World War II Europe: Could the Axis have won the war?

Half_Life_Expert#4276

Here is the next what if/Could it? thread, following up from the one of Case Blue in 1942.

I think this topic was going to be inevitable, so I might as well just put it up. As it is such a broad topic, I don't think it will require nearly as long of an intro as most of the previous threads have had, so ill keep it relatively short and to the point.

First I will make it clear that this is only about the War in Europe, I think the possibilities of a Japanese Victory in Asia/Pacific have already been discussed in some of my previous threads, but I will make a companion thread to this one if there is support for it.

IMPORTANT: This is not about a "What if the Axis had won the war?" and all that that implies.

This is about examining whether or not it was possible for the Axis to win the Second World War in Europe.

There are so many pivotal moments in this war that are often debated as being turning points and critical decisions that effected the outcome of the war. Some of these are:

-Failing to Prevent the Evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940

-Failing to subdue the RAF in the Battle of Britain

-The swing south of Army Group Center in Operation Barbarossa to complete the Kiev Encirclement, but delayed the advance on Moscow.


These key moments should be discussed, but we must also look at the bigger picture of the Axis and Allied War efforts.

I only have a few rules with this thread:

1) for rather obvious reasons, we are only to examine how the Axis, chiefly Germany, could have won World War II in Europe from a MILITARY standpoint, with economic and political aspects only when absolutely unavoidable and critical to the military efforts. This really goes without saying.

2) we will assume the exact same conditions at the outbreak of war with the Invasion of Poland on September 1st, 1939. Basically what I mean is that we will examine if the Axis could have won based on their historical situation when the war actually started, so no changes to pre-war orders of battle or troop/vehicle strengths etc.

If the general consensus is that the Axis could not have won the war given the circumstances with the historical starting situation, then we may discuss what changes in the pre-war preparations would have been hypothetically required for an Axis victory.

But the main focus of this thread is to examine the decisions during the war, with the starting date being September 1st, 1939.


So, given the above framework, discuss and examine the following question:

"Could the Axis Forces, chiefly Germany and Italy, have won the Second World War in Europe?"

daelin4#9896

lol coincidentally I went to reading up on Wolfenstein: the New Order recently, which for those that don't know, is a typical Nazi-killing run and gun plus a bit of stealth in a world where the Germans won the war (through ridiculously ambiguous reasons).

I want to just start my premise before I divein to the details: the answer is not just no, but they never could have. On top of that, the only Axis power that actually intended to start a war against the Allies was Japan- Germany was counting on having the require military force by around 1946, and Italy's participation was only due to keeping with alliance obligations. That Albert Speer didn't thrust Germany's industry into war footing until around 1943 also shows just how incapable and inexperienced the Nazi leadership was.

There is a problem with your thread rule: war is fought for political and economic reasons, and so from a strategic military standpoint, the Germans in WW2 fought because A) Hitler didn't want peace nor surrender; without war resources would have been made scarce without fighting for it; and C) the political landscape gave no room for nay-sayers.

Now to actually address the issue of Germany winning, one must first actually describe the criteria: what counts as winning and how might one side like Germany could have attained it.
For start, there are two ways to win a war: you either pound the enemy into the ground, or you negotiate turns that would, presumably, be more favourable to you than to others. The latter has pretty much been the usual way that wars ended; a victorious war as opposed to a victorious battle or campaign, was rarely the kind where the enemy was subjugated or destroyed at the level that Germany would experience in 1945; wars were usually fought in a series of campaigns, after which objectives were either achieved or lost, and from pressures by the public or to avoid further risk of blunders and political disintegration, truces were made between warring parties. Hitler would never countenance surrender, and although he was open to (favourable) terms with the Allies, this was not the case with the Soviet Union, of which he demanded its effective annihilation. This in effect would require a "winning Germany scenario" to have at the very least, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, preferably with the abandonment of the Western Allies, itself a presumed scenario Hitler counted on after Poland.
With all that pointed out, there really can't be winning a war from a military standpoint without considering political or economic agendas or pretexts for the military actions.

The thing is that the historically starting point of WW2 wasn't Germany's intended starting point either. By the time Germany was projected to be in a position to challenge the current world order, would have been no earlier than 1946-1948, with the economic and military buildup that Hitler deemed sufficient to challenge the British and French (and the Soviets sooner or later) with any suitable degree of marginal error. Remember that after Poland it was Britain and France that declared war, not Germany. In fact all military operations made by the Wehrmacht were effectively meant to counter-act the Allies from then on- the battles of France and Britain were intended to neutralize these powers in response to war, one of them being a failure. The fighting in Africa and Balkans were entirely reactive, the former being in response to Italian setbacks, the latter to reinforce the region to ensure Barbarossa would not leave the Germans exposed to attack from pro-Allied Greece. After Poland, Barbarossa was pretty much the only true act of belligerent aggression by the Germans in WW2, and even then it's hardly surprising given the ideological stance Hitler and Nazism held towards communism. Throughout the war Germany was on the ropes and fighting to gain an initiative; we're not talking about some military juggernaut just itching to flex muscle, the only people that held that view were the political leadership- such as Goering and Hitler- few of them qualified military thinkers. The German General Staff on the other hand, always had doubts towards operations due to the high risk in men and materials needed- men and materials that were always in short supply; statistically, it was horses that formed the bulk of the German logistics system. Those people that itched for war either were aware of the reality of Germany's military situation, or were out of touch with reality, or political sycophants.

