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However, IF Barbarossa had worked (and, by working I mean making Stalin surrender, and probably the SU being expelled from Europe) things arent so clear, and IF Barbarossa had worked and Germany hadnt declared war on the USA then victory would have clearly been in the Axis side.
So, I think the question rests in Barbarossa and the SU, as France was already defeated and there wasnt much the UK could do about german domination of the continent.
I am not sure just what you disagree with.
Barbarosaa working depends a lot on whether Barbarossa as originally planned, or Barbarossa in it's intentions, That is to say, immediate destruction of Soviet armies and anticipated Soviet collapse within months or weeks of commencement, or eventual conquest of western Russia at an undetermined date, preferably before the US enters the war or the other Western Allies produce problems on other fronts. The actual plans of a prompt defeat of the Soviet Union carried a great deal of presumptions like the Soviets standing their ground ad to risk being destroyed (which occured in some cases but not all), or of course a collapse of cohesion as the Germans wreaked havoc.
None of these required war, declared or declaring on, against the United States. In fact Hitler could have just manipulated things and disowned the Japanese for their actions.
Had the German High Command decide to only produce the Panzer IV, and Panzer V (Panther) tanks, and completely ignore the heavy tanks like the Panzer VI (Tiger), and Panzer VII (KoningTiger), than they would of had much better chances. If I recall correctly, by the second year that the Panther was in production, they had already out numbered the Tiger tank which had been in production a year and a half earlier. The Panther tanks would have been what the German's needed to combat the T-34 spam that the Russians were doing, and in some cases were actually superior to the T-34 in both armor and firepower. Though, the problem was that Hitler decided that bigger is better, which in some cases is true, but not in this case.
If the Germans' high command had much authority over the production of the armoured vehicles it would have just been consistently overruled by Hitler.
Development of both heavy and medium tanks stared before the war, and nothing suggested to the Germans up until Barbarossa that they needed anything else. Now if they did have intelligence on tanks like the T-34 and KV series, and barring irrational sense of superiority, then they might have been encouraged to up the production speeds.
But what you suggest ignores a lot of tactical considerations. For one, few tank designs by the Germans were failures, and the Tiger and King Tiger for their worth were very powerful and feared vehicles. It made little economic sense yes, but they remained tactically effective. The Germans needed more of everything, not simply less of certain ones in favour of others. Panthers for their part had their share of mechanical problems. The reason why Panther production went over the Tiger's, was because the latter eventually dropped since they did realize, despite it's reputation and capability, that it was a dead-end. But you can't come to that conclusion without having done the hard work, the Germans had no way of knowing that the Tiger would eventually not mean much in the long run, especially given how powerful it's performance was; logistics, training and other tactical considerations like air support also play a role in how effective armoured vehicles are, and these aren't things Tiger tanks have control over. In the end, if the Germans had enough of anything they would have won the war; they lost because they never did.
Moreover, the Russians were doing more than just T-34 spam. In fact T-34s were great in their simple yet innovative design, but in nearly every other case, they proved operationally inferior to German counterparts. The Soviets however had the economic advantage of producing many of them, and can afford to make upgrades. They also weren't idle in their design evolution either- whatever new toys the Germans threw to the field, the Soviets adapted and built effective counters.
As for USA entering the war, it was inevitable, there's no way you can fight the British in the Atlantic and not have any tangles with the US, a historical and contemporary ally that was actively shipping to the UK. Besides Hitler's view of Americans, he also didn't no much on the diplomatic/ political side to minimize likelihood of their involvement- you can quote his declaration of war after Pearl Harbour as a primary example. But its not like the US wouldn't just find a a reason to go to war either.
Corrected action is the most sincere form of apology.
First of all, you assume that Germany declares war in the USA, when it was stupid to do. Either that or you assume that, for no reason, the average citizen would understand, the USA dclares war on Germany.
And, even if you dont assume the above but you assume that the USA gives the atomic know how to the brithish, you assume that the USA would have financed the Manhattan Project, even while they werent at war.
Finally, the atomic bomb was not ready until 1945. By that time the Axis should have won or it would be Defeated, making the bomb pointless.
I'm not assuming anything...it's a historical fact that Germany declared war on the US. It wouldn't have mattered to the win or lose equation in any case.
The Soviets and Brit Empire were winning the ground war by late '42...it just would have meant that the war in Europe may have lasted longer, and Germany would have been completely wrecked, rather than just key cities...you may also have seen most of western Europe under the Soviet boot. I would suggest that a successful revolution would have occurred in Germany first though...they were terrified of the Soviets.
Japan would still have been nuked.
Keep in mind that the German economy and industry relied massively on slave labour and stolen gold, money and valuables...they had to expand simply to supply the labour, finances and resources. It was entirely possible that the free world could have put a freeze on the German use of the sequested Swiss bank accounts, the occupied nation gold reserves, and international money transfer.
I'm not assuming anything...it's a historical fact that Germany declared war on the US. It wouldn't have mattered to the win or lose equation in any case.
The Soviets and Brit Empire were winning the ground war by late '42...it just would have meant that the war in Europe may have lasted longer, and Germany would have been completely wrecked, rather than just key cities...you may also have seen most of western Europe under the Soviet boot. I would suggest that a successful revolution would have occurred in Germany first though...they were terrified of the Soviets.
Japan would still have been nuked.
Keep in mind that the German economy and industry relied massively on slave labour and stolen gold, money and valuables...they had to expand simply to supply the labour, finances and resources. It was entirely possible that the free world could have put a freeze on the German use of the sequested Swiss bank accounts, the occupied nation gold reserves, and international money transfer.
The thread was about what Germany might have done to win the war, not about what would happen if everything happened again (we all agree that with the USA and the SU at war, Germany had no chance of winning). That is why I said that one of the two things Germany should have done is not declaring war on the USA.
On any case, the nuke point may well be moot, since it was made in 1945. Too late to affect the outcome in most possible scenarios
I'm not assuming anything...it's a historical fact that Germany declared war on the US. It wouldn't have mattered to the win or lose equation in any case.
The Soviets and Brit Empire were winning the ground war by late '42...it just would have meant that the war in Europe may have lasted longer, and Germany would have been completely wrecked, rather than just key cities...you may also have seen most of western Europe under the Soviet boot. I would suggest that a successful revolution would have occurred in Germany first though...they were terrified of the Soviets.
Japan would still have been nuked.
Yes, that is the way it went in actual history. However, the point of this thread is to discuss ways the Axis could have won, which means diverging from the original timeline. All I'm trying to say is that if Operation Barbarossa had been successful in decisively defeating the Soviet Union, and Germany had never declared war on America after Pearl Harbor, then it is likely Germany could have effectively won the war in Europe.
As for Japan, they were pretty much screwed.
"The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other ******* die for his."
- General George Patton (1885-1945)
Wow, I really need to not make these threads during the height of my school work.
Since the first responses by daelin and Madea, I've been glancing at them and promising myself to get back to them as soon as I have the time (which I haven't due to a big paper that I just finished) on top of other school work. But obviously this thread has been very successful.
So I am typing the following response as a work in progress, as I have yet to read all of your 'Walls of text' yet, so im initially going to respond to the first few responses; and edit this post as I read more of the thread.
First though, a couple of clarifications:
1) I've noticed a lot of references to Japan, so ill modify my original conditions to allow discussing Japan only as to how the war in Asia would potentially have a direct effect on the War in Europe. This means things like the common What if? of Japan attacking the USSR in support of Barbarossa.
2) I know daelin said in his first response something about my statement regarding 'only military; no political-economic'. Well, I know this daelin, I know the critical importance of political and economic aspects of war, especially this one, I only put that in there because I felt obligated to place some sort of disclaimer, as talking about WWII on this scale could bring potential problems of users violating the forum rules. You all know what I mean by this, so I just felt I was obligated to make some effort to try and focus this only on military related efforts.
So, now my preliminary responses, from the first page:
I know I made the error of not clarifying a victory condition for the Axis to win, my apologies, but I think the thread is far enough along where I don't need to add one to the OP.
But given Hitler's reasons for war, it seems that total defeat of the Soviets would be a satisfactory goal in the short run for him. I think arguing 'If Germany did not attack Russia, they would have won the war' is a pointless argument. My dad argues that all the time when I discuss WWII with him, I have to make it clear to him that Hitler was not hell bent on fighting the west, one way or another he WAS going to attack the USSR.
Attacking the west in 1940 was no doubt done to get the Allies off Germany's back in preparation for the march east. I think the incredible victory over France has been the key piece of evidence that gives a lot of people the belief that Germany could have won the war, but, I tend to be in agreement with daelin and others for the most part, given a 1939 start point, Germany could not have won the war.
The entry of the US certainly meant that Germany's war with the west had now become unwinnable, at least not without horrendous losses and a very tense and uneasy armistice (not a true victory).
Fun Fact: Hitler' declaration of War on the United States was the only official declaration of war he ever did. All others were ether surprise attacks or having war declared on him (really just France and British Empire in 1939)
But of course with the Allies' demand of unconditional surrender in 1943 meant that there was little if any chance of an armistice. I think the only chance of an armistice (a very slim one) of that would have been a total success of an anti-Nazi revolt within Germany to overthrow the regime, and even then the war with the USSR would probably not have ended.
As Maeda said 'if the Nazis didn't act like Nazis'. The very nature of Germany under the leadership of the time assured that Germany was going to lose the war.
"we have officially entered into pre-whinning about our games."- Cogre
I will always respect differing opinions on here, so long as they are presented maturely and in a civil manner
"No Battleplan ever survives contact with the enemy"- Helmuth Von Moltke the Elder
Germany could have won a war if Hitler instead decided to build up the German economy and military. He was hoping to do this after what he assumed to be easy gains with taking over Eastern Europe. Even before and during the war the Nazis did little to think for the future in practical terms, it was all ideological but lacking in a touch with reality.
End of the day Hitler took some steps that caused the British and French to declare war, a step that Hitler was willing to risk Germany and millions of lives for. And doing so without even safeguarding the nation through economic or even international consolidation he was very foolish.
If anything, Hitler not making war onto other countries would have assured victory in the event he was forced into one, re Soviets invade first. Of course given Poland and the Soviets, there's little reason to presume the Allies would help out quickly enough.
Corrected action is the most sincere form of apology.
You are all assuming that war with Britain would not have dragged out, that Italy didn't lose North Africa, and that the Soviets wouldn't go to war against Germany, and that the German economy could function after January 1943 when her gold reserves were exhausted, and that Japan didn't go to war with everyone in 1941.
That's some pretty bold assumptions.
Once Germany invaded Poland, it pretty much lost the war...there is no way in hades that the British Empire would capitulate, and certainly the dominions were prepared to oust Churchill or any Brit Prime Minister if they considered it (most dominion prime ministers didn't think much of him, privately, and most dominion troops had no time for him...the King, yes, Churchill, no).
Many people look at the Brit Empire as just Britain...it wasn't, and in fact the main forces of the Empire were barely deployed against Germany...notwithstanding manpower, there was massive economic resources to draw on, which in fact the US relied on for much of its' Pacific drive. The manpower resources in India and Africa were barely touched, and the 'european' dominion forces had far less than a quarter of their forces in action for most of the war.
Once Japan came in, and it had to come in, it was game over...they were on the run by late 1942, at the same time Germany was, and Italy was pretty much out of the fight by then, people tend to forget that...and people tend to overlook that it was pretty much only the Brit Empire and Soviets who put the Axis in that position...1 pretty much out, 1 lagging badly, and 1 embarrassed at the end of the first round.
Sorry, off topic here, but I thought I'd mention it for those who get spooked by numbers...as of our last posts, HLE has 4, 184 posts, and I have 4, 418 posts....
We are now entering the twilight zone....beware the giant aztec bird-headed monster gods...
But given Hitler's reasons for war, it seems that total defeat of the Soviets would be a satisfactory goal in the short run for him. I think arguing 'If Germany did not attack Russia, they would have won the war' is a pointless argument. My dad argues that all the time when I discuss WWII with him, I have to make it clear to him that Hitler was not hell bent on fighting the west, one way or another he WAS going to attack the USSR.
Hitler foresaw confrontation with the West but certainly not in 1939, or at the least, his regime hardly made honest preparations for that. The then-latest Kriegsmarine ship projects were estimated to be complete by 46-48, nearly all of them were scrapped once war was declared. To that effect Germany was not even priming up for the action necessary to win a war, we might as well discuss how a geek with poor body structure might be able to win a bodybuilding competition against an athlete, with the former doing virtually nothing about the upcoming event.
Attacking the west in 1940 was no doubt done to get the Allies off Germany's back in preparation for the march east. I think the incredible victory over France has been the key piece of evidence that gives a lot of people the belief that Germany could have won the war, but, I tend to be in agreement with daelin and others for the most part, given a 1939 start point, Germany could not have won the war.
What made the victories over France and the BEF possible were largely due to the Allies' poor performance and the fact that strategically speaking these weren't terrible setbacks. Britain's army or navy was not crushed so there is little reason for any German general to consider them beaten for good. France capitulated of course, but also led to the Germans occupying the place, which drew on military resources that could otherwise have been used elsewhere. And it wasn't like they made an GeneralOst style of plan for France either, if anything the occupation was ad hoc and symbolic of triumph over historical grievances. Whatever the case Hitler did nothing on the political or diplomatic side to soothe relations with the West, something he would have to do if he was to go against Russia and not have the British or French come back at him, something that's mor or less impossible in the first place since it all started with the invasion and occupation of their military ally, Poland.
Contemplating anything to avoid the Polish debacle requires Hitler abandoning his ideological vision of a German-dominated Eastern Europe. It really all comes down to his personality- he likes war, loves waging war, and wants to rage it out against Poles, Jews, Slavs and communists first; the British and the French were a secondary necessity.
As for the US, I've come to conclude that Hitler simply didn't think that far ahead. He's not exactly the wise or educated type of man. Wowing audience with your screaming down from the pulpit only make you look like a good leader. He had WW1 to read up on and consider adapting to.
Corrected action is the most sincere form of apology.
You are all assuming that war with Britain would not have dragged out, that Italy didn't lose North Africa, and that the Soviets wouldn't go to war against Germany, and that the German economy could function after January 1943 when her gold reserves were exhausted, and that Japan didn't go to war with everyone in 1941.
