battle of Stalingrad at all. There was no reason for the Wehrmacht to make a determined effort against that city at that time, the only reason such an effort was made there because Hitler wanted to capture the city bearing Stalin's name, that's it.

Case Blue probably would have failed in the long run anyway, but if it were not for Hitler, it probably would not have been the complete catastrophe that it was.


In the end, the vast numbers and resources available to the Red Army were going to defeat the Wehrmacht eventually. Perhaps a total Success of Case Blue could have held off the Red Army for an extra six months or year. I say this with regard to all the ground gained by the Red Army in their large counter attacks starting in November of 1942.


This has been a very interesting discussion guys, please keep it up, but I have in mind the next What if/Could it? topic, which I will post shortly. Its going to be another one that I had avoided doing due to it being sort of obvious, but having done this one I think I should do it now.

daelin4#9896

Case Blue certainly wasn't meant to be a war winner, but it would have caused the Soviets a great deal of trouble if it had succeeded, something the Germans needed to happen badly- if manpower seemed inexhaustible, taking the Baku fields, producing like what 70-80 percent of all petrol to the USSR, would have made a big impact on the Soviets' operational capability, even if the Germans would take months or years before the infrastructure can be turned to their own use. There are almost always two ways to bolster your own position- improving your own, or destroying your opponent's. It simply became an overstrectched plan that got detoured towards Stalingrad and weakened every other sector as a result, and gave away German intentions to Stalin so he can in turn dilute his own forces from everywhere else and concentrate on strategic offensives. What made the initial gains for Blau was Stalin's continued assumption that the manouvre was a diversion from the suggested real target, Moscow. Once the smoke cleared and the Germans were fixated at Stalingrad, he simply built up armies to encircle Paulus.

I actually haven't seen much documentation regarding the obsession with Hitler towards Stalingrad based on the whole name game. Given the details about the city itself and the role its location plays in the war, many more practical reasons would explain Hitler's focus on the city. Method of approach was surely flawed, but we're not talking about some backwater town that offered literally nothing to each side. It'd even go as far as to say the whole name obsession is a myth.

I think a success in terms of lost oil fields for the USSR could have been a significant disruption. No petrol means no moving vehicles or planes, as demonstrated by the Germans' own acute shortages later on in WW2. In that respect Case Blue certainly seemed like a very practical solution. If anything, Barbarossa should have been immediately followed, or even done in conjunction with, the taking of the Baku fields. That way, if you haven't destroyed the Russians in fighting, you've also cut off their lifeline. If you take the enemy's oil they would at last be unable to fight back. You can pretty easily win a war if the enemy can't really do anything to your own operations. If we want to look at it from a cold tactical level, bombing the fields if they cannot be taken would have been a viable option to neutralize the Russians' ability to respond. Of course, Hitler was anticipating the untermensch Russians to falter before the might of the Aryan army, ironically heavily supported by non-Germans.

JohnJohn70

Without changing events too much, I think it would have been fairly easy for the axis to salvage the end of the 42 offensive. If Manstein had a slightly larger relief force, especially a couple companies of tigers, and slightly more air support, they could have made it to the 6th army pocket. While Von Paulus refused to attempt a break out, if he had sent 1 or 2 divisions when the relief force was close, I feel they could have opened a corridor for supplies and eventual relief/evacuation.

People overestimate the capability of the Soviets in 42. If they had indeed reached the 6th army, they could have evacuated south as the forces in the Caucasus pulled back and established a Rostov-Izyum line-even though it was 300 miles(or perhaps where the Don and Donets met just 200 miles distance. The soviet divisions/armies in the area would have had little ability to stop them, especially if the luftwaffe was in the air.

They could have prepared that line and built up defense to halt the soviets when they would arrive. The soviets would have been too week to penetrate and by January 1st 43, it would have been over. The line could have ran from Rostov-Izyum-up the river east of Kursk to Orel. The 6th army, while tired and battered, would habe been intact and the germans probably would have had 150-200k fewer casulaties, along with 100k fewer axis allies.

Stalin would have still insisted on the northern offensives around Rzhev and then probably around Belgorod and such. Both would probably have ended the same way. The only difference: No need for Kursk. The only question would be is where would the germans strike in 43?

I personally think they needed to do 2 things: 1) Stregthen the front n-s and their allies over the next several months to withstand the eventual soviet attack. They would bleed them, then go on the offensive themselves. 2) Even though Finland bowed to american and british pressure to limit their involvement, I think the Germans should have launched a major offensive north to cut off that supply route for good(or months till retaken). I think it would have been relatively easy if the germans comitted at least 2 armies: 1 north from the white sea to Kola/Murmansk, and the second army south to secure/clear the Lake Ladoga/Onega areas. I think the Finns would have supported them and provided valuable defensive units. With perhaps 4+german divisions, the Finns more than likely would have gladly tried to take the Karelian Isthmus/Leningrad. Perhaps all but Leningrad would have taken 2 months at the most-say March to May.

If they did this, it would have limited the allies lend lease when it was important, hurt soviet morale and blostered axis moral. They still could have launched an offensive or a series of opperations, but perhaps could have waitied till August and thus had more Panthers and Tigers and such (the earlier months would have been involved in the north)

During this time, if wise, the Germans could have licensed numerous weapons to the Roumanians and Hungarians. If they did this, then in 7+months, they could have fielded several armoured divisions equipted with Mk IV and such. And they could have also assisted them in devolping the Turan III a lot sooner and a few models of tank destroyers and such. By August 43, both R&H could have been reliable partners-if the germans had only taken the time to assist them.

Do these things and soviet casulaties probably could have been at mid-44 levels. Contrary to belief, the soviets did NOT have an endless supply of manpower. They would have eventually bled to death. I think the axis would have bled the soviets during the rest of 43 (to Jan 45 levels) for little gain. They would have been lucky to reach and expanded Panther-Wootan line by (not including Kiev/Dnieper river ) Jan44.