The First World War: Indefinite Stalemate?

Half_Life_Expert#4276

I am currently watching the 20th Century Battlefields Episode on the Battle of Amiens in 1918, the one battle that best showed how to break the stalemate on the Western Front

It got me thinking: How long could the stalemate have lasted by itself?

Think about it. The Stalemate was firmly broken in the strategic sense by the closing of the Eastern Front (Russian Revolution) and the Entry of the United States into the War on the Allied side, which in my opinion served primarily to just relieve and back up the exhausted French, British/Commonwealth and what was left of the Belgian Armies.

On the tactical level the stalemate was partially beaten by the introduction of the Tank as well as new artillery and infantry tactics.

it was all of these combined that really broke the seemingly endless stalemate.

What if only some or none of these factors were ever created? What if the US stayed out and there was no Russian Revolution? What if the tank was abandoned due to mechanical issues or never created? What if the commanders never realized the foolishness in the outdated tactics?

Of course the questions I just asked were in all likelihood not going to happen, given the circumstances surrounding the decisive factors coming into play.

Just think about it. The tactical, operational, and strategic situation in Europe never really changes from its situation from 1915-1916, even up until the real end date: Nov 11. 1918.

Given all the knowledge we have of the situations of both sides, how long could this stalemate have lasted just by itself? If there were a de facto winner, which side would that be?

Remember: this assumes that there is no decisive factor or battle that swings the tide of war in ether side's favor

[Deleted User]

Well, the allies considered that the war would end in 1919, the reason it actually ended on the western front in 1918 was due to two reasons (keeping in mind that the large mass of US forces in France were not actually operational...most of them were due for deployment in 1919, and were still in basic training).

The first reason was the level of tactical and technological excellence in both the French and Empire armies, with an entire gamut of infantry support weapons coming on line, increased use of tanks as supporting assets, rather than as fighting elements on their own (despite what the tank pundits and dodgy historians would have you believe), improved all arms integration and use, and enhanced planning and logistic processes and efforts, despite a worsening manpower situation. Quite simply, by 1918, the French and 'Brit' forces were at the top of their game...the real jerks in command had been sacked, professionals or at least professionals enough to rely on their staff, put in their place, and the cadre of all units were hardened veterans. Even the British and French were promoting into their officer corps from the ranks as a matter of course (although less so than the extent to that is was happening in Brit Empire 'Dominion' forces).

The second reason, and this has been largely washed over by generation upon generation of historians (which probably has significant impact on the cause of WW2), is that the German war machine completely and utterly collapsed:

Germany, and the army, was starving due to the effectiveness of the blockade by the Royal Navy...the war had run too long for Germany to sustain itself;

German supply and the logistic tail needed to support the war was collapsing under it's own weight. Again, imports were crippled, and necessary resources simply weren't available. The occupied territories were stripped of coal simply to sustain the german rail system, while the home economy was completely without coal or peat for heating or cooking purposes:

The morale of the German soldier had collapsed. Units were refusing to go into the attack, and were refusing to go into the line against the Australian Corps after the March and subsequent offensive. Using the Australian example, the AIF (Australian Imperial Force) capitalised on this morale collapse through the use of a tactic termed 'peacefull penetration', which was anything but...basically, there were two primary tactical approaches - In the first, anywhere from a single man to a company would sneak into the opposing lines, and kill and capture as many as they could, hopefully as quietly as they could, but the main intent was to kill, then escape back to friendly lines. The second tactical approach was that anywhere from a platoon or a company (or more) would seize sections of the german line, and dig in...the next night, more would grab another piece of the line, and so on. Eventually, entire regiments would be crow-barred out of their positions. This combined process would occur every night and most days along the front...with the idea being to establish a clear psychological and tactical superiority over the enemy...to make them know that they were beaten, and that the boot was being put in. They would also do things like piercing cans of food to let them taint, and leave them in the opposing trench lines to poison the opposition.

Essentially, in 1916, the Germans launched a war of attrition, at Verdun. They lost.