That's some pretty bold assumptions.
All I'm assuming is that:
1. Operation Barbarossa succeeds, through a variety of factors discussed before.
2. Hitler essentially ignores his allies and doesn't declare war on America after Pearl Harbor or let Operation Barbarossa get delayed by helping the Italians.
From these assumptions, all else follows. With the Soviet Union defeated, and American help still limited to Lend Lease, then Germany would be able to turn its full attention upon Great Britain. Operation Sealion still probably couldn't happen, but with many of the men previously on the Eastern Front now freed up, it would be pretty much impossible for Britain to hold onto Egypt, thus closing off the Suez canal and forcing them to go around Africa to get to the rest of their Empire. In this situation, defeat is pretty much inevitable for Great Britain, and they would likely negotiate for peace eventually. As for the German economy, it is true that in a war footing that it would have crashed eventually, but the war would likely have been won by then assuming the conditions above. Especially considering that in the final years of the war German industrial production actually increased, due to the policies of Albert Speer.
"The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other ******* die for his."
- General George Patton (1885-1945)
Britain had been going around Africa to the rest of the Empire for several hundred years, it only would have added a few more weeks to the trip, and would have had no impact on the resource supply issue, as the convoy system generally routed shipping via long and indirect routes anyhow - what was important was getting ships into convoy, not speed of delivery.
I can't see how Barbarossa could win, the Germans didn't manage to defeat Russia in WW1, it collapsed from within, and under the Soviet regime the country was far more stable and focussed against foreign invasion than under the czars. On top of that, the Soviets had massive success in withdrawing their industry into Siberia, before the 1942 offensive. The Soviets lost @25 million people during the war, and in 1945 had more than twice as many men to attack just Berlin, than the Axis had for the start of Barbarossa...those figures alone answer the question OP posed.
Throughout the war, the Germans never succeeded in pacifying the occupied Soviet territories - people under partisan and Red Army protection were still producing food and in some cases shipping it to the Soviet unoccupied zones...the front wasn't one continuous line, but essentially occupied zones with a screening force...this was borne out during the winter of '42/'43, when Stalingrad was just one of a number of major encirclements...notwithstanding that at the same time the Germans were in the process of losing another 350 000 troops in Tunisia. All this was happening before US involvement became a major factor.
On top of which, Japan was going backwards at the same time in Papua New Guinea - Again, before US involvement became a major factor.
The Germans were making a serious mistake, one which they are not alone in making, particularly in modern times - the mistake they made with the Brits and the Soviets is that they misread what it would take to defeat their enemy - they based their planning on what they considered as victory requirements, from which their enemies would surrender or be defeated. That's pretty pointless if your enemies have a different view and standards on the matter...thus, when the Brits didn't sue for peace, and the Soviet Union didn't collapse, but came back stronger, the Germans were caught out. Which comes back to my earlier contention that the Germans lost the war when they invaded Poland - effectively, they lost it because they hadn't planned for it, and weren't ready for it. Their military was thrust into something by the government, without adequate planning, and eventually the wheels fell off the wagon.
Edit: Regarding the Suez Canal, it had no strategic value once war was declared...the British Admiralty's Convoy and Routing Office determined the convoy and merchant marine routes for the entire world, and didn't route any through the Mediteranean...aside from the issues with potentially hostile bases on either shore, you physically can't sail in convoy through the canal, notwithstanding the chokepoint risk. It was used for single ships for reinforcing the Med, but not as a through-route.
I can't see how Barbarossa could win, the Germans didn't manage to defeat Russia in WW1, it collapsed from within, and under the Soviet regime the country was far more stable and focussed against foreign invasion than under the czars. On top of that, the Soviets had massive success in withdrawing their industry into Siberia, before the 1942 offensive. The Soviets lost @25 million people during the war, and in 1945 had more than twice as many men to attack just Berlin, than the Axis had for the start of Barbarossa...those figures alone answer the question OP posed.
That would be the main debate. Yes, the Germans could not defeat the Soviets in a war of attrition, however, in my opinion, the Germans still could have won if they had struck a more decisive blow in 1941 by capturing Moscow. This would have imposed tremendous logistical problems upon the Soviets, since their railway and communication network connecting eastern and western Russia essentially centered around Moscow, not to mention the fact that if Operation Typhoon had gone more according to plan, and Moscow had been encircled before the first winter snows, then a huge portion of the Red Army would have been cut off from supplies, making Kiev seem like child's play. Yes, the logistical situation for the Germans would have been terrible as well, and it is unlikely that they could hold onto the city throughout the winter of 41-42, but the symbolical importance of Moscow falling even temporarily, plus the effects of effectively cutting Russia in two, would have likely led to the total collapse of Russian resistance in the west. With the Russian strategic position crippled before they could properly utilize their massive advantage in manpower, then the following year in 1942 the Germans would be able to strike a fatal blow.
As for Britain, I was not saying that the loss of Egypt would immediately force their surrender, I simply meant that with the loss of one of their most important colonies/protectorates in Africa, as well as their main sphere of influence on the Mediterranean besides small territories such as Gibraltar or Malta, the British Empire would pretty much lose its capability to resist further German expansion. Sure, the Royal Navy would prevent Germany from taking the home islands or their overseas dominions, but without a strong foothold in Europe or Africa, they would be unable to do much more than defend themselves, and the resulting stalemate would eventually lead to peace.
"The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other ******* die for his."
- General George Patton (1885-1945)
Reading about Barbarossa there seems to be little reason to believe it is anything but a repeat of Napoleon's campaign, one that Hitler should have studied intensely, or at least appreciate the opinions of his generals that did. The risks involved were considerably poor, basically the authoritarian Soviet regime collapses simply because a large portion of it's developed territory and immediate military resources were lost. To be fair Hitler likely deduced this from his own experiences in previous campaigns, but this simply draws the conclusion that Hitler was under victory's spell, which frankly means nothing when it comes to facing a different opponent of military scale and industrial capacity, and sheer size.
Opting to declare and aggressively fight certain enemies at the same time is not good strategy, no matter how ideologically oppose you are to them. Even worse, the events in WW2 was basically Germany fighting increasingly more enemies, at the same time, without neutralizing enough of them at once to maintain balance. For many of these enemies Nazi Germany was the belligerent that struck the first blow. Ironically it was only Britain and France that Germany defeated (and temporarily), the two countries that first declared war on Germany.
But one should note that unlike the East, Germany was fighting to preserve itself from immediate threats, not for fulfilling ideological visions. In that effect Germany would have "won the war" if it only minimized the scale of the conflict to just France/ Britain, and not drawing on Russia as part of that conflict, this would be possible if the Soviet Union in the meantime of this scenario does not take active part in the conflict until Hitler timed it right. Considering how the Soviets didn't really do anything until Barbarossa one might have reason to believe that if they weren't attacked in 1941 Hitler might have actually just limited his war against the Western Allies and have that done before getting onto Russia.
Of course besides the fact that reality showed both the actual outcome as well as Hitler's vision thought things differently, there's like a gajillion other variables that would have prevented such an ideal scenario from happening. For one thing Hitler would have to have given up Poland, the main cause for war, if he wanted immediate resolution to a problem he probably didn't think much on.
So I guess to answer the OP question, "the war" would have been won if "the war" never became "the war" in the first place, but rather a different war that, ideally, left out the British and French. End of the day this meant that all of control over winning WW2 had much more to do with the Allies' actions more than Germany. Consider how things might turn out if the Allies just abandoned Poland, for example, it would have given them no credibility, among the USSR or even the USA, fomented public outrage and perhaps colonial issues, and would not have scratched Germany's original plans for a war footing against Russia. But even then, Hitler's armies would have little experience in a campaign as large as Barbarossa, so on the other side of the coin there's little reason why all of these scenarios would somehow contribute to an overall higher chance of success for Germany in a Russian campaign. Barbarossa occurred on the heels of German experience in the two years prior to June 1941; without those years of war and victory Barbarossa might never have occurred the way it did.
On a Suez campaign, there is also the fact that you have to consider Rommel's Africa campaign and the realities behind the events in order to determine victory rather than defeat. For a start, Africa was lost because the Germans were unable to secure a sufficient logistical train to support Rommel's operations- the minute he ran out of steam he was forced back. And securing supply routes without being disrupted from extension or attack from Allied forces is difficult in a part of the world where Germany had little control over. Crete was obviously meant to alleviated that, but given the disastrous result of Operation Mercury, coupled with the fact that all operations in the Mediterranean were in reality just preparations and securities for Barbarossa, shows that the way Africa was handled would have to have been approached very differently (but also very predictably) than how it was in real life.
And like what HG said, there's little reason to see taking over the Suez would do anything for both sides. It would have cut off the most predictable route for the Allies to gain access to Asia, but nothing suggests it was the only possible route. It also would not have alleviated the Germany position in the theatre or in the war itself at all, you just have a long stretch of Africa to defend, all to deny it from the British who can just strike at the Germans from any other angle. It's not like once Rommel sized Egypt he'd be in a permanent position of invincibility and all Arabs will be speaking German.
Corrected action is the most sincere form of apology.
A couple of things, taking Moscow would mean nothing...politically, it wouldn't have done much more than make the Soviets a lot more bitter than they already were - and the main thing about the Russian character is that they revere their land. While the transport network point does have some validity, the Soviets were building infrastructure at a great rate...remember that they developed the necessary rail lines and support structure for the '42/'43 winter offensive in a period of weeks, in areas where there was nothing but barren step and frozen forest. Due to the equipment and doctrinal differences, the Axis forces were largely tied to the communication lines, the Soviets, with a more simplistic and robust system, were largely capable of operating away from it.
Regarding the north african adventure, that's all it was. Rommel had no authority and no support to launch an aggressive offensive to capture Egypt or Palestine...that was his doing, with tacit agreement from the High Command - tacit because if it went wrong, he's the bunny carrying responsibility. But also bear in mine that the Brit Empire had cleaned out the rest of Africa, there was no longer any Axis possessions in East Africa, and a large South African force in that area.
But, and I'll repeat it, economically Egypt was a null point, including the Canal. Politically, for Churchill, yes, it was important. Militarilly it was important for the eastern meditteranean fleet, but the German and Italian forces would have been struggling to get any further than the Alemein line even under the most favourable conditions.
Haven't been able to get back to this thread for a few days, but nothing like a good historical argument to take your mind off other things.
Anyway, both of you are focusing in on a passing comment I made about the fact that if the Soviet Union could be defeated, then Germany would be able to free up forces in order to defeat the Allies in other contested theaters, such as Africa. I was never saying that taking Egypt was the key to Germany winning the war. Personally, I think the Afrika Korps would have been better used on the Eastern Front, in the hope that Italy could hold out on its own. Risky, I know, but perhaps those few extra Panzer divisions, with Erwin Rommel at their head, could have possibly made the critical difference in the war against the Russians.
Which brings me back to the main point though, of the Soviet Union and Operation Barbarossa. It is true that capturing Moscow would not have hurt the Russians too badly politically or economically. Stalin and all other political officials could have been evacuated quite easily should the city have come under more serious threat, and most of the industry was already moved east to the Urals. However, as any Total War player knows, one can never underestimate the importance of moral, and the loss of Moscow would have certainly dealt a massive psychological blow to anyone living in the Soviet Union, at least excluding the ones already fanatical about the defense of their motherland. Of course, in the times of Napoleon, this could blow be endured, however in the increasingly centralized Soviet Union, one has to wonder if some of the diverse peoples that lay within the Soviet Union might have started questioning the legitimacy of a government that could not even defend its own capital, especially since many of them weren't too fond of the Soviets in the first place. Even if the Germans could not hold onto the city, the simple moral factor of capturing it, and then burning it to the ground while retreating to more defensible lines could have made many of the non-Russians in the Soviet Union significantly less enthusiastic about going to war for a regime that seemingly would not be in power for much longer.
Then, as I mentioned before, one cannot forget that a successful Operation Typhoon would have entailed the encirclement of over a million Russian soldiers. At that time, the Russians had practically no forces in reserve, with almost everything they had in the area committed to the defense of Moscow, so an encirclement similar to that of Kiev, only of a larger magnitude, would have been unimaginably devastating to them. Furthermore, the point of communication and transportation centering around Moscow still stands, as while the Russians may have had the capability to organize tremendous logistical feats in 1942-43, the same was not true in 41. They had simply not mobilized the majority of their manpower at that point, and that which they had readily available was for the most part already tied up along the front. So, the loss, or even just encirclement, of Moscow would have effectively cut off any Soviet divisions west of Moscow from their main line of supplies and reinforcements, allowing for even further gains before the arrival of winter, and then the Soviet winter offensive of 41 would have been nearly far less effective, and would probably succeed at little more than driving the Germans temporarily out of Moscow.
"The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other ******* die for his."
- General George Patton (1885-1945)
There actually is a way for the Axis to have won the war, but it could only have happened if Kang and Kodos left Rigel-7 in time and zapped the Soviets with their death-rays.
And so I'm first to digress from the point of this thread! Yay! What do I win?
"There is nothing wrong with nepotism, provided you keep it all in the family."
--Winston Churchill
You are all assuming that war with Britain would not have dragged out, that Italy didn't lose North Africa, and that the Soviets wouldn't go to war against Germany, and that the German economy could function after January 1943 when her gold reserves were exhausted, and that Japan didn't go to war with everyone in 1941.
It hadnt mattered whether war with Britain would have dragged out or not. Same goes for the italians losing North Africa. What really mattered was the SU. Everything else is secondary (except for the USA getting into the war). If Barbarossa had worked and Germany has defeated the SU, Germany would have ruled Europe, and there wouldnt be much the Brithish Empire could do about it.
Regarding the german economy, it didnt mattered, as you can see by what happened IRL. When nations fight for their very survival, they always find ways to get the money or resources they need to keep on figthing.
And Japan didnt go to war with everybody in 1941. Just with the allies, which, as much as it might hurt you, were the lesser partner regarding who fights Germany.
Once Germany invaded Poland, it pretty much lost the war...there is no way in hades that the British Empire would capitulate, and certainly the dominions were prepared to oust Churchill or any Brit Prime Minister if they considered it (most dominion prime ministers didn't think much of him, privately, and most dominion troops had no time for him...the King, yes, Churchill, no).