If there's anything that needs to be examined when it comes to the subject, it's the fact that war started in September 1939. Germany was simply not prepared for it. German rearmament, as frightful as that might sound, was in reality both a gamble and comparative pitiful considering the actual industrial capability of the country; when the Germans marched back into the Rhineland, the most practical (and indeed pretty much the planned) exit strategy in the event of Allied hostile response was to run tucked tail back to the other side and hope the Allies don't give chase!
In general Germany lacked the manpower to produce a sufficiently large fighting force without risking severe social/ economic effects of depleting the work force back home- unlike countries like the United States, involvement of females in the labour force was discouraged, with the aim that they instead be housewives providing offspring to the state rather than riveting hulls or shovelling coal, one of the tents of social Nazism towards gender roles. The various armed services also vied for the manpower needed to shore up their strength- ironically unemployment was solved by war, but war tends to ask much more blood and bodies than a nation can offer.
Hitler's vision of a "prepared Germany" involved, predominately, a prepared military whose size allowed it to combat the British. This meant the Kriegsmarine would have had to finish constructing it's numerous projects, and not all of them would have proven useful in the coming war. Larger and ever more impressive battleship projects would require tremendous resources and men to crew them...and battleships weren't the forte of the German fleet, as the U-boat campaign would prove. These were eventually scrapped as the realities of war came knocking on their proverbial door.
The Luftwaffe was the prize project of Hermann Goering, who was both egotistical and power-hungry, making him few friends among the other Germany political/ military leadership. The focus towards tactical bombers was also reactionary, the vision of the Luftwaffe, while at times imaginative and innovative, ultimately proved ill-suited to a drawn out war. Without major revisions to its general planning and strategic focus might have made a difference, but this would still be linked to the rest of the German war effort: remember that even if you build a thousand jet fighters, you still need fuel and crews and the infrastructure to make use of them. Of, and another thousand bombers and the support needed for them as well.
One good question regarding the Luftwaffe however, was whether changes to how it approached defending Europe against bomber raids might have made a difference. A great deal of men and resources were devoted into providing stationary anti-aircraft artillery against likely routes for bomber sorties by the Allies- while the bomber campaign itself was horrendously inefficient and cost many planes and lives, the real effect was tying up all these men and materials in Europe rather than the front. The mismanagement of the Luftwaffe fighter force (and a concurrent lack of bomber development and sound strategic deployment) made for an air force that was stretch thin.
We also need to take into account the fact that the Germans effectively thought on three simultaneous fronts- France, Africa and Russia. The Allies can have a go at the Germans from any direction since the British had colonial allies.

Naisho

I am actually going to take a slightly different position.

It was in fact possible for the Axis to win ww2. The key being 2 fold.

1. The US doesn't enter until very late

2. The original intention of the Axis is upheld.

The goal of the Axis was the destruction of the communist state of Russia. That was the real goal. That is the specific reason the axis was formed. Only one nation didn't fight Russia during WW2 at a crucial front. That was Japan on the Manchurian border. There were elite Russian troops stationed on that border that were withdrawn to defend Moscow during the first winter. A two front costly war would have likely broken Russia.

We always talk about the desperate defense of the Russians. Of the lack of weapons and supplies. Imagine for a moment where those supplies were split in half or so. Maybe that is to optimistic for the Axis but it shows an interesting historical alternative that I think ultimately would have been doable.

Maeda_Toshiie

Half Life Expert wrote: »

Here is the next what if/Could it? thread, following up from the one of Case Blue in 1942.

I think this topic was going to be inevitable, so I might as well just put it up. As it is such a broad topic, I don't think it will require nearly as long of an intro as most of the previous threads have had, so ill keep it relatively short and to the point.

First I will make it clear that this is only about the War in Europe, I think the possibilities of a Japanese Victory in Asia/Pacific have already been discussed in some of my previous threads, but I will make a companion thread to this one if there is support for it.

IMPORTANT: This is not about a "What if the Axis had won the war?" and all that that implies.

This is about examining whether or not it was possible for the Axis to win the Second World War in Europe.

There are so many pivotal moments in this war that are often debated as being turning points and critical decisions that effected the outcome of the war. Some of these are:

-Failing to Prevent the Evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940

-Failing to subdue the RAF in the Battle of Britain

-The swing south of Army Group Center in Operation Barbarossa to complete the Kiev Encirclement, but delayed the advance on Moscow.


These key moments should be discussed, but we must also look at the bigger picture of the Axis and Allied War efforts.

I only have a few rules with this thread:

1) for rather obvious reasons, we are only to examine how the Axis, chiefly Germany, could have won World War II in Europe from a MILITARY standpoint, with economic and political aspects only when absolutely unavoidable and critical to the military efforts. This really goes without saying.

2) we will assume the exact same conditions at the outbreak of war with the Invasion of Poland on September 1st, 1939. Basically what I mean is that we will examine if the Axis could have won based on their historical situation when the war actually started, so no changes to pre-war orders of battle or troop/vehicle strengths etc.

If the general consensus is that the Axis could not have won the war given the circumstances with the historical starting situation, then we may discuss what changes in the pre-war preparations would have been hypothetically required for an Axis victory.

But the main focus of this thread is to examine the decisions during the war, with the starting date being September 1st, 1939.


So, given the above framework, discuss and examine the following question:

"Could the Axis Forces, chiefly Germany and Italy, have won the Second World War in Europe?"

tl;dr.


Yes and no. Yes only if the Nazis didn't act like Nazis.

Minimum for statemate condition: requires the following conditions to be met:
1. The US does not enter the war on the Allies. This guarantee that the Allies cannot successfully liberate France or Italy. The Axis may lose North Africa, but invasion of Europe by the British as the main force is nigh impossible.

1a. Helpful but not strictly necessary: the US does not send L&L supplies to the Soviets. Coupled with no US entry into the war, the Eastern Front grudge match will at worst turn into an intractable stalemate.


While Roosevelt was actively avoiding open warfare with the Germans, the German declaration of war against the US is a diplomatic necessity, a quid pro quo with the Japanese. The Japanese were considering to go to war only after 1946 with the independence of the Philippines and consequent withdrawal of the US Navy from SEA. On the other hand, the oil embargo was causing significant problems for the IJN (the IJA walked and ate rice, not gasoline). So the Japanese had the agreement with Hitler to declare war on the US at the same time. The Germans couldn't wait till 1946 since the their economy would have collapsed by then.

(source: Gerhard Weinberg's talk at the GC Marshall Foundation)


Minimum for victory on the Eastern Front:

1. No US entry into the war.

2. The Germans on the Eastern Front actually behaved like the Germans of 1914-1917 on the Eastern Front. Had the Germans not a) underestimate the untermench Red Army, b) treated the untermench as people to turn against their own dictator, a 1940s version of the Brest Litovsk is highly likely. Let's face it, the kind of complete victory against the Soviets as possible in HOI is not going to happen in real life. Even reaching the Archangel-Astrakhan line is difficult. Real German territorial gains is not going to be in Russian, only Poland. Even for Poland, permanent gains will be Posen with the rest of Poland (fomerly under Imperial Russia prior to independence in 1918) turned into a satellite state.

The Germans had to turn the Belorussians and Ukrainians against the Soviet apparatus. Treat the captured Red Army personnel well enough and promise them a Russian free of Stalin. This solve most of the partisan issue, and gives a massive boost in available manpower.

However, this is impossible, given the Nazi ideology and Generalplan Ost. Hitler is no astute politician like Bismark.

---

Dunkirk, BoB is strongly represented in the English speaking world (no thanks to the BBC), but are not in anyway crucial to the outcome of the war, because
1) the Wehrmacht can't swim that far to invade.
2) the U boat campaign wasn't enough to strangle the British.
3) the Brits aren't going to be invading France or Sicily on their own.
4) the manpower saved at Dunkirk aren't going to be swimming Calais to invade, are they?