Edit:

I'll add a bit more here...

It should also be remembered that in March/April 1918 the Allies introduced a unified command, with Foch, and both the national commanders under him, Petain and Haig, were generals at the top of their game.

Petain had rebuilt the morale and capabilities of the French army after the 1917 revolts, and was managing it extremely well, achieving success without wastage, and an increased emphasis on materiel rather than men.

Haig (after the two March/April offensives) had just fought a successful mobile battle, in retreat, against massive odds, and was launching limited counter-offensives to regain ground. My personal view is that the focus on Haig has been too much on casualties (everyone was following the same path at the time), rather than on his successes in 1918, which tend to get overlooked for one reason or another. Keep in mind that at the crisis point, he committed his remaining strategic reserve divisions (the five AIF divisions and supporting troops), with the explicit order that there would be no retreat and they were to hold and if necessary die in place...'no retreat' was not conditional, and numbers of the troops were actually issued written orders to that effect, and retreating troops were to be shot down.

On the other fronts, by the end of 1918 Turkey had been driven back over its' own borders, and due to a number of 'border incidents', the Desert Mounted Corps (Chauvel's mixed cavalry force in the Middle East) was preparing for an invasion of Turkey, and to renew the war with them on the pretext that they were breaking the truce and treaty. If that had happened, it is possible that the Germans would have seen mixed forces opening up a limited eastern front in their rear, sometime in mid 1919. It wouldn't have taken much effort to transfer a significant force, probably US into Turkey for use through the Balkans and into the occupied eastern territories, in conjunction with Empire forces.

Simply, the March/April 1918 offensives were the end for Germany...but they wouldn't accept that they were beaten on the battlefield (and never did, judging by many of the post-war accounts and histories)...that was the tragedy of WW2.

Maeda_Toshiie

As HG said, the German economy was badly strained by fighting on two fronts with an ally that couldn't be relied on to handle an equal share. The end of fighting on Eastern Front only helped to prolong the struggle.

The German army were suffering irreplaceable losses in terms of personnel quality by 1918. This is made worse by two factors, the use of infiltration tactics, and the German tendency of sending its best junior officers/NCOs into front line combat units. The first, while innovative and influenced small unit tactics for decades to come, required well trained and skilled personnel, and such units tend to suffer heavy casualties even when experiencing success. This drained regular units of their "better" personnel. The second also meant that the best were getting at a disproportionately high rate. The Spring Offensive was the final serious effort that the German army could mount and its failure was akin to the Kursk on the Eastern Front in 1943.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

so do you mean that in the end, Germany would have lost anyway?

DarkSideHome

Retrospect is foolish even at the best of times. But that being said, the Germans have lost the "War" during the spring offenses if not earlier.


All the cards were turned against them. A few extra battles won here and there wouldn't have tipped the scales much anyways.


The shortage in talent, raw material and energy sources would have only been more evident if the war lasted for any longer than it did.

Half_Life_Expert#4276

i suppose you guys are right, plus the Central Powers were very much fighting a two front war, which is an inherent major strategic disadvantage in most cases

Mackles

Half Life Expert wrote: »

What if only some or none of these factors were ever created? What if the US stayed out and there was no Russian Revolution? What if the tank was abandoned due to mechanical issues or never created? What if the commanders never realized the foolishness in the outdated tactics?

That's a bit of non-question isn't it? If nothing changed would nothing have happened? If everyone had kept doing what they were doing before under the same circumstances would the situation continue as before?

[Deleted User]

In all fairness, after the truce in the Middle East, and what was essentially Kamal Attaturk's taking over of the Turkish Army, the Turks were starting to crank up to have another go, and to reclaim northern Syria. That was probably more a reflection that the common soldiery and junior officers had high confidence in Attaturk than for any other factor. I doubt that they would have stood much chance, and it is highly probable that Allenby (Empire commander in chief) would have discretely allowed Chauvel and his corps to sort out the remnants of the Turkish army, take Istanbul, and secure whatever was necessary, and more or less smooth things out with London after the event.