Again, what the BE did wasnt so important. What was important at such an early stage (I mean, after France was defeated) was the SU. The brithish got into the continent 3 times before Overlord (4, if we count the 1942 landing) and all of them they were expelled.
Many people look at the Brit Empire as just Britain...it wasn't, and in fact the main forces of the Empire were barely deployed against Germany...notwithstanding manpower, there was massive economic resources to draw on, which in fact the US relied on for much of its' Pacific drive. The manpower resources in India and Africa were barely touched, and the 'european' dominion forces had far less than a quarter of their forces in action for most of the war.
I know, but that doesnt change the fact that there was nothing the BE could do. And on top of that they couldnt draw much more resoruces than they already did. In fact, by 1944 (for Ovelord) the BE used its last reserve units. By the end of the war in Europe there were just two BE armies (one english, one canadian) for five american ones in the western front (not counting Italy).
Once Japan came in, and it had to come in, it was game over...they were on the run by late 1942, at the same time Germany was, and Italy was pretty much out of the fight by then, people tend to forget that...and people tend to overlook that it was pretty much only the Brit Empire and Soviets who put the Axis in that position...1 pretty much out, 1 lagging badly, and 1 embarrassed at the end of the first round.
As I told you, you assume that once Japan attacked the USA Hitler had to declare war on the USA. I know that is exactly what he did, but there was no practical reason for that. In fact, it was one of its biggest mistakes.
A couple of things, taking Moscow would mean nothing...politically, it wouldn't have done much more than make the Soviets a lot more bitter than they already were - and the main thing about the Russian character is that they revere their land. While the transport network point does have some validity, the Soviets were building infrastructure at a great rate...remember that they developed the necessary rail lines and support structure for the '42/'43 winter offensive in a period of weeks, in areas where there was nothing but barren step and frozen forest. Due to the equipment and doctrinal differences, the Axis forces were largely tied to the communication lines, the Soviets, with a more simplistic and robust system, were largely capable of operating away from it.
Not to mention even if the Germans did overwhelm the considerable defenses around Moscow but also incapacitate the Soviet leadership, Stalin and the bureaucracy can easily just move eastward to avoid that fate. The Germans would accomplish nothing other than expend resources into taking another large city centre. It's not like their logistical or strategic position would have been bolstered. The Soviets would even more readily launch an Operation Uranus on the Axis forces involved in such battle.
Also, considering the layout of Moscow, it would just be a far more difficult version of Stalingrad.
Anyway, both of you are focusing in on a passing comment I made about the fact that if the Soviet Union could be defeated, then Germany would be able to free up forces in order to defeat the Allies in other contested theaters, such as Africa. I was never saying that taking Egypt was the key to Germany winning the war. Personally, I think the Afrika Korps would have been better used on the Eastern Front, in the hope that Italy could hold out on its own. Risky, I know, but perhaps those few extra Panzer divisions, with Erwin Rommel at their head, could have possibly made the critical difference in the war against the Russians.
The failure of Africa would simply be replicated in the Eastern Front, one of unsupported logistical problems. Once Rommel ran out of steam he withdrew all the way back to Tripoli. The same tactical problems- encountering T-34s and long stretch of landmass, would simply have resulted. I also don't see how Rommel being in Russia would have made any "critical" difference: his successes were remaining on the offensive despite British indications that he was staying put. If anything, Barbarossa was simply Rommel's strategy at a grand scale...and while it worked in achieving tactical success, it was a strategic failures since the political expectations were not fulfilled as anticipated. To expect anything different with Rommel "at their head" (spearheading one front and not possibly all of them) is like expecting anything other than ketchup because you switched ketchup bottles. There's also the fact that ideologically speaking Rommel would have butt heads with the German leadership over treatment of Slavs. We also cannot expect similar results of his style of combat in the Russian steppes; the African wilderness did not have short days and long winters. And as stated, his operational capability, like with every general, are all limited by supply; considering the larger forces allocated for Barbarossa, there's probably even less chance of Rommel being able to make more gains than any other German commander.
However, as any Total War player knows, one can never underestimate the importance of moral, and the loss of Moscow would have certainly dealt a massive psychological blow to anyone living in the Soviet Union, at least excluding the ones already fanatical about the defense of their motherland.
There really hasn't been many examples of a regime collapsing simply because it's political centre was lost, causing it's military forces to lost cohesion. Only one example comes to mind and that is basically Persia after Alexander's victory at Gaugamela, but that's not a great example either since Persian resistance remained after much of the empire disintegrated in favour of the Macedonian king. In that case, the centrality of the head of state and his/her relationship with the rest of the government plays a significant role in how things turn out if governance was disrupted.
There may have been additional confusion and setbacks, but considering the logistical problems the Germans have, the Russians would have had plenty of time to muster a response, either in taking it back or counter-attacking or just fortifying their other positions. A LOT of the Soviet military resources went to Moscow's defense, and if Stavka knew if German intentions they would just re-allocate men and vehicles at a much faster pace than the Germans. Even if some inexplicable miracle allowed the Germans to take Moscow and plow the Russians into the ground in a straight up urban struggle (again, unlikely since the Soviets would just do a counter-attack to the besieging forces). Moscow is also situated on a river and over half of it, including the Kremlin, is on the eastern side; by comparison the entirety of Stalingrad hugs the western side of the Volga. By all accounts, taking Moscow would be significant harder, and Stalingrad was relatively unfortified once the Germans were steaming towards that fateful city. The rush of Soviet reinforcements was meant to bolster what was a significantly undefended portion of the front: Moscow never had this problem since it was bristling with defenses and remained so until Stalin realized that the Germans were putting all eyes onto the south and into the city bearing his name.
As for morale, it matters tremendously how Moscow wold be lost, ie if it was abandoned but with forces and government intact, one or the other destroyed, or most unlikely, both. Even the Germans didn't collapse until formal surrender in 1945 with Berlin overrun, and that was no capitulation strategy, it was pretty much the last of the Nazi political centres to fall.
One has to wonder if some of the diverse peoples that lay within the Soviet Union might have started questioning the legitimacy of a government that could not even defend its own capital, especially since many of them weren't too fond of the Soviets in the first place. Even if the Germans could not hold onto the city, the simple moral factor of capturing it, and then burning it to the ground while retreating to more defensible lines could have made many of the non-Russians in the Soviet Union significantly less enthusiastic about going to war for a regime that seemingly would not be in power for much longer.
Besides the fact that the Soviets had a tremendous internal security apparatus (on par with the SS) that would have continued to operate even if the central government was disrupted, these various peoples were also regularly suppressed, either passively or through force. We're not talking about a feudal establishment like the Persians or medieval states, but a modern authoritarian government that went through revolution and civil war, plus the Great War, that had a tremendous influence on its emphasis of state security. There's also the fact that, notwithstanding Soviet propaganda, there is little reason for these people to prefer brutal Nazi German rule over Soviet tyranny. Burning down Moscow after a significant battle in taking it would be a huge waste of resources, it would also presumably contradict Nazi plans to establish a reichkommissariat (shorthanded as colony) in the same locale.
If you want a significant psychological blow, it would be encirclement and siege of Moscow, which would also disrupt government function without even destroying it. But like I said, you can't really encircle one of the most fortified cities in Eurasia that also spans a river.
It hadnt mattered whether war with Britain would have dragged out or not. Same goes for the italians losing North Africa. What really mattered was the SU. Everything else is secondary (except for the USA getting into the war). If Barbarossa had worked and Germany has defeated the SU, Germany would have ruled Europe, and there wouldnt be much the Brithish Empire could do about it.
I don;t see how Germany somehow defeating the Soviet Union would end up ruling Europe, especially since they'd be exhausted from doing so, and still have work to do in consolidating their gains, which they barely did with earlier conquests. The visions of economic parity with the other world empires ignores the fact that it took years of development (or in modern terms, nation building); we cannot expect oil infrastructure and wheat fields to simply be handed over graciously, and partisan activity in both sides of Germany's empire were a significant problem. What the Germans needed to do was to move slower, not faster. But Hitler was not in control over the pace of expansion; Greece and Africa opened up because the Italians weren't pulling their weight. Nothing ever goes according to plan, and for someone like Hitler, adapting to disrupted plans was not his forte.
Regarding the german economy, it didnt mattered, as you can see by what happened IRL. When nations fight for their very survival, they always find ways to get the money or resources they need to keep on figthing.
What happened in real life was that Germany ran out of resources to keep fighting. And even if they weren't, sabotage and air raids make or break weak links in the chain of the military industry. Even though the bombing campaign was, relatively speaking, ineffective comparing the loss of men and planes involved, it demanded a great deal of resources to provide adequate air defense, and it wasn't like the Wehrmacht was having plenty to go around. The Atlantic was lost because there were frankly not enough U-boats, and not enough U-boat pens to sustain them adequately if there were. The Nazis leadership were also not fighting for their very survival, the organization of the Third Reich was in reality quite a feudal mess, and Himmler's enormous police regime didn't help, allocating resources more useful for military operations towards exterminating civilian populations without having to answer for it.
And Japan didnt go to war with everybody in 1941. Just with the allies, which, as much as it might hurt you, were the lesser partner regarding who fights Germany.
Pretty much the real reason the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour was so that the US Navy can't interfere with them attacking the British, French and Dutch colonies in South-east Asia. But I suppose you're right in the sense that they didn't fight "everybody" because the Soviets learned that they were doing just that, so instead of picking a fight with the Kwantung Army instead sent forces westward.
The Battle for Britain was meant to neutralize the British from the war, an objective that frankly failed. Hitler couldn't ignore the British threat as much as he couldn't ignore the French before he launched Case Yellow. It was not a matter of preventing the British from landing, it was a matter of not being starved into surrender by blockades and lack of resources. Getting terms from the British would have prevented all of these, but of course required the British to be knocked off their feet. If anything I'd say the inability to get agreement out of the British was a bigger factor in winning the war, since doing so prevented a second front and all focus put towards the Soviet Union.
I'm not sure what you mean by the British had nothing they could do, their very presence was a threat to Hitler's dream of a German empire. Going to war with the British was expected AFTER the Soviet Union was destroyed and autarky was achieved. Even if economic and manpower resources were meagre, the British and their aligned colonial forces were still in a position to attack whatever soft spots the Germans had from any direction in the world. That the British didn't have much to offer in terms of military strength (which factors in the contribution of the United States) doesn't matter much, because you can still be a huge thorn in ones side without having to continually lose men over it. It wasn't like Germany was flowing with men and materiel either, and the British were also counting on resistance groups like the French, Dutch and even Germans.
In short the British were in a much better economic position in both terms of actual economics plus potential over Germany. But it wasn't like Hitler was trying to get into a tussle with them first. Like I said, Hitler would have won the war if the war in its very nature turned out from the beginning to be very different, ie the British failed to declared war after Poland, which made no sense from the political and practical standpoint. By that time the British were ready for declaring war after what happened with Czechoslovakia. What mattered more, was what Hitler should not have done.
As for Japan and war against the US, the anti-Comintern Pact did not require Hitler to declare war on Germany, and whether due to underestimating American industry or just thinking the Americans are dumb folk, decided to do so, and at the worst time too. He could have easily just said "Whoa man don't drag me into that"
Corrected action is the most sincere form of apology.
As I pointed out earlier, the Soviet Union lost around 25 million people, half of them troops, and still managed to put together a force of 5 million for the battle of Berlin, as well as driving towards the North German Plain, Southern Germany and Austria, Czechoslavakia and into the Balkans, as well as guarding and administrating their rear areas, and building up a force to finish off the 1939 war against the Japanese. That's all a pretty impressive effort for a mob that the Germans considered on the ropes in 1941, and 1942, which leads me to think that perhaps the Germans may have been a little bit off the mark with their views on what it would take to win.
There is always something to be said for the 'if the Germans had treated the occupied zone Russians better' argument, but the fact is that they really couldn't do anything very differently...they had to lay the land waste, they had to loot anything they could, they had to have slave labour. The simple fact was that their wartime economy was a slave economy...they had so many troops on the line that any expansion could only be met through the use of foreign labour...either voluntary, or slave.
Plus, and I am harping on the point, but I will elaborate, the German gold reserves ran out in early 1943. The amount of gold held by Germany at the start of the war had been used for purchasing foreign supplies and resources, etc...at the end of the war, Germany had slightly more gold than what it started with...that is a historical fact, details of which were known at the time, as all international gold reserves are required to be known internationally so that comparative exchange rates can be developed and implemented. The exact implications of that, are that for the entire duration of the war, the Germans effectively used gold from two sources - the gold reserves of the nations they conquered, and the gold reserves of peoples and individuals they persecuted...Let me stress that I am not leading this debate onto contentious or political grounds, simply clearly pointing out the economics of the war.
How was that accomplished? Quite simply through the then international banking system, with the tacit agreement of a number of neutral nations, including a number that later came into the war. That aspect was only fully understand in the late 1990's when business records of certain large international banks were obtained through legal action.
The simple fact was that Germany had to wage an aggressive war of conquest, once Britain failed to sue for peace. Undoubtedly the attack on the Balkans and the Soviet Union was a bad decision, but the Germans had to go into the Balkans to bail out Italy who was getting hammered by the Greeks...similarly, the Germans had to go into North Africa, because the Italians were in the process of losing their North African territories.
Just as, in late 1941, the Japanese had to go to war against the colonial powers in South East Asia and the Pacific (including the US as a colonial power), simply because its' war machine was grinding towards a halt due to lack of resources (various minerals, rubber, oil, etc)...and again, much of what Japan achieved during the war was done through slave labour, although whether that was a matter of convenience or necessity is still a matter for debate (the end result was the same though).
The question is, if Germany had not declared war on the US, would the US have gone to war against Germany? And, secondly, would it have mattered?
I'll answer the second part first: No, it wouldn't have. Proof: The Soviet Union launched five million men at Berlin in April 1945, with the vast majority of the equipment and supplies home grown Soviet gear. Plus they had another eight odd million doing a few other things at the same time, like overrunning eastern and central europe, and preparing to take Mongolia.
First question? I can't say for certain, but I expect they would. The US was already expanding aero-naval bases through the Atlantic, and was actively patrolling further out, and they were having brushes with the Uboats...keep in mind the sinking of the Reuben James was not received well in the US.