The Kiev encirclement did not doom Barbarossa. Instead, it is a necessary step to clear the flanks, destroying 5 field armies in the process, and also weakened the defenses around Moscow (due to diversion of units away).

Moscow was probably not a realistic objective for 1941 in the first place. Logistics dictated that the campaign was going to be a multi-year process, but the German high command handwaved it away, thus setting the stage for the failure of Barbarossa, and contributed to the eventual loss of the Eastern Front.

Maeda_Toshiie

Naisho wrote: »

I am actually going to take a slightly different position.

It was in fact possible for the Axis to win ww2. The key being 2 fold.

1. The US doesn't enter until very late

2. The original intention of the Axis is upheld.

The goal of the Axis was the destruction of the communist state of Russia. That was the real goal. That is the specific reason the axis was formed. Only one nation didn't fight Russia during WW2 at a crucial front. That was Japan on the Manchurian border. There were elite Russian troops stationed on that border that were withdrawn to defend Moscow during the first winter. A two front costly war would have likely broken Russia.

We always talk about the desperate defense of the Russians. Of the lack of weapons and supplies. Imagine for a moment where those supplies were split in half or so. Maybe that is to optimistic for the Axis but it shows an interesting historical alternative that I think ultimately would have been doable.

Khalkhin Gol taught the IJA that they aren't going to beat the Russians at their game, that's why the IJN won the arguement. Besides, Hitler wanted the IJN to tie down the USN.

Naisho

Maeda Toshiie wrote: »

Khalkhin Gol taught the IJA that they aren't going to beat the Russians at their game, that's why the IJN won the arguement. Besides, Hitler wanted the IJN to tie down the USN.

Who said anything about beating? A Japanese excursion into Russia would have likely tided up extremely important supplies. That would have weakened the other front quite significantly. On a tactical level it might have been a loss, but the strategic gains would have been significant.

Besides, in what way did Germany benefit from the Japanese fighting the USN? Aside from convoy protection, Germany was effectively cut off from the rest of the world's market, and had very little ability to prevent all access points to allies. If the USN got too close to Germany they would have been targeted by ground based aircraft. At the early point in the war nobody really understood the weakness of ships to aircraft. Bigger and better ships were the focus before and early in the war. That was why all the treaties over ship designs existed for heavy battleships.

Remember Stalin was begging / demanding a second front against the Axis to relieve the pressure. To say Germany could not have benefited against a 2 front Russia begs the question. Could Russia have beaten a 1 front Axis? Stalin didn't think so.

Maeda_Toshiie

Naisho wrote: »

Who said anything about beating? A Japanese excursion into Russia would have likely tided up extremely important supplies. That would have weakened the other front quite significantly. On a tactical level it might have been a loss, but the strategic gains would have been significant.

That excursion will very quickly end up with the same result as Khalkhin Gol, though probably worse because the IJA's logistics and tanks well and truly suck. Khalkhin Gol showed how they sucked in 1939, and they never corrected those defects.

The point is, the Japanese is likely to get whipped in short order. Remember, that border region has horribly bad infrastructure. With most of the Kwantung Army tied down and slowly bleeding away in China, the amount of forces they can commit is small. On top of that, the IJA was even less mechanized than the horse riding Heer. And the IJA didn't even have horses.

Even if the Japanese commit substantial forces, they won't be getting very far.

http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=2151738&postcount=11

Besides, in what way did Germany benefit from the Japanese fighting the USN? Aside from convoy protection, Germany was effectively cut off from the rest of the world's market, and had very little ability to prevent all access points to allies. If the USN got too close to Germany they would have been targeted by ground based aircraft. At the early point in the war nobody really understood the weakness of ships to aircraft. Bigger and better ships were the focus before and early in the war. That was why all the treaties over ship designs existed for heavy battleships.

The Battle of the Atlantic.

Naisho

Maeda Toshiie wrote: »

That excursion will very quickly end up with the same result as Khalkhin Gol, though probably worse because the IJA's logistics and tanks well and truly suck. Khalkhin Gol showed how they sucked in 1939, and they never corrected those defects.

The point is, the Japanese is likely to get whipped in short order. Remember, that border region has horribly bad infrastructure. With most of the Kwantung Army tied down and slowly bleeding away in China, the amount of forces they can commit is small. On top of that, the IJA was even less mechanized than the horse riding Heer. And the IJA didn't even have horses.

Even if the Japanese commit substantial forces, they won't be getting very far.

http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=2151738&postcount=11



The Battle of the Atlantic.

The battle of the Atlantic wasn't a benefit in any large way. To either side. Germany didn't have the navy power to contest the large area control of the allies even with the war in the pacific. This is even assuming that the US would actually militarized (which it wouldn't have without intervention by Japan). The US couldn't have sent anything larger than a destroyer to protect the convoys as long as they weren't at war. If they did the outrage against the government's over aggressive stances would have result in mass anger against the US government. Many Americans remember Woodrow Wilson failed promise of not entering ww1 and they themselves intended to keep it with ww2

I do not agree with the link you posted assessment of the situation for a few very important reasons. The US navy convoy warfare was so effective against Japanese shipping that it by the end of WW2 most shipping was for food and they had few spare ships for anything else. The argument that its difficult to get the resources is a null argument when the alternative was no resources. The pacific war was won 2 years before the official ending because of that blockade.



If the question is which war would have likely benefited the axis more. Its the war against Russia not the US. The attack against the US increased what could be sent with lend lease. It expanded lend lease from a British program to a united offensive program. Not just Japan but none of the axis benefited from the attack against the US in 41.

octavian1127

I would argue the evacuation at Dunkirk didn't have a significant impact on the war. The Battle of Britain was definitely a major setback to German war efforts.

You've missed the major reason Germany failed. First of all, they got the US involved in the war. Secondly, they got Russia involved in the war. Either one by itself at the right time could have been overcome, but fighting a two front war against the most powerful economy AND the largest population base was impossible odds. You could even argue that including Japan as an Axis member was their downfall. While they were successful against China, it was almost inviting the US and Russia to become involved before Germany was prepared for it.

Maeda_Toshiie

Naisho wrote: »

The battle of the Atlantic wasn't a benefit in any large way. To either side. Germany didn't have the navy power to contest the large area control of the allies even with the war in the pacific. This is even assuming that the US would actually militarized (which it wouldn't have without intervention by Japan). The US couldn't have sent anything larger than a destroyer to protect the convoys as long as they weren't at war. If they did the outrage against the government's over aggressive stances would have result in mass anger against the US government. Many Americans remember Woodrow Wilson failed promise of not entering ww1 and they themselves intended to keep it with ww2

1. Hitler considered America for an eventual showdown for world domination. SU for the semi finals, America for the finals. See his second book for it.