As far as the Western Front though, one of the major problems that the Germans faced in the Spring Offensives was overrunning allied supply dumps. Essentially their troops were exhausted, and were filling up on what was to them high protein foods, and looting as much as they could. That caused discipline breakdowns, health and sanitation collapse, and disorganised their advance critically.

The other aspect, which I didn't make too clear, sorry, was Haig's 'stand and fight to the last man' order. The Empire forces did, in many cases...the units that didn't and fell into retreat, were largely disorganised ones...when small groups under effective and aggressive leaders turned and stood, many retreating troops joined them, complaining that all they needed was orders or leaders. The Fifth and Third armies were not a beaten force in rout, but they were largely a disorganised rabble in retreat, and once organisation took hold, they either stood in compliance with the 'stand and die' order, or they fought a mobile and aggressive fighting retreat, which is the most difficult military operation of any. Broken armies don't do that, and it should have sent alarms ringing through the german command a lot earlier than it did.

After writing my spiel/wall of text last night, I actually had a thought, which made me laugh a bit.

Everyone has the view that in WW2 the French and Brits were refighting WW1...that may be true to some extent, but if you look at the German side of the coin, they actually achieved in 1940 what they set out to achieve in March 1918. The irony was that if it had happened in 1918, it would have meant a reasonable (for them) chance of peace, but in 1940 it actually made the situation worse as they had no planning in place for the event that they did win through to the coast.

dge1

I agree with much of the sentiment expressed.

In short the German army did not believe it had been defeated. what they did not grasp, or conveniently forgot, was that not all wars are fought on the battlefield. They were loosing on the most importantly side, civilian support, because of the factors mentioned - supplies, blockade, civilian morale.

Once the American forces had been all brought on line there would not have been much doubt about the fact they lost. The collapse in 1918, that few on either side really understood, set up all kinds of possibilities. The way it was handled by the Allies, particularly the French was one biggest pieces of fuel for the second World War.

Istvan

All of the sentiment seems to be in agreement, so I'd like to throw in a few points that shine a different light on the situation.

While it's true that Germany was faltering as a whole, there have been comments stating that the German army was itself collapsing, which I am unable to agree with. Dge1 mentioned that the German army did not believe itself defeated, and that's because the German army itself was not defeated in 1918. Naturally, an army does not exist in a vacuum of domestic factors, such as the economy, morale, etc. but I say let's not be so quick to suggest that the German army was falling apart due to these factors at this point in time.


Furthermore, there seems to be much sentiment that Britain and France were completely confident that victory was merely around the corner, and it was only at this point that they were truly switching into full-gear, while the Germans were on the verge of collapse. I do not doubt that the Allied economies were, for all their problems, in a better position and that the allies were progressing with technological innovations more rapidly than the Germans, after all it had been the British who invented the tank and the British and French together controlled 37~% of the world, whereas the big-bad-bully Germany - intent on conquering the world (oh, the irony) - was confined to its little section of Europe, cut off from whatever few colonies it did have. However, despite all of this, I do not believe that the situation was so white-and-black in the sense that the Allies could confidently predict their inevitable victory. I am unable to find the quote at this moment (I will need to dig out one of my history books) but the capitulation of Russia and the successful German summer offensive of 1918 both wrought great fear into the British leadership. Lloyd George is said to have (this is the quote I'm missing) stated something along the lines of 'the war is over, we've lost,' and in good political fashion began looking for someone to blame for the defeat.

So, could the Germans have won had the Americans not intervened? I don't know, but probably not. However, irrespective of what we think with the advantage of hindsight, at the time in 1918, the British and French politicians saw defeat at their doorstep, and as we know from Germany's case a political surrender is sufficient to end a war - a military surrender is not necessary. So perhaps the British and French politicians would have 'jumped-the-gun' and surrendered even while their armies firmly and decisively prevented a capture of Paris, if there wasn't hope of American intervention. It's a stretch, but who knows?