Edit: On top of which, the US needed Brit Empire and French and Dutch co-operation for their southern pacific and Phillipines operations. MacArthur didn't have many US troops until 1944, and fought most of his battles with Australian troops till then, also, his logistical tail was completely based in Australia...No fight war against Germany, no base in Australia without massive concessions.
Second post, sorry...too much to say to edit the above one.
To add fuel to the debate, be aware that the critical phase of the Battle of the Atlantic came in early 1943, prior to US involvement in anything other than individual ships beyond their coastal waters. The back of the Uboat menace was broken, and technical and doctrinal developments by the Allies (primarily Britain, at that time), prevented the Uboats from becoming a critical threat from that point on.
Further, if the British had to continue the fight as the remaining Western Ally, it is highly probable that the 'bomber dream' would have been realised - a force of two to two and a half thousand heavy night bombers to devastate Germany...combined with a massively increased light night bomber and intruder force, essentially to harry the German defences. Certainly, there is some validity in the argument that the Luftwaffe could put up a solid defence, but by late '44 and '45 the day and night fighter forces were being sucked into both the day and night battles - planes were basically being used 24/7, and were really only effective in good intercept conditions, and in large numbers...being attacked by multiple raids, during periods of poor intercept conditions, would have seriously degraded chances of success.
With increasing improvements in technology and doctrine, the RAF night bomber force expanded in both capability and destructiveness. Accuracy was vastly improved, and the German cities never had to face attack from the 'grand slam' cavitation bombs...if they had, it is quite probable that many areas of some cities would have been rendered uninhabitable.
Again, though, the Germans would have had to face the Soviets, as well as maintaining credible defences on the western front, and battle a night bomber force of increasing effectiveness.
The US pan-American zone of protection extended as far as the Iceland and would convoy ships that far out. That was April of 1941. The idea that US shipping and protection didn't exist sounds a bit much.
There is also the involvement of the production of Liberty transport ships built to UK's naval needs. They were built between 1941-1945. By 1943 3 such ships were completed almost daily.
If you want to take the position that the US military or industrial might wasn't needed to accomplish the war and that the UK had vast untapped potential. You are allowed to think that. Just realize that Mass starvation in the Indian and African colonies was becoming a real thing even with US involvement. The collapse into the commonwealth nations of today is a direct result of those decisions. The British Empire was gathering everything it had to mount a credible defense / offensive stance. Especially after the loss of the equipment from Dunkirk.
"You have raised assorted issues under what might be termed a “I-don’t-like-it because-I-say-it’s-not-historical” banner. This isn't quite the same as "justified", I'm sorry to say." -MikeB
My point was that the turn around point for the war was largely before US involvement became marked.
In respect to the US contribution, in the first five months of 1942, the USN sank 1 Uboat, whereas the entire UBoat successes for that period exceeded the total tonnage sunk for 1941. Eventually, later in 1942, the USN had to borrow anti-submarine ships of the Royal Navy, form convoys off its' own coasts, and alter doctrine to convoy protection, rather than offensive sweeps.
Until the turn around point in the Battle of the Atlantic with the battle for convoys HX229 and SC122, responsibility for convoy protection for the western Atlantic was predominantly a Canadian responsibility.
I don;t see how Germany somehow defeating the Soviet Union would end up ruling Europe, especially since they'd be exhausted from doing so, and still have work to do in consolidating their gains, which they barely did with earlier conquests. The visions of economic parity with the other world empires ignores the fact that it took years of development (or in modern terms, nation building); we cannot expect oil infrastructure and wheat fields to simply be handed over graciously, and partisan activity in both sides of Germany's empire were a significant problem. What the Germans needed to do was to move slower, not faster. But Hitler was not in control over the pace of expansion; Greece and Africa opened up because the Italians weren't pulling their weight. Nothing ever goes according to plan, and for someone like Hitler, adapting to disrupted plans was not his forte.
You dont see how Germany defeating the SU would end up ruling Europe? That is like saying that you dont see how Chelsea might win the Premier after having scored an average of 3 goals per match.
Anyway, there would be nobody left to fight in the continent. It would be like Napoleons Empire but with no Russia to be the grave of his army. You can think that, since the BE would still be alive, Germany wouldnt have won, but lets be serious, Germany would have achieved all its objectives, and it would be in a very, very strong position, while the BE one would be exactly the same (well, worse, since it wouldnt have France as a full ally) as before the war.
What happened in real life was that Germany ran out of resources to keep fighting. And even if they weren't, sabotage and air raids make or break weak links in the chain of the military industry. Even though the bombing campaign was, relatively speaking, ineffective comparing the loss of men and planes involved, it demanded a great deal of resources to provide adequate air defense, and it wasn't like the Wehrmacht was having plenty to go around. The Atlantic was lost because there were frankly not enough U-boats, and not enough U-boat pens to sustain them adequately if there were. The Nazis leadership were also not fighting for their very survival, the organization of the Third Reich was in reality quite a feudal mess, and Himmler's enormous police regime didn't help, allocating resources more useful for military operations towards exterminating civilian populations without having to answer for it.
Germany run out of resources at the very end, because the resource locations were being overrun by the soviets (in a world were the soviets had been defeated this would not have happened) In fact, Germanys industrial production peaked in 1944, no matter the bombings and soviet victories. I agree that the highest leaders of nazi Germany were quite an inept bunch (Hitler, Goering and Himmler. Goebbels was very good at his job) but after Schadt took control of production, the german industry began to take off.
It was not a matter of preventing the British from landing, it was a matter of not being starved into surrender by blockades and lack of resources. Getting terms from the British would have prevented all of these, but of course required the British to be knocked off their feet. If anything I'd say the inability to get agreement out of the British was a bigger factor in winning the war, since doing so prevented a second front and all focus put towards the Soviet Union.
With Europe at his feet there was no way Hitler could be "starved into surrender by blockades and lack of resources". In fact, given that after defeating the SU Germanys only enemy would be the BE, the UK position would worsen a lot, since a good part of Germanys resources could have been devoted to the UBoat campaign.
I didnt say that the BE staying in the war after the defeat at France wasnt important. What I said was that IF Germany had knocked the SU out of the war, then the BE possibilities to defeat Germany would be almost zero.
I'm not sure what you mean by the British had nothing they could do, their very presence was a threat to Hitler's dream of a German empire. Going to war with the British was expected AFTER the Soviet Union was destroyed and autarky was achieved. Even if economic and manpower resources were meagre, the British and their aligned colonial forces were still in a position to attack whatever soft spots the Germans had from any direction in the world. That the British didn't have much to offer in terms of military strength (which factors in the contribution of the United States) doesn't matter much, because you can still be a huge thorn in ones side without having to continually lose men over it. It wasn't like Germany was flowing with men and materiel either, and the British were also counting on resistance groups like the French, Dutch and even Germans.
The BE could be a thorn in germanys side, true. But reflect on what you said for a moment. Not a mortal, dangerous enemy. A thorn. Something annoying but with no power to finish you off. And, as I said, the BE could be a thorn in Germanys side just as Germany could be a thorn in the BE side (UBoat campaign).
As I told you, just think about the times the brithish tried to get a foothold in the continent. Only in Overlord they were succesful. And that with US help AND HUGE soviet forces attacking in the East. Now take the US and SU forces away and tell me what the BE could have realistically do. And resistance groups, could be a thorn (again) but all by themselves there was nothing they could do. The 1944 polish rising is good proof of that.
I think you overestimate Germany's capability to passify such a large portion of the continent, particularly due to the Third Reich's hostile attitude towards its eastern populations - an attitude that immediately alienated any potential support or passive acceptance of German rule. The Polish uprising may have failed, but that's only one event of many events. Germany would have exhausted itself after years of attempting to control such a vast expanse of territory and attempting to put down similar uprisings throughout Central and Eastern Europe, while also attempting to exterminate these peoples. The Third Reich was not built with firm supporting structures made to last- its brief existence reflects its weak economic, social and political architecture that was only strong enough to support a few years of devastating warfare.
With Europe at his feet there was no way Hitler could be "starved into surrender by blockades and lack of resources". In fact, given that after defeating the SU Germanys only enemy would be the BE, the UK position would worsen a lot, since a good part of Germanys resources could have been devoted to the UBoat campaign.
But that's exactly what happened in WW1... Germany and Austria-Hungary owned most of Europe, yet they were both starved and bled into submission. Britain's empire was a ready source of resources and manpower, whereas Germany's Europe was nothing but a huge, hostile liability that they were intent to waste time and resources on on exterminating.
Battle not with Canadians, lest ye become a Canadian, and if ye gaze into the maple syrup, the maple syrup gazes also into you.
I think you overestimate Germany's capability to passify such a large portion of the continent, particularly due to Third Reich's hostile attitude towards its eastern populations - an attitude that immediately alienated any potential support or passive acceptance of German rule. The Polish uprising may have failed, but that's only one event of many events. Germany would have exhausted itself after years of attempting to control such a vast expanse of territory and attempting to put down similar uprisings throughout Central and Eastern Europe, while also attempting to exterminate these peoples. The Third Reich was not built on stable grounds made to last- its brief existence reflects its weak economic, social and political architecture that was only strong enough to support a few years of devastating warfare.
The only part that should be pacified should be East Europe, as that was the part Hitler really wanted to subdue and annex. And we all know what he did with those populations he couldnt subdue so resistance movements in East Europe, while annoying, would not last much. All along history I cant find a single case of an enemy defeated only by guerrilla warfare. And you can find many, many instances where an enemy has finally defeated a guerrilla movement.
PS. I guess Afghanistan could qualify, as there was no regular army of any kind, but it is the only instance I can think about.
But that's exactly what happened in WW1... Germany and Austria-Hungary owned most of Europe, yet they were both starved and bled into submission. Britain's empire was a ready source of resources and manpower, whereas Germany's Europe was nothing but a huge, hostile liability that they were intent to waste time and resources on on exterminating.
No, the CP didnt own half of Europe. Far from that. In fact, it was the Entente the one that had a big superiority in landmass. On top of that, agriculture had seen its production per kms. increased dramatically since WW I. That is why during WW II you didnt see the german population starving the way it happened during WW I.
And Britain couldnt afford to behave the way Nazis and Commies behaved. Basically Britain couldnt "harvest" manpower the way Germany and the SU did nor could forget about casualties as much as the soviets, and to a lesser extent the germans, did. It couldnt do it on cultural and moral grounds.
You dont see how Germany defeating the SU would end up ruling Europe? That is like saying that you dont see how Chelsea might win the Premier after having scored an average of 3 goals per match.
Germany defeating the Soviets would still have to deal with the western Allies, who in the meantime were already giving them hell. Even ruling western Europe the Germans had to expend a great deal of resources to fend off the strategic bombing they were conducting in the meantime before Normandy. Victory over the Soviets is one thing, how the Germans capitalize on that victory, what conditions were occurring during and after victory, and WHEN that victory actually occurs matter quite a lot, since these are real prerequisites to "ruling Europe".
I don't watch football, but in any case that is grossly over-generalizing what is ultimately a very complex scenario in WW2's Europe.
Anyway, there would be nobody left to fight in the continent. It would be like Napoleons Empire but with no Russia to be the grave of his army. You can think that, since the BE would still be alive, Germany wouldnt have won, but lets be serious, Germany would have achieved all its objectives, and it would be in a very, very strong position, while the BE one would be exactly the same (well, worse, since it wouldnt have France as a full ally) as before the war.
The Germans had plenty to fight in parts of the continent that they ruled. The French resistance, bombings and commando raids, the numerous fronts in other parts of the world, all demand economic and strategic efforts that only expand as the Germans take more of it. If the French and Polish weren't actively fighting, they offered aid in the form of intelligence to the Allies. The Polish were keenly aware of the German cryptography program, for instance.
Germany run out of resources at the very end, because the resource locations were being overrun by the soviets (in a world were the soviets had been defeated this would not have happened) In fact, Germanys industrial production peaked in 1944, no matter the bombings and soviet victories. I agree that the highest leaders of nazi Germany were quite an inept bunch (Hitler, Goering and Himmler. Goebbels was very good at his job) but after Schadt took control of production, the german industry began to take off.
Running out of resources wasn't the only issue, it was disruption of production. In any case, defeat of the Soviet Union would not have nullified these problems, but that depends a lot on how the Soviets were defeated and in the manner the Germans capitalized on this victory. They can't just start shoving all their troops into trains to head straight for France or Africa, especially if the Germans continued the operational successes of Barbarossa where large pockets of Soviets remained behind front lines to cause trouble.
Germany's production also peaked in response to growing wartime constraints, not because things were going well or that it was an inevitability. By 1944 the Germans were clearly losing war, not winning it. It would actually make less political sense to up your war economy as your primary strategic- and ideological- enemy was destroyed.
With Europe at his feet there was no way Hitler could be "starved into surrender by blockades and lack of resources". In fact, given that after defeating the SU Germanys only enemy would be the BE, the UK position would worsen a lot, since a good part of Germanys resources could have been devoted to the UBoat campaign.
Germany was still having economic problems even after tremendous gains over three years. The Germans never took advantage out of the economic conditions they supplied themselves until it was too late. And remember, the upping of war economy occurred without every really taking over Russia or defeating the Soviet Union. If anything, the continued conquest of the East produced the opposite effect of Hitler's intended dream for Germany's economy, rather than assuring it. Amount of resources produced is also at most half of the equation, it is also wise use. Hitler did neither, it wouldn't have mattered if the Soviets were, somehow, defeated, especially if that didn't change. And it didn't, not until as you say 1944 when it was too late.
I didnt say that the BE staying in the war after the defeat at France wasnt important. What I said was that IF Germany had knocked the SU out of the war, then the BE possibilities to defeat Germany would be almost zero.
The British by themselves perhaps, but the British were never on their own. They had French, Polish and eventually American aid in numerous forms. There were also other non-aligned forces that fought against the Axis as well, including what would eventually be Tito's Yugoslavia. They also didn't need to just defeat Germany, nothing can definitely prove that Germany would not have collapse given the way the political and social structure was organized. It was that country's leadership that was problematic of all things, and that's going to have huge implications on how you fight wars and run economies and enact foreign policy. Chelsea can only score three goals per match if they didn't have hair-brained coaches or teammates that won't pass the ball because they want the glory for themselves. If anything it was a surprise that Germany remained organized as it were despite even internal German military resistance that eventually culminated to the July 20 plot. Even the army's intelligence department was pretty much a resistance movement.