2. The US was increasingly embroiled in the Battle of the Atlantic before the actual declaration of war. There were hostile encounters before Dec 1941. It won't be long before U-boats floating off the US coast cause enough "incidents" to upset the US public.

3. The IJN was at least near peer, if not peer, with respect to the USN and RN in terms of quality: equipment, personnel and doctrine. It is also the biggest navy outside of the USN and RN that the Germans can become allies of.

4. Hitler was at war with Britain and the SU. The US was sending LL to both the UK and the SU. What do you do when a country is actively aiding your enemies on the field?

I do not agree with the link you posted assessment of the situation for a few very important reasons. The US navy convoy warfare was so effective against Japanese shipping that it by the end of WW2 most shipping was for food and they had few spare ships for anything else. The argument that its difficult to get the resources is a null argument when the alternative was no resources. The pacific war was won 2 years before the official ending because of that blockade.

The disastrous inability of the IJN to constitute a convoy system in the Pacific War is an issue that does not detract any prewar assessment of the IJN in engaging the USN in a fleet to fleet action.

If the question is which war would have likely benefited the axis more. Its the war against Russia not the US. The attack against the US increased what could be sent with lend lease. It expanded lend lease from a British program to a united offensive program. Not just Japan but none of the axis benefited from the attack against the US in 41.

The Japanese themselves turned away from attacking the SU because the IJA found itself beaten at Khalkhin Gol. Khalkhin Gol wasn't some border skirmish to be brushed aside. The manpower strength on each sides exceeded a single corps.

The Japanese themselves (including their high command) were enamoured with the ideal decisive battle doctrine as key to beating the USN and thus forcing the US out of the "southern resource area". It is only with hindsight that we can say that it failed. In 1941-1942, who especially the Japanese, could predict the events of 1943-1945?

The Japanese went to war with the US because of oil. The IJN was running short of oil and the US wasn't selling after the Japanese occupied Southern Indochina.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=905

Naisho

Maeda Toshiie wrote: »

The Japanese themselves (including their high command) were enamoured with the ideal decisive battle doctrine as key to beating the USN and thus forcing the US out of the "southern resource area". It is only with hindsight that we can say that it failed. In 1941-1942, who especially the Japanese, could predict the events of 1943-1945?

The entire basis of this thread is hindsight. "What needed to occur for the axis to win." This thread isn't about "what could we reasonably expected the axis to do given the people in charge." Taking just your last statement if Japan didn't take Indochina then no oil crisis.

I argue Japan needed to attack Russia creating a second front and avoiding the US as long as possible.

SO boil your statement down to 2 or 3 sentences. What did the axis need to do to win? Or was it hopeless?

Geier

It was possible. They just shouldn't have declared war against the USSR, nor against the US. If they had focused on improving the Lutwaffe to a degree where it could annihilate the RAF, increase the number of sorties, bomb the heck out of the UK then proceed with Operation Sea Lion, after Western Europe was fully occupied by the Axis (Portugal and Spain were friends of Axis countries). In the Asian front, the Japanese should've attacked the British Raj, there were already people that wanted independence from the British Empire, Subhas Chandra Bose as the main example, if they could have manipulated the Indians and Pakistanis into revolution and proceeded to attack the British Raj, they could have taken out nearly all of the British Empire. After that focus on the Middle East, as the Brits had done during The Great War, mess with the Arabs and their pan-Arabism, convince them that the British have screwed you in the past and will screw you again, as in the British Raj they already wanted independence, the main example is the Great Syrian Revolution of 1925, they will rise up against the Brits weakening them further, attack the Middle East and invade it the proceed to mass up troops at the border of the USSR, preparing for an attack, then attack from three different fronts, not even the full might of the Red Army nor that of the Man of Steel could fight at three fronts, invade the USSR, a war that will take you years and years will reassuring the US that they are friends with them, until they occupy the USSR and fully develop the Nuclear Bomb. Before the attack on the USSR, they invade Oceania with a small portion of their army and a large part of their navy. After all the world is theirs nuke all major American cities and attack.

Naisho

the reason why operation sea lion never occurred was due to the fact that Germany didn't have any landing craft capable of offensive landings. It also didn't help that Germany was locked into the Baltic sea by the British navy. Germany though almost did win the blitz by putting pressure on the air bases.

In the documentary The World at War (well worth watching due to the interviews) a Germany ace commented on the fact that they lost almost all of their experienced pilots by the end of it.

Also to consider in terms of fighter aircraft capability. Germany didn't actually have a sufficient answer to deal with long range bombing runs from France to England. The aircraft were by enlarge underpowered or incapable of the tasks given. The JU-87 (the stuka dive bomber) was a flying deathtrap as it was outclassed by the end of 1939. The HE-111 had minimal defensive capability, and the bf-110 that was designed as a long range bomber escort but couldn't actually compete against the Hurricanes as they could literally fly circles around them. So it became an ground attack aircraft. This left Germany without truly superior fighters. The FW190A didn't have the range to engage in England and it was superior to all allied aircraft at the time. This left the BF109, which was a boom and zoom fighter which means it couldn't out turn the British aircraft when they had to play on the formation defensive.

I am writing all of this to point out that operation sea lion had a lot of problems. It wasn't impossible and with a bit of concentrated effort it could have occurred but at significant cost of weapons/machines and pilots.

Operation sea lion would have likely ended WW2 as the military capability of all german support branches would have been spent.

daelin4#9896

Naisho wrote: »

Who said anything about beating? A Japanese excursion into Russia would have likely tided up extremely important supplies. That would have weakened the other front quite significantly. On a tactical level it might have been a loss, but the strategic gains would have been significant.
Remember Stalin was begging / demanding a second front against the Axis to relieve the pressure. To say Germany could not have benefited against a 2 front Russia begs the question. Could Russia have beaten a 1 front Axis? Stalin didn't think so.

The Japanese have no reason to commit so much of their scarce resources into what is effectively a gigantic holding action while their own political objectives were being actively ignored. They were arguably in even more dire straits than the Germans; it's not like they owned all of China and have already turned the country's resources towards their own ends, they didn't even manage to do that after taking the British, French and Dutch colonies in the Indies.
Not to mention, it wasn't like the Japanese had a large bulwark against Russian invasion anyways. It's own military was tied up in other parts of China and after Pearl Harbour, occupying the East Indies and it's myriad of islands. If anything Japan was at war in three major fronts, not including the islands themselves. The Japanese also ended up signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviets in order to ensure their own ambitions were being realized.
I don't agree with the assumption that Stalin pressing for more Allied contribution against German amounted to the Soviet Union in such dire straits, Stalin was a politician and political strategies involve making sure the Allies- who were friends with Soviet Union only because of mutual hostilities with the Third Reich, was doing more work instead of the Soviets.
I also agree with Maeda that the Japanese weren't prepared for the kind of conventional land war against the Soviets that would be required to advance into or even hold back the Russians. The minute they had to go on the defensive, they were crushed by the US. On the offensive, the enemy was either isolated or deprived of critical support. None of these advantages will occur in a fight against and into Russia.