However, the original question involved the assumption that the Russian Revolution would never have broken out. In that case the late successful German push could never have materialised, as it came about from the large surge of manpower by pulling troops out of Russia. On the other hand, Russia's defeat, I believe, was imminent. It was only a matter of time before the Russian state surrendered, as the country was economically devastated and thousands of soldiers were abandoning their posts on a consistent basis. Had the Russian Revolution not broken out, or failed, I still believe that a surrender would have come from Russia, at least a short-lived surrender, during which time the Germans would have moved their forces westward, but at a later date. At that point in time it's possible that the German state may have already surrendered before the eastern forces could have been redeployed in the west in this delayed Russian-surrender scenario. This therefore would probably not have had a significant impact on WW1, but I believe it would have greatly impacted the world of the 1930s and '40s. Probably the most significant difference would have been that the Russian state would have capitalised on the opportunity to come off as a victor when German surrender was clear by denying their former surrender to Germany and Austria-Hungary and re-engaging in the war at the 11th hour. This isn't impossible, as Romanian declared war 3 days before the official surrendered of the Central Powers and it was deemed as a victor as a result, despite having surrendered years earlier, and so I imagine that the Russians would have been smart enough to do same and come out as victors even despite their earlier surrender. This phony re-engagement would have meant that Russia would have suffered no territorial losses in the peace negotiations of WW1 and would not have fallen out of the international order, thus remaining a key ally for Britain and France. Thus there would have been no reason for the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany to become best buddies, which paved the way for Germany's early success in WW2 to be possible.

I'm theory crafting with limited knowledge, but perhaps one could argue in this scenario a Second World War would have been prevented, or at least delayed and/or it would have taken on a different character. If Russia had remained a part of the international system and been rewarded after WW1 (perhaps with parts of Turkey to grant it warm water ports?), it probably would have played a bulwark to German expansionary goals, rather than as a willing aid. Since WW2 is in many ways a continuation of WW1, perhaps you could argue that Germany would have found itself in an in indefinite stalemate in the 1930s and 40s- unwilling to accept the situation it was in (Treaty of Versailles), but uncertain if it would be capable of changing its fate (No Russian resources, unable to circumvent Treaty of Versailles by manufacturing arms in Russia, unable to invade Slavic 'allies' of France, Britain and Russia without upsetting Russian interests, thus sparking conflict).

but if you look at the German side of the coin, they actually achieved in 1940 what they set out to achieve in March 1918. The irony was that if it had happened in 1918, it would have meant a reasonable (for them) chance of peace, but in 1940 it actually made the situation worse as they had no planning in place for the event that they did win through to the coast.

Didn't they? Maybe I am jumping to conclusions with this critique, but it seems to me that the quote assumes that the German focus was on the west to begin with and that the Germans had accomplished their ultimate goals, but did not know what to do with their victory. I think that's a mistake, as the war with France and Britain was something Hitler had preferred to avoid, or at least wasn't expecting in 1939, as France and Britain weren't his concerns. His goal wasn't to accomplish what the German army had failed to accomplish in 1918. Germany's ultimate goal had been to establish a powerful European Empire. Lebensraum, as you no doubt are familiar with was the priority here. Poland, the Ukraine, Russia - these were Germany's interests and thus targets. France and Britain merely brought themselves under fire by finally standing up for - or more accurately: finally pretending to stand up for - their allies in 1939. Germany's victory over the Allies did not leave the Germans uncertain with what they should now do. On the contrary, their victory over France and Britain now allowed Germany to continue what Germany had wanted to do in the first place: establish a powerful empire in Central and Eastern Europe, thus giving them the manpower and resources (the Ukraine alone has 33~% of the world's most valuable black soil) necessary to compete with France's, Britain's empires and America's empires (even if the US wasn't technically called an empire).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalplan_Ost

As you can see, the Generalplan Ost - the plan to colonise non-German Central and Eastern Europe - was already being prepared before France ever even capitulated, which implies that the Germans already had long-term plans in place, long before it achieved its former goal from 1918.