The BE could be a thorn in germanys side, true. But reflect on what you said for a moment. Not a mortal, dangerous enemy. A thorn. Something annoying but with no power to finish you off. And, as I said, the BE could be a thorn in Germanys side just as Germany could be a thorn in the BE side (UBoat campaign).
You can have a thorn in your side and still survive, or fall. Partisans were a thorn in the Germans' side but they were either destroyed, assimilated into Soviet forces, or fought both. The bomber campaign could not have possibly win the war by itself, but it didn't have to, and defeating the Soviet Union would not have changed that. As long as Goering kept misusing his Luftwaffe, the German's air force would have been crippled and allowed a major strategic advantage in any operations, as Normandy has proven. Remember that the battle of Britain was eventually called off for the same reason; thorns can't kill, but they can cripple.
As I told you, just think about the times the brithish tried to get a foothold in the continent. Only in Overlord they were succesful. And that with US help AND HUGE soviet forces attacking in the East. Now take the US and SU forces away and tell me what the BE could have realistically do. And resistance groups, could be a thorn (again) but all by themselves there was nothing they could do. The 1944 polish rising is good proof of that.
You forgot about losing Italy before Normandy.
The problem with your analysis is that it depends entirely on unrealistic hypotheses like, besides winning over Russia, the Americans never end up joining or even providing materials for either side, and requires isolating the British from any outside help. A factor that is not connected with whether the Germans win in the East, and yet has to be factored in as a consequence. IF the British stood alone then you have a case, but why on earth would that ever happen considering the scenarios and the backgrounds to them? The Germans relied on satellite parties to control countries like Bulgaria and Hungary, this is because they cannot afford to occupy them as if they were enemy states. The Germans controlled a lot of Europe yes, but it was because they were gambling on them not throwing off their yoke. We're not talking iron grip here, we're talking subordinates that prefer anything besides living under Soviet heels.
What you CAN argue is the plight of these satellites after Germany withdrew, the Soviets marched in and without Allied help they were assimilated as Soviet satellites. The Soviet Union however is a much different monster than Nazi Germany.
The only part that should be pacified should be East Europe, as that was the part Hitler really wanted to subdue and annex. And we all know what he did with those populations he couldnt subdue so resistance movements in East Europe, while annoying, would not last much. All along history I cant find a single case of an enemy defeated only by guerrilla warfare. And you can find many, many instances where an enemy has finally defeated a guerrilla movement.
That's what the Germans thought, but the French had different ideas. Hitler wasn't exactly someone you can look to for realistic long-term planning. He was a visionary, but had little practical experience to kind of work and knowledge required to make them reality, he was never a guy that liked details.
The resistance movements were not anticipated and while not a gigantic detriment to conquest was nevertheless complicated the strategy of Generalplan Ost. Like Hitler's strategic blunder in considering the Americans as meek and greedy, he underestimated the capabilities of peoples he considered inferior sub-humans.
Corrected action is the most sincere form of apology.
The only part that should be pacified should be East Europe, as that was the part Hitler really wanted to subdue and annex. And we all know what he did with those populations he couldnt subdue so resistance movements in East Europe, while annoying, would not last much. All along history I cant find a single case of an enemy defeated only by guerrilla warfare. And you can find many, many instances where an enemy has finally defeated a guerrilla movement.
You're equating a brief moment of military victory over hostiles with permanent German domination, almost as if this were a video game where you get a "You are teh winnar" screen the moment you destroy the last enemy Barracks in the corner of the map. But this is a matter of actually maintaining, controlling, subduing, organizing on a vast scale. You must control a vast expanse of land with dozens of millions of hostile peoples who are not at all pleased with the German occupation. It doesn't just arbitrarily end in German victory once X is captured. And like I said, the Third Reich was a flimsy thing - it lacked the necessary structures in place to actually maintain power over such a vast expanse of land. Simply rolling into the Ukraine with a few tanks doesn't mean the German economy or political system was healthy or would have the strength necessary to survive for long under the weight of trying to rule so much of Europe with so few men. The Germans had no structures in place to actually ensure that their empire would last for a significant period of time... collapse was inevitable.
The Soviets were only capable of conquering half of Europe, because they had a far larger army than the Germans, they were far better equipped than the Germans by that point, and the peoples of Europe genuinely wanted change and the Soviets offered them the prospect of change.
No, the CP didnt own half of Europe. Far from that. In fact, it was the Entente the one that had a big superiority in landmass.
I've never seen a map yet where the Central Powers didn't dominate the European continent.
Europe Map WW1.jpg Just look at the size of that grey!
world-war-1-map-of-europe-in-1914-5418.jpg
Simply owning a huge portion of Europe didn't assure their victory.
On top of that, agriculture had seen its production per kms. increased dramatically since WW I.
Want to back that up?
Farming Techniques.jpg
As far as I know food production barely changed from 1914-1970. We're only seeing the current increases in production thanks to the democratisation of the automobile in the form of farm machine equipment and sophisticated techniques for increasing crop yields (ie direct genetic manipulation). Both would only become realities after WW2.
The 'occupied areas' of the SU were never pacified...it took massive numbers of troops and 'security formations' just to secure the main lines of communications, and in fact the term 'occupied area' largely consisted of aerial observation and odd recconnaisance patrols. The Germans pretty much established defended localities, and maintained patrols between them, where possible. The Pripyat Marshes were never seriously penetrated by the German forces during the entire war, and still had Soviet regular army formations operating in them, as well as Soviet civil administration.
I don't think anyone has actually worked out what would constitute 'defeat' of the Soviet Union...it would be either capitulation, which didn't happen, and seems unlikely to occur; or it would be destruction of the ability for the Soviets to continue to wage war, which didn't happen and seems unlikely to be able to occur.
While I don't deny the massive contribution of the US to the European War, it needs to be seen in context of the timeline...and in that view, it didn't really make a major impact, relatively speaking, until 1944. Certainly, US forces contributed in a major way to North Africa and Italy campaigns, but by the same token, the BE forces still had large numbers of troops that had not been committed sitting available in the UK.
You're equating a brief moment of military victory over hostiles with permanent German domination, almost as if this were a video game where you get a "You are teh winnar" screen the moment you destroy the last enemy Barracks in the corner of the map. But this is a matter of actually maintaining, controlling, subduing, organizing on a vast scale. You must control a vast expanse of land with dozens of millions of hostile peoples who are not at all pleased with the German occupation. It doesn't just arbitrarily end in German victory once X is captured. And like I said, the Third Reich was a flimsy thing - it lacked the necessary structures in place to actually maintain power over such a vast expanse of land. Simply rolling into the Ukraine with a few tanks doesn't mean the German economy or political system was healthy or would have the strength necessary to survive for long under the weight of trying to rule so much of Europe with so few men. The Germans had no structures in place to actually ensure that their empire would last for a significant period of time... collapse was inevitable.
The Soviets were only capable of conquering half of Europe, because they had a far larger army than the Germans, they were far better equipped than the Germans by that point, and the peoples of Europe genuinely wanted change and the Soviets offered them the prospect of change.
I know that large number of military forces should be available to control the occupied landmass (modern day Poland, Bielorus, Ukraine, Baltic countries and parts of Russia) but it is not something different the germans did irl BUT with the big, big, big "bonus" of not having the Red Army in front of you (as in my scenario Barbarossa is a success and the SU surrenders. And, I should add, the nazis get a good chunk of Soviet Europe. And probably trade deals with the remaniing SU to get resources it cant get any other way).
With the SU defeated, the Wehrmatch would have lots of "spare units" to control the recently annexed areas AND fortify the Atlantic Wall. I dont see enlarging the Afrikakorps as a big option because the italian capacity to supply the forces already present was low.
I've never seen a map yet where the Central Powers didn't dominate the European continent.
You are taking a map of 1917, just before Russia surrendered. The newly conquered territories didnt produce much (just as it happened during WW II also). I was talking about "core" landmass (the national territory). The Entente powers one was 4 or 5 times as big.
As far as I know food production barely changed from 1914-1970. We're only seeing the current increases in production thanks to the democratisation of the automobile in the form of farm machine equipment and sophisticated techniques for increasing crop yields (ie direct genetic manipulation). Both would only become realities after WW2.
That the german population didnt starve as it happened during WW I is a fact. And that considering that Germany was equally blockaded and, on top of that, being subjected to bombing. A part of it was due to starving other populations (The East ones. Nazis took the food from those areas to Germany, and let them starve), and a part was due to increases in agricultural yield. A SU defeat would have made it easier for the nazis to exploit the newly conquered territories.
While I don't deny the massive contribution of the US to the European War, it needs to be seen in context of the timeline...and in that view, it didn't really make a major impact, relatively speaking, until 1944. Certainly, US forces contributed in a major way to North Africa and Italy campaigns, but by the same token, the BE forces still had large numbers of troops that had not been committed sitting available in the UK.
By 1944 (for Overlord) the BE used the last units it had in reserve. After that, it struggled to find replacements.
Some people seem to think that, as the BE was very large and very populated (600 million at the wars outbreak, iirc), it could muster large parts of its population, just as the SU or Nazi Germany did (thus getting an army larger than the german or even the soviet one). Well, that was NOT the case.
The USA didnt simply make a "major contribution" since 1944. The US was the MAIN participant since 1944 in the NorthWest Europe and Pacific theatres (in the Pacific since 1941).
On any case, the main enemy of Nazi Germany during WW II was, by far, the SU. Approximately 3 out of every 4 soldiers, AFVs, planes and resources were sent to fight to the Eastern front (and that since 1944. Before that year Nazi Germany and most Axis countries were sending almost all of it resources to be killed/destroyed in the East front)
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I am not sure just what you disagree with.
Barbarosaa working depends a lot on whether Barbarossa as originally planned, or Barbarossa in it's intentions, That is to say, immediate destruction of Soviet armies and anticipated Soviet collapse within months or weeks of commencement, or eventual conquest of western Russia at an undetermined date, preferably before the US enters the war or the other Western Allies produce problems on other fronts. The actual plans of a prompt defeat of the Soviet Union carried a great deal of presumptions like the Soviets standing their ground ad to risk being destroyed (which occured in some cases but not all), or of course a collapse of cohesion as the Germans wreaked havoc.
None of these required war, declared or declaring on, against the United States. In fact Hitler could have just manipulated things and disowned the Japanese for their actions.
If the Germans' high command had much authority over the production of the armoured vehicles it would have just been consistently overruled by Hitler.
Development of both heavy and medium tanks stared before the war, and nothing suggested to the Germans up until Barbarossa that they needed anything else. Now if they did have intelligence on tanks like the T-34 and KV series, and barring irrational sense of superiority, then they might have been encouraged to up the production speeds.
But what you suggest ignores a lot of tactical considerations. For one, few tank designs by the Germans were failures, and the Tiger and King Tiger for their worth were very powerful and feared vehicles. It made little economic sense yes, but they remained tactically effective. The Germans needed more of everything, not simply less of certain ones in favour of others. Panthers for their part had their share of mechanical problems. The reason why Panther production went over the Tiger's, was because the latter eventually dropped since they did realize, despite it's reputation and capability, that it was a dead-end. But you can't come to that conclusion without having done the hard work, the Germans had no way of knowing that the Tiger would eventually not mean much in the long run, especially given how powerful it's performance was; logistics, training and other tactical considerations like air support also play a role in how effective armoured vehicles are, and these aren't things Tiger tanks have control over. In the end, if the Germans had enough of anything they would have won the war; they lost because they never did.
Moreover, the Russians were doing more than just T-34 spam. In fact T-34s were great in their simple yet innovative design, but in nearly every other case, they proved operationally inferior to German counterparts. The Soviets however had the economic advantage of producing many of them, and can afford to make upgrades. They also weren't idle in their design evolution either- whatever new toys the Germans threw to the field, the Soviets adapted and built effective counters.
As for USA entering the war, it was inevitable, there's no way you can fight the British in the Atlantic and not have any tangles with the US, a historical and contemporary ally that was actively shipping to the UK. Besides Hitler's view of Americans, he also didn't no much on the diplomatic/ political side to minimize likelihood of their involvement- you can quote his declaration of war after Pearl Harbour as a primary example. But its not like the US wouldn't just find a a reason to go to war either.
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0 · Disagree AgreeI'm not assuming anything...it's a historical fact that Germany declared war on the US. It wouldn't have mattered to the win or lose equation in any case.
The Soviets and Brit Empire were winning the ground war by late '42...it just would have meant that the war in Europe may have lasted longer, and Germany would have been completely wrecked, rather than just key cities...you may also have seen most of western Europe under the Soviet boot. I would suggest that a successful revolution would have occurred in Germany first though...they were terrified of the Soviets.
Japan would still have been nuked.
Keep in mind that the German economy and industry relied massively on slave labour and stolen gold, money and valuables...they had to expand simply to supply the labour, finances and resources. It was entirely possible that the free world could have put a freeze on the German use of the sequested Swiss bank accounts, the occupied nation gold reserves, and international money transfer.
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0 · Disagree AgreeThe thread was about what Germany might have done to win the war, not about what would happen if everything happened again (we all agree that with the USA and the SU at war, Germany had no chance of winning). That is why I said that one of the two things Germany should have done is not declaring war on the USA.
On any case, the nuke point may well be moot, since it was made in 1945. Too late to affect the outcome in most possible scenarios
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0 · Disagree AgreeAs for Japan, they were pretty much screwed.
- General George Patton (1885-1945)
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0 · Disagree AgreeSince the first responses by daelin and Madea, I've been glancing at them and promising myself to get back to them as soon as I have the time (which I haven't due to a big paper that I just finished) on top of other school work. But obviously this thread has been very successful.
So I am typing the following response as a work in progress, as I have yet to read all of your 'Walls of text' yet, so im initially going to respond to the first few responses; and edit this post as I read more of the thread.