Back to Germany, pretty much everything would have to have gone in order- plus a large amount of coincidental turn-arounds- to amount to victory. Ultimately the Nazi political leadership was too interfering with the military leadership and as a result both performed very poorly.

@Geier there are significant problems with your assessment: none of what you suggest fit the Nazi ideology of expansion eastward. The war against the Western Allies was entirely reactionary- notice that with sole exception to the Rhineland, the Germans under Hitler had been expanding eastwards, in an ultimate showdown against Russia. The battles to take Western Europe was a necessity prodded by the declaration of war by Britain and France.
What you suggest is that Hitler does everything BUT his political agenda, an agenda he has been propagating to the German public and Nazi leadership for years. More importantly, all of your suggestions demand military action for no recognizable economic benefit.

On Britain, the Germans would have had to maintain their air superiority after thy have achieved it, you don't just beat down the RAF and then leave- you need to establish a superior presence to ensure that the enemy's air force doesn't just resurge. This was the case with the Red Air Force after Barbarossa- despite acquiring local air superiority during operations, the Luftwaffe were unable to keep it at a permanent, on-going basis. The Royal Navy would also have to be neutralized to ensure problems in securing Western Europe is successful- air raids from Britain is one thing, commando and troop landings in France and Africa are another. Beating Britain into submission in itself was a huge task, and Hitler saw no reason to be so embroiled in a war against a people he didn't want to keep fighting.
The planning for Sea Lion was made simply because the Germans were realistic enough to face the fact that the British will have to be beaten out of the fight, not just amazed by how fast the Germans took over France. Everything about Sea Lion demanded the impossible as long as Hitler was giving it secondary priority.

Istvan

Too tired, didn't read for the most part, but I think Naisho and Daelin are approaching the topic correctly. First we have to identify what it means for the Axis to "win WW2". While briefly skimming over the thread I already saw comments saying Germany should not have involved the USSR, but that belies a western-centric point of view that sees the war as a German attempt at conquering France and Britain. But why? "'Cuz 'Merica is the bestest" might be an acceptable answer in North American history classes, but we should aim for a more holistic approach to history.

Rather, we need to put the war into its proper historical context, which is that of a Germany seeking to expand eastward to craft a German Empire within Central and Eastern Europe, and France and Britain happening to intervene. Once France had surrendered and Britain had retreated across the channel, victory over France's and Britain's intervention seemed a given, and so it appeared that Germany would now be able to return to its actual designs, which was the conquest of Eastern Europe, destruction of the Soviet state, extermination of the Slavic populations, and colonisation of said area with German colonists. Leaving out war in the east simply cannot be done, therefore saying Germany should never have declared war on the USSR is a pointless comment, because that was the whole point all along.


Edit:
To answer the question, though, I think it's fair to say that for victory there would need to be a collapse of the Soviet state and a feeble Britain, both of which are impossible with the presence and support of the USA (USA! USA!). The American hardware supplied to the Red Army was primordial in the Soviet victory over the Wehrmacht. Early in the war, the Germans found that one of their greatest weaknesses in Russia, much like Napoleon's a century earlier, was the lack of mobility, the presence of which they had gotten accustomed to in their battles throughout Western and Central Europe. The Red Army suffered the same weakness- even if they managed to defeat the Germans in a confrontation, it was unusual that they actually managed to surround and thoroughly destroy the German army before the bulk of it retreated to safety. This dynamic was greatly altered when the US began supplying the Red Army with not only tanks, arms and ammunition, but also dozens of thousands of transport vehicles for the purpose of mechanizing the Red Army. By the second half of the war between Nazi Germany and the USSR, the Red Army was sufficiently mobile that it was able to consistently cut off and surround German retreats, leading to punishingly heavy German losses. Germany, meanwhile, was dealing with fuel shortages and found itself grossly immobile in comparison.

Theoretically, suppose that Germany does manage to break the Soviet Union - the conquest of Moscow, for example, would have brought utter ruin to the Soviet's transport system since virtually all railroads connected to that particular area. For Germany to actually be able to claim victory, its victory should be viewed not as a brief moment when all its enemies have surrendered or pose no serious threat, rather, we need to view the matter in the long-term: can Germany (and its Axis allies) hold onto all these acquired territories?

I think the German high command's utter disregard for human life and barbaric plans in general were an overall blunder, as they alienated any potential support and multiplied opposition of conquered peoples. The Ukrainians for example originally supported Germany, as they viewed Germany as a potential liberator from the USSR, but that matter changed when the Germans began attempting to exterminate the Ukrainians. The Poles, similarly, so enraged by mistreatment by Germany and determined to regain independence fielded the third largest army of the war, albeit underground, even after the Polish government fled into exile. I simply cannot imagine Germany peacefully holding onto so much of Europe with its policies of extermination, with so few soldiers. Their empire would last a few years at best, even with a collapsed Soviet state.

What about the other Axis? I don't know how Italy treated its conquered populations, but I don't think it would have been impossible for Italy to hold onto those territories, so long as there wasn't outside intervention.

Hungary and Romania pretty much only captured territories that had Hungarian and Romanian majorities, respectively anyway, so I don't see local unrest as an issue, though it's possible that conflict may have broken out between the two Axis states over the matter of Transylvania. Leaving the Romanian portion to Romania and giving the Hungarian portion to Hungary wasn't something that either side was fully content with, as they both wanted it all.

Over all, the Axis victory in Europe, even with a Soviet collapse, would have been short-lived due to Axis leadership weakness and conflict of interests.

Naisho

@Istavan

now that I do agree with in terms of the end result.

Speaking of which I was reminded of a cool video about WW2 that takes the political in favor of the practical, and turns the war into a period of conquest for food.

I will throw it up here as kinda food for thought and what victory meant for the warring parties.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-2q-QMUIgY

triscuit21

Going to try to avoid talking about the causes of the war, and simply talk about possible ways the Axis could have won...maybe.

Primarily, I'm going to focus on how the Soviet Union might have been defeated, assuming identical conditions to actual history. First, I would say the outcome of the Eastern Front was essentially decided in 1941, after the failure of Operation Barbarossa. After that, the Germans never really had much of a chance to win the war decisively, and as such their operations after 1941 (ie Fall Blau) were focused on prolonging the war by securing necessary resources such as oil from the Caucasus, with the hope of depriving the Russians of their economic base, and thus wearing the Soviet Union down in a war of economic attrition until a somewhat favorable peace could be established.