[Deleted User]

I'll disagree on a few points.

First, after the Spring offensives, everyone was sc****** the bottom of the barrel manpower wise, and what was left were either veterans, or boys. The exception being the US forces training in France. The Empire dominion forces weren't diluted down through top ups with children, as were the european nations, and largely accepted either understrength formations or combining units (which was largely resisted and caused a lot of ill will).

Largely, the German army in 1918 was beaten on the battlefield...because large numbers were starting to drift off through desertion, or simply units collapsing. The critical mistake that the allies made, due no doubt to public feeling and the manpower situation, was not to overrun the remnants of the german army, occupy germany, and insist on a 'no terms surrender'. The Australians at least tried to force this, and again at Versai attempted to force a situation that would cripple the German capacity to re-arm. We did manage to strip it of its' pacific possessions though.

WW2:

Keep in mind that the german leadership was operating largely in cellular isolation - there was very little co-ordination between government entities, and it was largely driven by centralisation of authority and decision making around Hitler. Hence, the BEF managed to withdraw to Britain, Germany tried to achieve air superiority with a tactical airforce (and failed), and on-the-hop planning was conducted for a potential invasion of Britain, as well as planning for campaigns elsewhere. The germans only had a few dozen Uboat to conduct strategic warfare, no naval forces sufficient to cover an invasion of UK, nor in fact, to even carry troops, and they didn't even realise the capability nor importance of the Brit radar system.

I'm not denying they didn't achieve, they did...but it was like a boxer who gets in a few good punches, but doesn't knock down his opponent, and isn't getting ahead on points.

Istvan

Keep in mind that the german leadership was operating largely in cellular isolation - there was very little co-ordination between government entities, and it was largely driven by centralisation of authority and decision making around Hitler. Hence, the BEF managed to withdraw to Britain, Germany tried to achieve air superiority with a tactical airforce (and failed), and on-the-hop planning was conducted for a potential invasion of Britain, as well as planning for campaigns elsewhere. The germans only had a few dozen Uboat to conduct strategic warfare, no naval forces sufficient to cover an invasion of UK, nor in fact, to even carry troops, and they didn't even realise the capability nor importance of the Brit radar system.

I'm not denying they didn't achieve, they did...but it was like a boxer who gets in a few good punches, but doesn't knock down his opponent, and isn't getting ahead on points.

Fair enough, it would be incorrect of me to say that Britain was defeated, as the Britain was not. Merely what I wanted to imply is that a large part of the reason why Germany did not focus everything on conquering Britain, or have fully fleshed out plans on how to deal with Britain, was because Britain was not the focus of Germany's attention. As mentioned eastward expansion had been the goal of the German state for sometime. The attempted Battle of Britain was simply a response to Britain having had gotten itself in the way of and stayed stubbornly in the way of Germany's more important designs. (That doesn't mean that I believe that Germany definitely would have defeated Britain without a doubt, had they focused on Britain... but who knows what Germany might have been capable of had it not spent the vast majority of its manpower and resources against the USSR.)

[Deleted User]

Totally agree with you.

I mentioned the lack of focussing on the Brit radar system in the Battle of Britain for a reason. It was only seriously threatened for a few days to a week, which wasn't enough time for the impact of the actual damage caused (or, more appropriately, operational neutralisation) to be assessed. The Brits eventually had to change their engagement tactics from lots of small standing and mobile air patrols to multi-squadron/wing formation controlled engagements (Douglas Bader's actual suggestion, among others)...those relied entirely on the radar sightings and tracking. If the radar sites were able to be neutralised, which was actually shown to be possible (at least to the Brits) then the Brit air defence plan was as good as rendered ineffective, with them having to rely on a system that was already faltering, and causing unacceptable losses.