First though, a couple of clarifications:
1) I've noticed a lot of references to Japan, so ill modify my original conditions to allow discussing Japan only as to how the war in Asia would potentially have a direct effect on the War in Europe. This means things like the common What if? of Japan attacking the USSR in support of Barbarossa.
2) I know daelin said in his first response something about my statement regarding 'only military; no political-economic'. Well, I know this daelin, I know the critical importance of political and economic aspects of war, especially this one, I only put that in there because I felt obligated to place some sort of disclaimer, as talking about WWII on this scale could bring potential problems of users violating the forum rules. You all know what I mean by this, so I just felt I was obligated to make some effort to try and focus this only on military related efforts.
So, now my preliminary responses, from the first page:
I know I made the error of not clarifying a victory condition for the Axis to win, my apologies, but I think the thread is far enough along where I don't need to add one to the OP.
But given Hitler's reasons for war, it seems that total defeat of the Soviets would be a satisfactory goal in the short run for him. I think arguing 'If Germany did not attack Russia, they would have won the war' is a pointless argument. My dad argues that all the time when I discuss WWII with him, I have to make it clear to him that Hitler was not hell bent on fighting the west, one way or another he WAS going to attack the USSR.
Attacking the west in 1940 was no doubt done to get the Allies off Germany's back in preparation for the march east. I think the incredible victory over France has been the key piece of evidence that gives a lot of people the belief that Germany could have won the war, but, I tend to be in agreement with daelin and others for the most part, given a 1939 start point, Germany could not have won the war.
The entry of the US certainly meant that Germany's war with the west had now become unwinnable, at least not without horrendous losses and a very tense and uneasy armistice (not a true victory).
Fun Fact: Hitler' declaration of War on the United States was the only official declaration of war he ever did. All others were ether surprise attacks or having war declared on him (really just France and British Empire in 1939)
But of course with the Allies' demand of unconditional surrender in 1943 meant that there was little if any chance of an armistice. I think the only chance of an armistice (a very slim one) of that would have been a total success of an anti-Nazi revolt within Germany to overthrow the regime, and even then the war with the USSR would probably not have ended.
As Maeda said 'if the Nazis didn't act like Nazis'. The very nature of Germany under the leadership of the time assured that Germany was going to lose the war.
I will always respect differing opinions on here, so long as they are presented maturely and in a civil manner
"No Battleplan ever survives contact with the enemy"- Helmuth Von Moltke the Elder
The WWI Thread: https://forums.totalwar.com/discussion/30914/why-a-world-war-i-themed-total-war/p1
I'm skipping TW: Warhammer
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0 · Disagree AgreeEnd of the day Hitler took some steps that caused the British and French to declare war, a step that Hitler was willing to risk Germany and millions of lives for. And doing so without even safeguarding the nation through economic or even international consolidation he was very foolish.
If anything, Hitler not making war onto other countries would have assured victory in the event he was forced into one, re Soviets invade first. Of course given Poland and the Soviets, there's little reason to presume the Allies would help out quickly enough.
Corrected action is the most sincere form of apology.
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0 · Disagree AgreeThat's some pretty bold assumptions.
Once Germany invaded Poland, it pretty much lost the war...there is no way in hades that the British Empire would capitulate, and certainly the dominions were prepared to oust Churchill or any Brit Prime Minister if they considered it (most dominion prime ministers didn't think much of him, privately, and most dominion troops had no time for him...the King, yes, Churchill, no).
Many people look at the Brit Empire as just Britain...it wasn't, and in fact the main forces of the Empire were barely deployed against Germany...notwithstanding manpower, there was massive economic resources to draw on, which in fact the US relied on for much of its' Pacific drive. The manpower resources in India and Africa were barely touched, and the 'european' dominion forces had far less than a quarter of their forces in action for most of the war.
Once Japan came in, and it had to come in, it was game over...they were on the run by late 1942, at the same time Germany was, and Italy was pretty much out of the fight by then, people tend to forget that...and people tend to overlook that it was pretty much only the Brit Empire and Soviets who put the Axis in that position...1 pretty much out, 1 lagging badly, and 1 embarrassed at the end of the first round.
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0 · Disagree AgreeWe are now entering the twilight zone....beware the giant aztec bird-headed monster gods...
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0 · Disagree AgreeWhat made the victories over France and the BEF possible were largely due to the Allies' poor performance and the fact that strategically speaking these weren't terrible setbacks. Britain's army or navy was not crushed so there is little reason for any German general to consider them beaten for good. France capitulated of course, but also led to the Germans occupying the place, which drew on military resources that could otherwise have been used elsewhere. And it wasn't like they made an GeneralOst style of plan for France either, if anything the occupation was ad hoc and symbolic of triumph over historical grievances. Whatever the case Hitler did nothing on the political or diplomatic side to soothe relations with the West, something he would have to do if he was to go against Russia and not have the British or French come back at him, something that's mor or less impossible in the first place since it all started with the invasion and occupation of their military ally, Poland.
Contemplating anything to avoid the Polish debacle requires Hitler abandoning his ideological vision of a German-dominated Eastern Europe. It really all comes down to his personality- he likes war, loves waging war, and wants to rage it out against Poles, Jews, Slavs and communists first; the British and the French were a secondary necessity.
As for the US, I've come to conclude that Hitler simply didn't think that far ahead. He's not exactly the wise or educated type of man. Wowing audience with your screaming down from the pulpit only make you look like a good leader. He had WW1 to read up on and consider adapting to.
Corrected action is the most sincere form of apology.
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0 · Disagree Agree1. Operation Barbarossa succeeds, through a variety of factors discussed before.
2. Hitler essentially ignores his allies and doesn't declare war on America after Pearl Harbor or let Operation Barbarossa get delayed by helping the Italians.
From these assumptions, all else follows. With the Soviet Union defeated, and American help still limited to Lend Lease, then Germany would be able to turn its full attention upon Great Britain. Operation Sealion still probably couldn't happen, but with many of the men previously on the Eastern Front now freed up, it would be pretty much impossible for Britain to hold onto Egypt, thus closing off the Suez canal and forcing them to go around Africa to get to the rest of their Empire. In this situation, defeat is pretty much inevitable for Great Britain, and they would likely negotiate for peace eventually. As for the German economy, it is true that in a war footing that it would have crashed eventually, but the war would likely have been won by then assuming the conditions above. Especially considering that in the final years of the war German industrial production actually increased, due to the policies of Albert Speer.
- General George Patton (1885-1945)
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0 · Disagree AgreeI can't see how Barbarossa could win, the Germans didn't manage to defeat Russia in WW1, it collapsed from within, and under the Soviet regime the country was far more stable and focussed against foreign invasion than under the czars. On top of that, the Soviets had massive success in withdrawing their industry into Siberia, before the 1942 offensive. The Soviets lost @25 million people during the war, and in 1945 had more than twice as many men to attack just Berlin, than the Axis had for the start of Barbarossa...those figures alone answer the question OP posed.
Throughout the war, the Germans never succeeded in pacifying the occupied Soviet territories - people under partisan and Red Army protection were still producing food and in some cases shipping it to the Soviet unoccupied zones...the front wasn't one continuous line, but essentially occupied zones with a screening force...this was borne out during the winter of '42/'43, when Stalingrad was just one of a number of major encirclements...notwithstanding that at the same time the Germans were in the process of losing another 350 000 troops in Tunisia. All this was happening before US involvement became a major factor.
On top of which, Japan was going backwards at the same time in Papua New Guinea - Again, before US involvement became a major factor.
The Germans were making a serious mistake, one which they are not alone in making, particularly in modern times - the mistake they made with the Brits and the Soviets is that they misread what it would take to defeat their enemy - they based their planning on what they considered as victory requirements, from which their enemies would surrender or be defeated. That's pretty pointless if your enemies have a different view and standards on the matter...thus, when the Brits didn't sue for peace, and the Soviet Union didn't collapse, but came back stronger, the Germans were caught out. Which comes back to my earlier contention that the Germans lost the war when they invaded Poland - effectively, they lost it because they hadn't planned for it, and weren't ready for it. Their military was thrust into something by the government, without adequate planning, and eventually the wheels fell off the wagon.
Edit: Regarding the Suez Canal, it had no strategic value once war was declared...the British Admiralty's Convoy and Routing Office determined the convoy and merchant marine routes for the entire world, and didn't route any through the Mediteranean...aside from the issues with potentially hostile bases on either shore, you physically can't sail in convoy through the canal, notwithstanding the chokepoint risk. It was used for single ships for reinforcing the Med, but not as a through-route.
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0 · Disagree AgreeThat would be the main debate. Yes, the Germans could not defeat the Soviets in a war of attrition, however, in my opinion, the Germans still could have won if they had struck a more decisive blow in 1941 by capturing Moscow. This would have imposed tremendous logistical problems upon the Soviets, since their railway and communication network connecting eastern and western Russia essentially centered around Moscow, not to mention the fact that if Operation Typhoon had gone more according to plan, and Moscow had been encircled before the first winter snows, then a huge portion of the Red Army would have been cut off from supplies, making Kiev seem like child's play. Yes, the logistical situation for the Germans would have been terrible as well, and it is unlikely that they could hold onto the city throughout the winter of 41-42, but the symbolical importance of Moscow falling even temporarily, plus the effects of effectively cutting Russia in two, would have likely led to the total collapse of Russian resistance in the west. With the Russian strategic position crippled before they could properly utilize their massive advantage in manpower, then the following year in 1942 the Germans would be able to strike a fatal blow.
As for Britain, I was not saying that the loss of Egypt would immediately force their surrender, I simply meant that with the loss of one of their most important colonies/protectorates in Africa, as well as their main sphere of influence on the Mediterranean besides small territories such as Gibraltar or Malta, the British Empire would pretty much lose its capability to resist further German expansion. Sure, the Royal Navy would prevent Germany from taking the home islands or their overseas dominions, but without a strong foothold in Europe or Africa, they would be unable to do much more than defend themselves, and the resulting stalemate would eventually lead to peace.
- General George Patton (1885-1945)
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0 · Disagree AgreeOpting to declare and aggressively fight certain enemies at the same time is not good strategy, no matter how ideologically oppose you are to them. Even worse, the events in WW2 was basically Germany fighting increasingly more enemies, at the same time, without neutralizing enough of them at once to maintain balance. For many of these enemies Nazi Germany was the belligerent that struck the first blow. Ironically it was only Britain and France that Germany defeated (and temporarily), the two countries that first declared war on Germany.
But one should note that unlike the East, Germany was fighting to preserve itself from immediate threats, not for fulfilling ideological visions. In that effect Germany would have "won the war" if it only minimized the scale of the conflict to just France/ Britain, and not drawing on Russia as part of that conflict, this would be possible if the Soviet Union in the meantime of this scenario does not take active part in the conflict until Hitler timed it right. Considering how the Soviets didn't really do anything until Barbarossa one might have reason to believe that if they weren't attacked in 1941 Hitler might have actually just limited his war against the Western Allies and have that done before getting onto Russia.
Of course besides the fact that reality showed both the actual outcome as well as Hitler's vision thought things differently, there's like a gajillion other variables that would have prevented such an ideal scenario from happening. For one thing Hitler would have to have given up Poland, the main cause for war, if he wanted immediate resolution to a problem he probably didn't think much on.
So I guess to answer the OP question, "the war" would have been won if "the war" never became "the war" in the first place, but rather a different war that, ideally, left out the British and French. End of the day this meant that all of control over winning WW2 had much more to do with the Allies' actions more than Germany. Consider how things might turn out if the Allies just abandoned Poland, for example, it would have given them no credibility, among the USSR or even the USA, fomented public outrage and perhaps colonial issues, and would not have scratched Germany's original plans for a war footing against Russia. But even then, Hitler's armies would have little experience in a campaign as large as Barbarossa, so on the other side of the coin there's little reason why all of these scenarios would somehow contribute to an overall higher chance of success for Germany in a Russian campaign. Barbarossa occurred on the heels of German experience in the two years prior to June 1941; without those years of war and victory Barbarossa might never have occurred the way it did.
On a Suez campaign, there is also the fact that you have to consider Rommel's Africa campaign and the realities behind the events in order to determine victory rather than defeat. For a start, Africa was lost because the Germans were unable to secure a sufficient logistical train to support Rommel's operations- the minute he ran out of steam he was forced back. And securing supply routes without being disrupted from extension or attack from Allied forces is difficult in a part of the world where Germany had little control over. Crete was obviously meant to alleviated that, but given the disastrous result of Operation Mercury, coupled with the fact that all operations in the Mediterranean were in reality just preparations and securities for Barbarossa, shows that the way Africa was handled would have to have been approached very differently (but also very predictably) than how it was in real life.
And like what HG said, there's little reason to see taking over the Suez would do anything for both sides. It would have cut off the most predictable route for the Allies to gain access to Asia, but nothing suggests it was the only possible route. It also would not have alleviated the Germany position in the theatre or in the war itself at all, you just have a long stretch of Africa to defend, all to deny it from the British who can just strike at the Germans from any other angle. It's not like once Rommel sized Egypt he'd be in a permanent position of invincibility and all Arabs will be speaking German.
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0 · Disagree AgreeRegarding the north african adventure, that's all it was. Rommel had no authority and no support to launch an aggressive offensive to capture Egypt or Palestine...that was his doing, with tacit agreement from the High Command - tacit because if it went wrong, he's the bunny carrying responsibility. But also bear in mine that the Brit Empire had cleaned out the rest of Africa, there was no longer any Axis possessions in East Africa, and a large South African force in that area.
But, and I'll repeat it, economically Egypt was a null point, including the Canal. Politically, for Churchill, yes, it was important. Militarilly it was important for the eastern meditteranean fleet, but the German and Italian forces would have been struggling to get any further than the Alemein line even under the most favourable conditions.
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0 · Disagree AgreeAnyway, both of you are focusing in on a passing comment I made about the fact that if the Soviet Union could be defeated, then Germany would be able to free up forces in order to defeat the Allies in other contested theaters, such as Africa. I was never saying that taking Egypt was the key to Germany winning the war. Personally, I think the Afrika Korps would have been better used on the Eastern Front, in the hope that Italy could hold out on its own. Risky, I know, but perhaps those few extra Panzer divisions, with Erwin Rommel at their head, could have possibly made the critical difference in the war against the Russians.