However, in 1941, the possibility of a decisive military victory for the Germans was still arguably possible. After all, in real life, the Germans advanced as close as 15 miles to Moscow. This is not to say that capturing Moscow would have automatically resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it can't be denied that it was a fairly centralized state, and the loss of Moscow would have been a serious blow to Soviet moral, lines of communication, transportation, coordination, etc.

Anyway, first of all I would say the most significant factor that resulted in the failure of Operation Barbarossa was the incompetence of the Italians, who had utterly failed in subduing the British forces holding Africa and Greece. As we all know, this forced the Germans to divert troops to those theaters in order to help the Italians, and delayed the start of Operation Barbarossa from April/May to the beginning of June. Although such a short of time may seem insignificant, that extra month or two may have been the difference between victory and defeat for the Germans.

As for factors that were actually within German control regarding Operation Barbarossa, there can be endless debate over Hitler's decision to delay the drive on Moscow in favor of closing the Kiev pocket; whether or not German logistics could have made the capture of Moscow tenable; the unpreparedness of the Wehrmacht for the Russian winter; et cetera. However, these debates tend to get bogged down in the minutiae, so I'll simply provide this link which gives a pretty good summary of German mistakes, and possible strategies/tactics that they could have employed instead.
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/barbarossa/articles/barbarossashrier.aspx

Rath_Darkblade

Maeda has a good point in that Germany could have won the war, but only if the Nazis didn't act like Nazis.

Let's think back to 1940. The Battle of Britain is about to begin. Hitler's forces have already crushed Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Sweden, the Balkan countries et al. What he needs to win the BoB is oil (not to mention someone competent in charge of the Luftwaffe, but that's another story).

The invasion of Russia makes sense if its justification is the liberation of the vast oil fields of the Caucasus, rather than Hitler's ideological hatred of communism.

But rather than invade Russia, it would have made sense to postpone the BoB and send the forces to had crushed the Balkans further southeast (into British Palestine), and split them into two. One of the two armies would invade further southeast (into Saudi Arabia), which is rich in oil; the other army would march southwest, into Egypt, thus catching the British army in Egypt between two fronts.

British Palestine was not heavily fortified or defended at the time, and might have been overrun relatively quickly. The loss of both Egypt and Palestine might have even shocked Churchill so far as to consider a truce with the Nazis - though I doubt it - but if he did, then the BoB would have been unnecessary.

If Britain had been neutralised in this way, then the Nazis could have seriously thought about invading Russia - or maybe even invoking Molotov-Ribbentrop and telling the Russians, "Ya know what? Let's just split Europe between us." But that would have been completely unlike Hitler, as we know.

So... let's just recap. Nazis - who don't act like Nazis - have invaded and crushed Turkey, British Palestine, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Britain has been knocked out of the war, and Europe has been divided between Hitler and Stalin. That's a win there, sure enough! And all it would have taken would have been for Hitler not to act like Hitler. But that's another story...

triscuit21

There's also the factor that Stalin was not exactly laying idle, while Hitler dealt with all his enemies in the west. Although the Red Army was nowhere near combat-effectiveness in 1941, Stalin was no fool, and knew that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact would not hold forever. He was just banking on the hope that Hitler would not attack until at least 1942. Of course, that hope then blinded him when all the signs pointed towards a major German offensive in 1941, making the initial Blitzkrieg along the Eastern Front significantly more effective.

However, if Hitler had indeed ignored all of his anti-communism ideologies outlined in Mein Kampf, and had simply left the Soviet Union alone while he dealt with Great Britain, then by the time he was ready to strike the Soviet Union, it may have been too late. After the Great Purge, Stalin was busy turning the Red Army into the most powerful army in the world, with new tanks such as the T-34 and KV-1 being put into mass production while obsolete models such as the T-26 got phased out, and the Mosin Nagant 91/30 was in the process of being replaced by the semi-automatic SVT-40 until Operation Barbarossa forced the Russians to go back to mass producing the cheaper Mosin Nagant. Had all these upgrades been allowed to complete unimpeded, the Soviets probably would have begun preparations for an offensive of their own, although it is hard to say when it would have occurred.

So, while delaying the invasion of Russia may very well have enabled Hitler to defeat Great Britain, it is likely would have also doomed him for the inevitable war with the Soviet Union.

Istvan

Excellent video, Naisho. I really liked his global approach to WW2, including the likes of British colonies in Africa and the Indian subcontinent. I didn't realize the British war effort affected these regions so negatively, but I suppose it shouldn't come as a surprise. Whenever I look at WW2 statistics, I always see ridiculously high military and civilian losses for the eastern branch Allies, moderate losses for the Axis, and light losses for the western branch of Allies, however, there is never any mention of the mortality rates as a result of the war in the colonies. That generally omitted and neglected bit of information really helps add an important piece of the puzzle for why the British Empire collapsed so rapidly following the war. I guess an empire cannot claim to be an enlightened despot ruling for the greater good when its own personal war efforts that have nothing to do with its colonies and yet they negatively affect those colonies.

[Deleted User]

Short and simple answer:

No. Atomic bombs came on line in July 1945, and in September '45 were being produced at the rate of 3 to 5 per fortnight, and the US was prepared to use them in a continual bombing campaign, if necessary to force peace.

Geier

Istvan wrote: »

Too tired, didn't read for the most part, but I think Naisho and Daelin are approaching the topic correctly. First we have to identify what it means for the Axis to "win WW2". While briefly skimming over the thread I already saw comments saying Germany should not have involved the USSR, but that belies a western-centric point of view that sees the war as a German attempt at conquering France and Britain. But why? "'Cuz 'Merica is the bestest" might be an acceptable answer in North American history classes, but we should aim for a more holistic approach to history.

Rather, we need to put the war into its proper historical context, which is that of a Germany seeking to expand eastward to craft a German Empire within Central and Eastern Europe, and France and Britain happening to intervene. Once France had surrendered and Britain had retreated across the channel, victory over France's and Britain's intervention seemed a given, and so it appeared that Germany would now be able to return to its actual designs, which was the conquest of Eastern Europe, destruction of the Soviet state, extermination of the Slavic populations, and colonisation of said area with German colonists. Leaving out war in the east simply cannot be done, therefore saying Germany should never have declared war on the USSR is a pointless comment, because that was the whole point all along.