The Brits knew the importance of airpower to protect their fleet so it could engage any invasion force - and in the restricted channel waters, that meant light forces of destroyer/light cruiser and smaller craft - which the germans could have coped with by the Luftwaffe. But it all relied on those radar stations being taken offline.

Clover

Someone has to give eventually, and as Germany correctly stated it had been shackled to a corps in 1916. Everyone was suffering from critical shortages, but the Allies in particular had been hit hard. Germany was locked up in the North Sea by the British Home-fleet, and Austria had been blocked in the Adriatic. The Ottomans didn't have enough of a fleet to break through the Horny of Africa, nor could it hope to push past Gilberte. The Entente had effectively stopped the Allies from trading with the outside, specifically the New World, while they themselves could trade for what they lacked with near impunity. Whats more is that the chief supplier, the USA, was not particularly fond of Germany, apart from the masses of German immigrants.

If Russia had not been knocked out by revolution, then Germany could not have shifted its Eastern forces to the West. If it couldn't do that then there isn't any hope for the Allies to win.

Istvan

Someone has to give eventually, and as Germany correctly stated it had been shackled to a corps in 1916.

Way off-topic, but I'd like to argue that it was a bit premature. While at the opening of the war Austria-Hungary performed hilariously poorly, from what I understand it was in large part because the Serbians and Russians had access to their battle plans, and thus could respond in highly effective and efficient manners to Austro-Hungarian maneuvers. This ceased being the case as the war continued, as Austro-Hungary ended up proving its worth as many times as it proved its incompetence.

If I'm not mistaken, the actual statement came from German commanders who were complaining about Austria-Hungary's performance, I'm guessing particularly in response to the Brusilov Offensive. The offensive was a disaster for Austria-Hungary not because of the that empire's inability to wage combat, but because it was the first time in the war that sophisticated tactics were being used against the inferior tactics that had been widespread up until that point. Indeed, Russia single-handedly invented the sophisticated tactics that the French, Germans and finally British would later use towards the end of the war on the western front with the use of storm troopers and brief but accurate artillery barrages to break a hole in the enemy lines and then exploit the hole to break the front. This caught the Austro-Hungarian army by surprise, and, unable to appropriately react, led to a massive loss of manpower, thus humiliating Austria-Hungary in Germany's eyes. Had Germany or France or Britain been in the same situation - facing unexpected superior tactics - I doubt they would have fared all that much better.

Therefore, considering Austria-Hungary's massive population, its organisational capabilities and its resources, it's rather inaccurate to accuse the empire of having been a corpse - an inanimate and worthless weight dragging the other down. That's not to say it had no unique problems; no doubt it did, as in terms of nation building and technology it was behind the western powers. While the British, French and Germans had a significant headstart in annihiliating minority languages via slow but steady assimilation through state construction, that obviously wasn't the case with Austria-Hungary. At the time of the French Revolution the majority of 'France' did not speak French, but by WW1, nearly 70% of France had been assimilated to speak French. I believe Britain was even more successful it eliminating the local Celtic languages, and aside from the Polish part of Germany, I assume much of Germany had some understanding of High German. This was hardly the case in Austria-Hungary, and so there were operational problems, as the predominately German and Hungarian commanders couldn't communicate with their Slavic and Latin soldiers. That was a problem, as was the inferior technology, but it did not prevent their operating entirely to be classified as a corpse. I don't see anyone going around calling Russia a corpse for having had large minorities in its army (and it was definitely anything but a corpse in WW2).

Of course, the argument can be made that it being a corpse doesn't refer to its military capabilities (or lack thereof), but rather that it was pretty much a dead empire. That would make sense from a modern perspective, as we are biased by our hindsight and knowledge of what was to come, however, the empire was not disintegrating in 1916, so that doesn't make much sense either. Even though I'm sure there is much period literature that points towards the idea that the empire was inevitably coming to an end at some point or another, the empire continued to act more-or-less as a coherent whole until towards the final months of the war, when it became starkly clear for the many minorities that the time was ripe to abandon their posts and rise up.