Which brings me back to the main point though, of the Soviet Union and Operation Barbarossa. It is true that capturing Moscow would not have hurt the Russians too badly politically or economically. Stalin and all other political officials could have been evacuated quite easily should the city have come under more serious threat, and most of the industry was already moved east to the Urals. However, as any Total War player knows, one can never underestimate the importance of moral, and the loss of Moscow would have certainly dealt a massive psychological blow to anyone living in the Soviet Union, at least excluding the ones already fanatical about the defense of their motherland. Of course, in the times of Napoleon, this could blow be endured, however in the increasingly centralized Soviet Union, one has to wonder if some of the diverse peoples that lay within the Soviet Union might have started questioning the legitimacy of a government that could not even defend its own capital, especially since many of them weren't too fond of the Soviets in the first place. Even if the Germans could not hold onto the city, the simple moral factor of capturing it, and then burning it to the ground while retreating to more defensible lines could have made many of the non-Russians in the Soviet Union significantly less enthusiastic about going to war for a regime that seemingly would not be in power for much longer.
Then, as I mentioned before, one cannot forget that a successful Operation Typhoon would have entailed the encirclement of over a million Russian soldiers. At that time, the Russians had practically no forces in reserve, with almost everything they had in the area committed to the defense of Moscow, so an encirclement similar to that of Kiev, only of a larger magnitude, would have been unimaginably devastating to them. Furthermore, the point of communication and transportation centering around Moscow still stands, as while the Russians may have had the capability to organize tremendous logistical feats in 1942-43, the same was not true in 41. They had simply not mobilized the majority of their manpower at that point, and that which they had readily available was for the most part already tied up along the front. So, the loss, or even just encirclement, of Moscow would have effectively cut off any Soviet divisions west of Moscow from their main line of supplies and reinforcements, allowing for even further gains before the arrival of winter, and then the Soviet winter offensive of 41 would have been nearly far less effective, and would probably succeed at little more than driving the Germans temporarily out of Moscow.
- General George Patton (1885-1945)
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0 · Disagree AgreeAnd so I'm first to digress from the point of this thread! Yay! What do I win?
--Winston Churchill
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0 · Disagree AgreeIt hadnt mattered whether war with Britain would have dragged out or not. Same goes for the italians losing North Africa. What really mattered was the SU. Everything else is secondary (except for the USA getting into the war). If Barbarossa had worked and Germany has defeated the SU, Germany would have ruled Europe, and there wouldnt be much the Brithish Empire could do about it.
Regarding the german economy, it didnt mattered, as you can see by what happened IRL. When nations fight for their very survival, they always find ways to get the money or resources they need to keep on figthing.
And Japan didnt go to war with everybody in 1941. Just with the allies, which, as much as it might hurt you, were the lesser partner regarding who fights Germany.
Again, what the BE did wasnt so important. What was important at such an early stage (I mean, after France was defeated) was the SU. The brithish got into the continent 3 times before Overlord (4, if we count the 1942 landing) and all of them they were expelled.
I know, but that doesnt change the fact that there was nothing the BE could do. And on top of that they couldnt draw much more resoruces than they already did. In fact, by 1944 (for Ovelord) the BE used its last reserve units. By the end of the war in Europe there were just two BE armies (one english, one canadian) for five american ones in the western front (not counting Italy).
As I told you, you assume that once Japan attacked the USA Hitler had to declare war on the USA. I know that is exactly what he did, but there was no practical reason for that. In fact, it was one of its biggest mistakes.
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0 · Disagree AgreeNot to mention even if the Germans did overwhelm the considerable defenses around Moscow but also incapacitate the Soviet leadership, Stalin and the bureaucracy can easily just move eastward to avoid that fate. The Germans would accomplish nothing other than expend resources into taking another large city centre. It's not like their logistical or strategic position would have been bolstered. The Soviets would even more readily launch an Operation Uranus on the Axis forces involved in such battle.
Also, considering the layout of Moscow, it would just be a far more difficult version of Stalingrad.
The failure of Africa would simply be replicated in the Eastern Front, one of unsupported logistical problems. Once Rommel ran out of steam he withdrew all the way back to Tripoli. The same tactical problems- encountering T-34s and long stretch of landmass, would simply have resulted. I also don't see how Rommel being in Russia would have made any "critical" difference: his successes were remaining on the offensive despite British indications that he was staying put. If anything, Barbarossa was simply Rommel's strategy at a grand scale...and while it worked in achieving tactical success, it was a strategic failures since the political expectations were not fulfilled as anticipated. To expect anything different with Rommel "at their head" (spearheading one front and not possibly all of them) is like expecting anything other than ketchup because you switched ketchup bottles. There's also the fact that ideologically speaking Rommel would have butt heads with the German leadership over treatment of Slavs. We also cannot expect similar results of his style of combat in the Russian steppes; the African wilderness did not have short days and long winters. And as stated, his operational capability, like with every general, are all limited by supply; considering the larger forces allocated for Barbarossa, there's probably even less chance of Rommel being able to make more gains than any other German commander.
There really hasn't been many examples of a regime collapsing simply because it's political centre was lost, causing it's military forces to lost cohesion. Only one example comes to mind and that is basically Persia after Alexander's victory at Gaugamela, but that's not a great example either since Persian resistance remained after much of the empire disintegrated in favour of the Macedonian king. In that case, the centrality of the head of state and his/her relationship with the rest of the government plays a significant role in how things turn out if governance was disrupted.
There may have been additional confusion and setbacks, but considering the logistical problems the Germans have, the Russians would have had plenty of time to muster a response, either in taking it back or counter-attacking or just fortifying their other positions. A LOT of the Soviet military resources went to Moscow's defense, and if Stavka knew if German intentions they would just re-allocate men and vehicles at a much faster pace than the Germans. Even if some inexplicable miracle allowed the Germans to take Moscow and plow the Russians into the ground in a straight up urban struggle (again, unlikely since the Soviets would just do a counter-attack to the besieging forces). Moscow is also situated on a river and over half of it, including the Kremlin, is on the eastern side; by comparison the entirety of Stalingrad hugs the western side of the Volga. By all accounts, taking Moscow would be significant harder, and Stalingrad was relatively unfortified once the Germans were steaming towards that fateful city. The rush of Soviet reinforcements was meant to bolster what was a significantly undefended portion of the front: Moscow never had this problem since it was bristling with defenses and remained so until Stalin realized that the Germans were putting all eyes onto the south and into the city bearing his name.
As for morale, it matters tremendously how Moscow wold be lost, ie if it was abandoned but with forces and government intact, one or the other destroyed, or most unlikely, both. Even the Germans didn't collapse until formal surrender in 1945 with Berlin overrun, and that was no capitulation strategy, it was pretty much the last of the Nazi political centres to fall.
Besides the fact that the Soviets had a tremendous internal security apparatus (on par with the SS) that would have continued to operate even if the central government was disrupted, these various peoples were also regularly suppressed, either passively or through force. We're not talking about a feudal establishment like the Persians or medieval states, but a modern authoritarian government that went through revolution and civil war, plus the Great War, that had a tremendous influence on its emphasis of state security. There's also the fact that, notwithstanding Soviet propaganda, there is little reason for these people to prefer brutal Nazi German rule over Soviet tyranny. Burning down Moscow after a significant battle in taking it would be a huge waste of resources, it would also presumably contradict Nazi plans to establish a reichkommissariat (shorthanded as colony) in the same locale.
If you want a significant psychological blow, it would be encirclement and siege of Moscow, which would also disrupt government function without even destroying it. But like I said, you can't really encircle one of the most fortified cities in Eurasia that also spans a river.
I don;t see how Germany somehow defeating the Soviet Union would end up ruling Europe, especially since they'd be exhausted from doing so, and still have work to do in consolidating their gains, which they barely did with earlier conquests. The visions of economic parity with the other world empires ignores the fact that it took years of development (or in modern terms, nation building); we cannot expect oil infrastructure and wheat fields to simply be handed over graciously, and partisan activity in both sides of Germany's empire were a significant problem. What the Germans needed to do was to move slower, not faster. But Hitler was not in control over the pace of expansion; Greece and Africa opened up because the Italians weren't pulling their weight. Nothing ever goes according to plan, and for someone like Hitler, adapting to disrupted plans was not his forte.
What happened in real life was that Germany ran out of resources to keep fighting. And even if they weren't, sabotage and air raids make or break weak links in the chain of the military industry. Even though the bombing campaign was, relatively speaking, ineffective comparing the loss of men and planes involved, it demanded a great deal of resources to provide adequate air defense, and it wasn't like the Wehrmacht was having plenty to go around. The Atlantic was lost because there were frankly not enough U-boats, and not enough U-boat pens to sustain them adequately if there were. The Nazis leadership were also not fighting for their very survival, the organization of the Third Reich was in reality quite a feudal mess, and Himmler's enormous police regime didn't help, allocating resources more useful for military operations towards exterminating civilian populations without having to answer for it.
Pretty much the real reason the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour was so that the US Navy can't interfere with them attacking the British, French and Dutch colonies in South-east Asia. But I suppose you're right in the sense that they didn't fight "everybody" because the Soviets learned that they were doing just that, so instead of picking a fight with the Kwantung Army instead sent forces westward.
The Battle for Britain was meant to neutralize the British from the war, an objective that frankly failed. Hitler couldn't ignore the British threat as much as he couldn't ignore the French before he launched Case Yellow. It was not a matter of preventing the British from landing, it was a matter of not being starved into surrender by blockades and lack of resources. Getting terms from the British would have prevented all of these, but of course required the British to be knocked off their feet. If anything I'd say the inability to get agreement out of the British was a bigger factor in winning the war, since doing so prevented a second front and all focus put towards the Soviet Union.
I'm not sure what you mean by the British had nothing they could do, their very presence was a threat to Hitler's dream of a German empire. Going to war with the British was expected AFTER the Soviet Union was destroyed and autarky was achieved. Even if economic and manpower resources were meagre, the British and their aligned colonial forces were still in a position to attack whatever soft spots the Germans had from any direction in the world. That the British didn't have much to offer in terms of military strength (which factors in the contribution of the United States) doesn't matter much, because you can still be a huge thorn in ones side without having to continually lose men over it. It wasn't like Germany was flowing with men and materiel either, and the British were also counting on resistance groups like the French, Dutch and even Germans.
In short the British were in a much better economic position in both terms of actual economics plus potential over Germany. But it wasn't like Hitler was trying to get into a tussle with them first. Like I said, Hitler would have won the war if the war in its very nature turned out from the beginning to be very different, ie the British failed to declared war after Poland, which made no sense from the political and practical standpoint. By that time the British were ready for declaring war after what happened with Czechoslovakia. What mattered more, was what Hitler should not have done.
As for Japan and war against the US, the anti-Comintern Pact did not require Hitler to declare war on Germany, and whether due to underestimating American industry or just thinking the Americans are dumb folk, decided to do so, and at the worst time too. He could have easily just said "Whoa man don't drag me into that"
Corrected action is the most sincere form of apology.
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0 · Disagree AgreeThere is always something to be said for the 'if the Germans had treated the occupied zone Russians better' argument, but the fact is that they really couldn't do anything very differently...they had to lay the land waste, they had to loot anything they could, they had to have slave labour. The simple fact was that their wartime economy was a slave economy...they had so many troops on the line that any expansion could only be met through the use of foreign labour...either voluntary, or slave.
Plus, and I am harping on the point, but I will elaborate, the German gold reserves ran out in early 1943. The amount of gold held by Germany at the start of the war had been used for purchasing foreign supplies and resources, etc...at the end of the war, Germany had slightly more gold than what it started with...that is a historical fact, details of which were known at the time, as all international gold reserves are required to be known internationally so that comparative exchange rates can be developed and implemented. The exact implications of that, are that for the entire duration of the war, the Germans effectively used gold from two sources - the gold reserves of the nations they conquered, and the gold reserves of peoples and individuals they persecuted...Let me stress that I am not leading this debate onto contentious or political grounds, simply clearly pointing out the economics of the war.
How was that accomplished? Quite simply through the then international banking system, with the tacit agreement of a number of neutral nations, including a number that later came into the war. That aspect was only fully understand in the late 1990's when business records of certain large international banks were obtained through legal action.
The simple fact was that Germany had to wage an aggressive war of conquest, once Britain failed to sue for peace. Undoubtedly the attack on the Balkans and the Soviet Union was a bad decision, but the Germans had to go into the Balkans to bail out Italy who was getting hammered by the Greeks...similarly, the Germans had to go into North Africa, because the Italians were in the process of losing their North African territories.
Just as, in late 1941, the Japanese had to go to war against the colonial powers in South East Asia and the Pacific (including the US as a colonial power), simply because its' war machine was grinding towards a halt due to lack of resources (various minerals, rubber, oil, etc)...and again, much of what Japan achieved during the war was done through slave labour, although whether that was a matter of convenience or necessity is still a matter for debate (the end result was the same though).
The question is, if Germany had not declared war on the US, would the US have gone to war against Germany? And, secondly, would it have mattered?
I'll answer the second part first: No, it wouldn't have. Proof: The Soviet Union launched five million men at Berlin in April 1945, with the vast majority of the equipment and supplies home grown Soviet gear. Plus they had another eight odd million doing a few other things at the same time, like overrunning eastern and central europe, and preparing to take Mongolia.
First question? I can't say for certain, but I expect they would. The US was already expanding aero-naval bases through the Atlantic, and was actively patrolling further out, and they were having brushes with the Uboats...keep in mind the sinking of the Reuben James was not received well in the US.
Edit: On top of which, the US needed Brit Empire and French and Dutch co-operation for their southern pacific and Phillipines operations. MacArthur didn't have many US troops until 1944, and fought most of his battles with Australian troops till then, also, his logistical tail was completely based in Australia...No fight war against Germany, no base in Australia without massive concessions.
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0 · Disagree AgreeTo add fuel to the debate, be aware that the critical phase of the Battle of the Atlantic came in early 1943, prior to US involvement in anything other than individual ships beyond their coastal waters. The back of the Uboat menace was broken, and technical and doctrinal developments by the Allies (primarily Britain, at that time), prevented the Uboats from becoming a critical threat from that point on.