Edit:
To answer the question, though, I think it's fair to say that for victory there would need to be a collapse of the Soviet state and a feeble Britain, both of which are impossible with the presence and support of the USA (USA! USA!). The American hardware supplied to the Red Army was primordial in the Soviet victory over the Wehrmacht. Early in the war, the Germans found that one of their greatest weaknesses in Russia, much like Napoleon's a century earlier, was the lack of mobility, the presence of which they had gotten accustomed to in their battles throughout Western and Central Europe. The Red Army suffered the same weakness- even if they managed to defeat the Germans in a confrontation, it was unusual that they actually managed to surround and thoroughly destroy the German army before the bulk of it retreated to safety. This dynamic was greatly altered when the US began supplying the Red Army with not only tanks, arms and ammunition, but also dozens of thousands of transport vehicles for the purpose of mechanizing the Red Army. By the second half of the war between Nazi Germany and the USSR, the Red Army was sufficiently mobile that it was able to consistently cut off and surround German retreats, leading to punishingly heavy German losses. Germany, meanwhile, was dealing with fuel shortages and found itself grossly immobile in comparison.

Theoretically, suppose that Germany does manage to break the Soviet Union - the conquest of Moscow, for example, would have brought utter ruin to the Soviet's transport system since virtually all railroads connected to that particular area. For Germany to actually be able to claim victory, its victory should be viewed not as a brief moment when all its enemies have surrendered or pose no serious threat, rather, we need to view the matter in the long-term: can Germany (and its Axis allies) hold onto all these acquired territories?

I think the German high command's utter disregard for human life and barbaric plans in general were an overall blunder, as they alienated any potential support and multiplied opposition of conquered peoples. The Ukrainians for example originally supported Germany, as they viewed Germany as a potential liberator from the USSR, but that matter changed when the Germans began attempting to exterminate the Ukrainians. The Poles, similarly, so enraged by mistreatment by Germany and determined to regain independence fielded the third largest army of the war, albeit underground, even after the Polish government fled into exile. I simply cannot imagine Germany peacefully holding onto so much of Europe with its policies of extermination, with so few soldiers. Their empire would last a few years at best, even with a collapsed Soviet state.

What about the other Axis? I don't know how Italy treated its conquered populations, but I don't think it would have been impossible for Italy to hold onto those territories, so long as there wasn't outside intervention.

Hungary and Romania pretty much only captured territories that had Hungarian and Romanian majorities, respectively anyway, so I don't see local unrest as an issue, though it's possible that conflict may have broken out between the two Axis states over the matter of Transylvania. Leaving the Romanian portion to Romania and giving the Hungarian portion to Hungary wasn't something that either side was fully content with, as they both wanted it all.

Over all, the Axis victory in Europe, even with a Soviet collapse, would have been short-lived due to Axis leadership weakness and conflict of interests.

I didn't mean not invading the USSR, just postponing the invasion till they had cleared the other front and could attack the USSR from two fronts, à l'Allies.

daelin4#9896

Istvan wrote: »

Theoretically, suppose that Germany does manage to break the Soviet Union - the conquest of Moscow, for example, would have brought utter ruin to the Soviet's transport system since virtually all railroads connected to that particular area. For Germany to actually be able to claim victory, its victory should be viewed not as a brief moment when all its enemies have surrendered or pose no serious threat, rather, we need to view the matter in the long-term: can Germany (and its Axis allies) hold onto all these acquired territories?

This would probably have been the most important part of Barbarossa being a success, either alongside or on top of the crushing effect on the Soviets with the breakthrough, encirclement and destruction of numerous Soviet armies at the onset of their offensive. However this strategy still holds logistical and strategic problems- for one thing, the supply issue would have too have been tremendously improved, if not overhauled, with preparations for winter and muddy conditions in order for the Germans to maintain pressure on the Russians- good ol General Winter was a huge helping hand for the Russians as they simply fled from the German advance until the latter tired themselves out. There is also the fact that the conditions for Uranus would have occurred in Moscow had the Germans concentrated on that city- which was fortified to the teeth compared to the relatively undefended Stalingrad that was bolstered at last minute. The Germans probably figured this would have happened and was likely a reason why Case Blue was launched.

triscuit21 wrote: »

After that, the Germans never really had much of a chance to win the war decisively, and as such their operations after 1941 (ie Fall Blau) were focused on prolonging the war by securing necessary resources such as oil from the Caucasus, with the hope of depriving the Russians of their economic base, and thus wearing the Soviet Union down in a war of economic attrition until a somewhat favorable peace could be established.

The problem with Fall Blau was that, like all the eastern conquests before Barbarossa, Germany was unable to efficiently utilize the captured land and resources after taking over those countries. It wasn't like oil would pour into Germany refineries and tanks months after the capture of the oil fields. It would provide a tremendous economic problem for the Soviets, but it would only limit counter-offensives from the Russians, not bolster the Germans' own capability, not unless they focus on reconstruction (as said, there's no reason why the Soviets would just hand them over after being beaten, damage to the infrastructure and insurgency after occupation has to be expected).
Attacking Moscow would have been far more difficult than Stalingrad, at best they would have to lay siege to it like at Leningrad, but the size and defense of the city would have been a daunting task, one that the Germans were not designed or equipped for.

Rath Darkblade wrote: »

But rather than invade Russia, it would have made sense to postpone the BoB and send the forces to had crushed the Balkans further southeast (into British Palestine), and split them into two. One of the two armies would invade further southeast (into Saudi Arabia), which is rich in oil; the other army would march southwest, into Egypt, thus catching the British army in Egypt between two fronts.

The problem with ignoring the British is that they would have just made problems with the rest of Europe, which they were already doing. Driving down to Palestine would either mean invading/ forcing the participation of Turkey (not a good idea), or going sea-borne, which would present many problems since the Allies had a powerful presence in the Mediterranean plus the numerous islands that would need to be taken from the British for logistical and strategic purposes.
The Middle East had not developed its oil infrastructure, and neither was its potential recognized until after WW2 ended; and in any case capturing built oil fields was more practical for the Germans- the need to take the Middle East and then develop oil fields, and then have the need to garrison the region to prevent being disrupted or destroyed by Allied attempts- would have been a tremendous project, and frankly done entirely to avoid confronting the Soviet Union, which made no political, strategic or ideological sense.
What you're asking is that the Nazis enact a plan to do everything except what they felt was necessary to achieve autarky and hegemony...and all to avoid attacking their rivals.

Geier wrote: »

I didn't mean not invading the USSR, just postponing the invasion till they had cleared the other front and could attack the USSR from two fronts.

The battles against France and Britain were the postponing of the war against the USSR. Further delays in fighting in the Balkans to secure that region, as well as North Africa to hold back the Allies from crushing the Italians, were also further delays.

Amilcar Barca

OK. Here I go. I have just read daelin opinion, and I dont agree with him.

Once Barbarossa didnt work and the USA got into the war I agree the Axis had no chance of winning. It was just a matter of time.

However, IF Barbarossa had worked (and, by working I mean making Stalin surrender, and probably the SU being expelled from Europe) things arent so clear, and IF Barbarossa had worked and Germany hadnt declared war on the USA then victory would have clearly been in the Axis side.

So, I think the question rests in Barbarossa and the SU, as France was already defeated and there wasnt much the UK could do about german domination of the continent.

Amilcar Barca

Rath Darkblade wrote: »

Maeda has a good point in that Germany could have won the war, but only if the Nazis didn't act like Nazis.

Let's think back to 1940. The Battle of Britain is about to begin. Hitler's forces have already crushed Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Sweden, the Balkan countries et al. What he needs to win the BoB is oil (not to mention someone competent in charge of the Luftwaffe, but that's another story).

The invasion of Russia makes sense if its justification is the liberation of the vast oil fields of the Caucasus, rather than Hitler's ideological hatred of communism.

But rather than invade Russia, it would have made sense to postpone the BoB and send the forces to had crushed the Balkans further southeast (into British Palestine), and split them into two. One of the two armies would invade further southeast (into Saudi Arabia), which is rich in oil; the other army would march southwest, into Egypt, thus catching the British army in Egypt between two fronts.

British Palestine was not heavily fortified or defended at the time, and might have been overrun relatively quickly. The loss of both Egypt and Palestine might have even shocked Churchill so far as to consider a truce with the Nazis - though I doubt it - but if he did, then the BoB would have been unnecessary.

If Britain had been neutralised in this way, then the Nazis could have seriously thought about invading Russia - or maybe even invoking Molotov-Ribbentrop and telling the Russians, "Ya know what? Let's just split Europe between us." But that would have been completely unlike Hitler, as we know.

So... let's just recap. Nazis - who don't act like Nazis - have invaded and crushed Turkey, British Palestine, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Britain has been knocked out of the war, and Europe has been divided between Hitler and Stalin. That's a win there, sure enough! And all it would have taken would have been for Hitler not to act like Hitler. But that's another story...

I dont agree. Invading and getting Palestine or North Africa wouldnt have helped Germany in what was its real objective: to carve an Eastern "Empire" out of the SU. It would have just given Stalin more time to rearm.

triscuit21

Amilcar Barca wrote: »

I dont agree. Invading and getting Palestine or North Africa wouldnt have helped Germany in what was its real objective: to carve an Eastern "Empire" out of the SU. It would have just given Stalin more time to rearm.

Exactly. Hitler's only hope of ultimately winning the war rested in defeating the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, for strategic as well as ideological reasons. And Barbarossa was his one real chance of defeating the Soviet Union quickly and decisively, before getting bogged down in the war of attrition that the Eastern Front came to be. So, possible scenarios of the Germans winning the war rest in the Germans somehow capturing Moscow before the winter of 41.

Obviously that was no easy task, but I can't help but feel that if the Italians hadn't bungled their invasion of Greece, and the 2nd Panzer Group under Guderian had been allowed to continue the drive towards Moscow rather than waste time helping Army Group South complete the encirclement of Kiev, then Operation Typhoon might have had a better chance to complete its two pincer movements, and encircle Moscow as per the original plan. From that point, things get a bit more ambiguous, as a lot of factors come into play, but the situation would have still been far better for the Germans than the original timeline.

[Deleted User]

The question was 'Axis', not simply 'Germany'.

The facts were that Japan was always going to war with the West, for resource and economic reasons; and Germany had to fight the Soviet Union after Britain didn't look for peace because its' gold reserves were due to run out in Jan/Feb 1943.

So, I repeat why the Axis couldn't win: Nukes, and the will to use them.

RiseFromTheAshez

Germany could win, but I don't think the Axis could win. The second Hitler declared war on the US, Germany's fate was sealed. No matter what he did after that point was going to win him the war. Even if somehow the Germans managed to win every major battle, atomic bombs would still start dropping on Berlin and every other major German city, in 1945. So, the only way the Germans would even stand a chanceis if they didn't go to war with America. It would actually benefit them, since they'd bebuying themselves time by letting the Japanese be the ones to fight them and wear them down.

Ok, so now, it would still be very hard for Germany to win. They need to kick the British out of the war ASAP. If they're able to win the Battle of Britain and mantain air superiority, they could easily keep the British out. Even if they don't surrender (I doubt Britain would ever surrender. They aren't actually threatened, since Germany wouldn't be able to invade them either) Britain would never be able to pull off an invasion of Europe like D-Day on their own.

With the British no longer being a threat, the Germans would probably be able to defeat the Soviets in a 1 on 1 fight.

In the end, it would still be extremely difficult, since for some reason Hitler wanted to be in control of everything, even though he knew nothing about warfare. He should've left his Generals in charge, which also affected their ability to fight.

Amilcar Barca

Hidden Gunman wrote: »

The question was 'Axis', not simply 'Germany'.

The facts were that Japan was always going to war with the West, for resource and economic reasons; and Germany had to fight the Soviet Union after Britain didn't look for peace because its' gold reserves were due to run out in Jan/Feb 1943.

So, I repeat why the Axis couldn't win: Nukes, and the will to use them.

You assume too many things.

First of all, you assume that Germany declares war in the USA, when it was stupid to do. Either that or you assume that, for no reason, the average citizen would understand, the USA dclares war on Germany.

And, even if you dont assume the above but you assume that the USA gives the atomic know how to the brithish, you assume that the USA would have financed the Manhattan Project, even while they werent at war.

Finally, the atomic bomb was not ready until 1945. By that time the Axis should have won or it would be Defeated, making the bomb pointless.

Tyer032392

Just doing Germany.

Had the German High Command decide to only produce the Panzer IV, and Panzer V (Panther) tanks, and completely ignore the heavy tanks like the Panzer VI (Tiger), and Panzer VII (KoningTiger), than they would of had much better chances. If I recall correctly, by the second year that the Panther was in production, they had already out numbered the Tiger tank which had been in production a year and a half earlier. The Panther tanks would have been what the German's needed to combat the T-34 spam that the Russians were doing, and in some cases were actually superior to the T-34 in both armor and firepower. Though, the problem was that Hitler decided that bigger is better, which in some cases is true, but not in this case.

srl67#3983

Amilcar Barca wrote: »

And, even if you dont assume the above but you assume that the USA gives the atomic know how to the brithish, you assume that the USA would have financed the Manhattan Project, even while they werent at war.

I think you underestimate british help and knowledge given in the Manhattan Project, e.g. the MAUD committee.