Further, if the British had to continue the fight as the remaining Western Ally, it is highly probable that the 'bomber dream' would have been realised - a force of two to two and a half thousand heavy night bombers to devastate Germany...combined with a massively increased light night bomber and intruder force, essentially to harry the German defences. Certainly, there is some validity in the argument that the Luftwaffe could put up a solid defence, but by late '44 and '45 the day and night fighter forces were being sucked into both the day and night battles - planes were basically being used 24/7, and were really only effective in good intercept conditions, and in large numbers...being attacked by multiple raids, during periods of poor intercept conditions, would have seriously degraded chances of success.
With increasing improvements in technology and doctrine, the RAF night bomber force expanded in both capability and destructiveness. Accuracy was vastly improved, and the German cities never had to face attack from the 'grand slam' cavitation bombs...if they had, it is quite probable that many areas of some cities would have been rendered uninhabitable.
Again, though, the Germans would have had to face the Soviets, as well as maintaining credible defences on the western front, and battle a night bomber force of increasing effectiveness.
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0 · Disagree AgreeThe US pan-American zone of protection extended as far as the Iceland and would convoy ships that far out. That was April of 1941. The idea that US shipping and protection didn't exist sounds a bit much.
There is also the involvement of the production of Liberty transport ships built to UK's naval needs. They were built between 1941-1945. By 1943 3 such ships were completed almost daily.
If you want to take the position that the US military or industrial might wasn't needed to accomplish the war and that the UK had vast untapped potential. You are allowed to think that. Just realize that Mass starvation in the Indian and African colonies was becoming a real thing even with US involvement. The collapse into the commonwealth nations of today is a direct result of those decisions. The British Empire was gathering everything it had to mount a credible defense / offensive stance. Especially after the loss of the equipment from Dunkirk.
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Naisho the Neko
"You have raised assorted issues under what might be termed a “I-don’t-like-it because-I-say-it’s-not-historical” banner. This isn't quite the same as "justified", I'm sorry to say." -MikeB
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0 · Disagree AgreeIn respect to the US contribution, in the first five months of 1942, the USN sank 1 Uboat, whereas the entire UBoat successes for that period exceeded the total tonnage sunk for 1941. Eventually, later in 1942, the USN had to borrow anti-submarine ships of the Royal Navy, form convoys off its' own coasts, and alter doctrine to convoy protection, rather than offensive sweeps.
Until the turn around point in the Battle of the Atlantic with the battle for convoys HX229 and SC122, responsibility for convoy protection for the western Atlantic was predominantly a Canadian responsibility.
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0 · Disagree AgreeYou dont see how Germany defeating the SU would end up ruling Europe? That is like saying that you dont see how Chelsea might win the Premier after having scored an average of 3 goals per match.
Anyway, there would be nobody left to fight in the continent. It would be like Napoleons Empire but with no Russia to be the grave of his army. You can think that, since the BE would still be alive, Germany wouldnt have won, but lets be serious, Germany would have achieved all its objectives, and it would be in a very, very strong position, while the BE one would be exactly the same (well, worse, since it wouldnt have France as a full ally) as before the war.
Germany run out of resources at the very end, because the resource locations were being overrun by the soviets (in a world were the soviets had been defeated this would not have happened) In fact, Germanys industrial production peaked in 1944, no matter the bombings and soviet victories. I agree that the highest leaders of nazi Germany were quite an inept bunch (Hitler, Goering and Himmler. Goebbels was very good at his job) but after Schadt took control of production, the german industry began to take off.
With Europe at his feet there was no way Hitler could be "starved into surrender by blockades and lack of resources". In fact, given that after defeating the SU Germanys only enemy would be the BE, the UK position would worsen a lot, since a good part of Germanys resources could have been devoted to the UBoat campaign.
I didnt say that the BE staying in the war after the defeat at France wasnt important. What I said was that IF Germany had knocked the SU out of the war, then the BE possibilities to defeat Germany would be almost zero.
The BE could be a thorn in germanys side, true. But reflect on what you said for a moment. Not a mortal, dangerous enemy. A thorn. Something annoying but with no power to finish you off. And, as I said, the BE could be a thorn in Germanys side just as Germany could be a thorn in the BE side (UBoat campaign).
As I told you, just think about the times the brithish tried to get a foothold in the continent. Only in Overlord they were succesful. And that with US help AND HUGE soviet forces attacking in the East. Now take the US and SU forces away and tell me what the BE could have realistically do. And resistance groups, could be a thorn (again) but all by themselves there was nothing they could do. The 1944 polish rising is good proof of that.
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0 · Disagree AgreeBut that's exactly what happened in WW1... Germany and Austria-Hungary owned most of Europe, yet they were both starved and bled into submission. Britain's empire was a ready source of resources and manpower, whereas Germany's Europe was nothing but a huge, hostile liability that they were intent to waste time and resources on on exterminating.
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0 · Disagree AgreeThe only part that should be pacified should be East Europe, as that was the part Hitler really wanted to subdue and annex. And we all know what he did with those populations he couldnt subdue so resistance movements in East Europe, while annoying, would not last much. All along history I cant find a single case of an enemy defeated only by guerrilla warfare. And you can find many, many instances where an enemy has finally defeated a guerrilla movement.
PS. I guess Afghanistan could qualify, as there was no regular army of any kind, but it is the only instance I can think about.
No, the CP didnt own half of Europe. Far from that. In fact, it was the Entente the one that had a big superiority in landmass. On top of that, agriculture had seen its production per kms. increased dramatically since WW I. That is why during WW II you didnt see the german population starving the way it happened during WW I.
And Britain couldnt afford to behave the way Nazis and Commies behaved. Basically Britain couldnt "harvest" manpower the way Germany and the SU did nor could forget about casualties as much as the soviets, and to a lesser extent the germans, did. It couldnt do it on cultural and moral grounds.
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0 · Disagree AgreeI don't watch football, but in any case that is grossly over-generalizing what is ultimately a very complex scenario in WW2's Europe.
The Germans had plenty to fight in parts of the continent that they ruled. The French resistance, bombings and commando raids, the numerous fronts in other parts of the world, all demand economic and strategic efforts that only expand as the Germans take more of it. If the French and Polish weren't actively fighting, they offered aid in the form of intelligence to the Allies. The Polish were keenly aware of the German cryptography program, for instance.
Running out of resources wasn't the only issue, it was disruption of production. In any case, defeat of the Soviet Union would not have nullified these problems, but that depends a lot on how the Soviets were defeated and in the manner the Germans capitalized on this victory. They can't just start shoving all their troops into trains to head straight for France or Africa, especially if the Germans continued the operational successes of Barbarossa where large pockets of Soviets remained behind front lines to cause trouble.
Germany's production also peaked in response to growing wartime constraints, not because things were going well or that it was an inevitability. By 1944 the Germans were clearly losing war, not winning it. It would actually make less political sense to up your war economy as your primary strategic- and ideological- enemy was destroyed.
Germany was still having economic problems even after tremendous gains over three years. The Germans never took advantage out of the economic conditions they supplied themselves until it was too late. And remember, the upping of war economy occurred without every really taking over Russia or defeating the Soviet Union. If anything, the continued conquest of the East produced the opposite effect of Hitler's intended dream for Germany's economy, rather than assuring it. Amount of resources produced is also at most half of the equation, it is also wise use. Hitler did neither, it wouldn't have mattered if the Soviets were, somehow, defeated, especially if that didn't change. And it didn't, not until as you say 1944 when it was too late.
The British by themselves perhaps, but the British were never on their own. They had French, Polish and eventually American aid in numerous forms. There were also other non-aligned forces that fought against the Axis as well, including what would eventually be Tito's Yugoslavia. They also didn't need to just defeat Germany, nothing can definitely prove that Germany would not have collapse given the way the political and social structure was organized. It was that country's leadership that was problematic of all things, and that's going to have huge implications on how you fight wars and run economies and enact foreign policy. Chelsea can only score three goals per match if they didn't have hair-brained coaches or teammates that won't pass the ball because they want the glory for themselves. If anything it was a surprise that Germany remained organized as it were despite even internal German military resistance that eventually culminated to the July 20 plot. Even the army's intelligence department was pretty much a resistance movement.
You can have a thorn in your side and still survive, or fall. Partisans were a thorn in the Germans' side but they were either destroyed, assimilated into Soviet forces, or fought both. The bomber campaign could not have possibly win the war by itself, but it didn't have to, and defeating the Soviet Union would not have changed that. As long as Goering kept misusing his Luftwaffe, the German's air force would have been crippled and allowed a major strategic advantage in any operations, as Normandy has proven. Remember that the battle of Britain was eventually called off for the same reason; thorns can't kill, but they can cripple.
You forgot about losing Italy before Normandy.
The problem with your analysis is that it depends entirely on unrealistic hypotheses like, besides winning over Russia, the Americans never end up joining or even providing materials for either side, and requires isolating the British from any outside help. A factor that is not connected with whether the Germans win in the East, and yet has to be factored in as a consequence. IF the British stood alone then you have a case, but why on earth would that ever happen considering the scenarios and the backgrounds to them? The Germans relied on satellite parties to control countries like Bulgaria and Hungary, this is because they cannot afford to occupy them as if they were enemy states. The Germans controlled a lot of Europe yes, but it was because they were gambling on them not throwing off their yoke. We're not talking iron grip here, we're talking subordinates that prefer anything besides living under Soviet heels.
What you CAN argue is the plight of these satellites after Germany withdrew, the Soviets marched in and without Allied help they were assimilated as Soviet satellites. The Soviet Union however is a much different monster than Nazi Germany.
That's what the Germans thought, but the French had different ideas. Hitler wasn't exactly someone you can look to for realistic long-term planning. He was a visionary, but had little practical experience to kind of work and knowledge required to make them reality, he was never a guy that liked details.
The resistance movements were not anticipated and while not a gigantic detriment to conquest was nevertheless complicated the strategy of Generalplan Ost. Like Hitler's strategic blunder in considering the Americans as meek and greedy, he underestimated the capabilities of peoples he considered inferior sub-humans.
Corrected action is the most sincere form of apology.
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0 · Disagree AgreeYou're equating a brief moment of military victory over hostiles with permanent German domination, almost as if this were a video game where you get a "You are teh winnar" screen the moment you destroy the last enemy Barracks in the corner of the map. But this is a matter of actually maintaining, controlling, subduing, organizing on a vast scale. You must control a vast expanse of land with dozens of millions of hostile peoples who are not at all pleased with the German occupation. It doesn't just arbitrarily end in German victory once X is captured. And like I said, the Third Reich was a flimsy thing - it lacked the necessary structures in place to actually maintain power over such a vast expanse of land. Simply rolling into the Ukraine with a few tanks doesn't mean the German economy or political system was healthy or would have the strength necessary to survive for long under the weight of trying to rule so much of Europe with so few men. The Germans had no structures in place to actually ensure that their empire would last for a significant period of time... collapse was inevitable.
The Soviets were only capable of conquering half of Europe, because they had a far larger army than the Germans, they were far better equipped than the Germans by that point, and the peoples of Europe genuinely wanted change and the Soviets offered them the prospect of change.
I've never seen a map yet where the Central Powers didn't dominate the European continent.
Europe Map WW1.jpg Just look at the size of that grey!
world-war-1-map-of-europe-in-1914-5418.jpg
Simply owning a huge portion of Europe didn't assure their victory.
Want to back that up?
Farming Techniques.jpg
As far as I know food production barely changed from 1914-1970. We're only seeing the current increases in production thanks to the democratisation of the automobile in the form of farm machine equipment and sophisticated techniques for increasing crop yields (ie direct genetic manipulation). Both would only become realities after WW2.
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0 · Disagree AgreeI don't think anyone has actually worked out what would constitute 'defeat' of the Soviet Union...it would be either capitulation, which didn't happen, and seems unlikely to occur; or it would be destruction of the ability for the Soviets to continue to wage war, which didn't happen and seems unlikely to be able to occur.
While I don't deny the massive contribution of the US to the European War, it needs to be seen in context of the timeline...and in that view, it didn't really make a major impact, relatively speaking, until 1944. Certainly, US forces contributed in a major way to North Africa and Italy campaigns, but by the same token, the BE forces still had large numbers of troops that had not been committed sitting available in the UK.
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0 · Disagree AgreeI know that large number of military forces should be available to control the occupied landmass (modern day Poland, Bielorus, Ukraine, Baltic countries and parts of Russia) but it is not something different the germans did irl BUT with the big, big, big "bonus" of not having the Red Army in front of you (as in my scenario Barbarossa is a success and the SU surrenders. And, I should add, the nazis get a good chunk of Soviet Europe. And probably trade deals with the remaniing SU to get resources it cant get any other way).
With the SU defeated, the Wehrmatch would have lots of "spare units" to control the recently annexed areas AND fortify the Atlantic Wall. I dont see enlarging the Afrikakorps as a big option because the italian capacity to supply the forces already present was low.
You are taking a map of 1917, just before Russia surrendered. The newly conquered territories didnt produce much (just as it happened during WW II also). I was talking about "core" landmass (the national territory). The Entente powers one was 4 or 5 times as big.
That the german population didnt starve as it happened during WW I is a fact. And that considering that Germany was equally blockaded and, on top of that, being subjected to bombing. A part of it was due to starving other populations (The East ones. Nazis took the food from those areas to Germany, and let them starve), and a part was due to increases in agricultural yield. A SU defeat would have made it easier for the nazis to exploit the newly conquered territories.
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0 · Disagree AgreeBy 1944 (for Overlord) the BE used the last units it had in reserve. After that, it struggled to find replacements.
Some people seem to think that, as the BE was very large and very populated (600 million at the wars outbreak, iirc), it could muster large parts of its population, just as the SU or Nazi Germany did (thus getting an army larger than the german or even the soviet one). Well, that was NOT the case.
The USA didnt simply make a "major contribution" since 1944. The US was the MAIN participant since 1944 in the NorthWest Europe and Pacific theatres (in the Pacific since 1941).
On any case, the main enemy of Nazi Germany during WW II was, by far, the SU. Approximately 3 out of every 4 soldiers, AFVs, planes and resources were sent to fight to the Eastern front (and that since 1944. Before that year Nazi Germany and most Axis countries were sending almost all of it resources to be killed/destroyed in the East front)
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